Dana Kimberly Devilla, Wayne Powell, as of the Estate of Dana Kimberly Devilla v. Sunny L. Schriver, Superintendant, Thomas a Coughlin, Iii, C.O. Lynch and Crowley, C.O.
Docket: 00-177
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 3, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Dana Kimberly D'Villa, an inmate at the Albion Correction Facility in New York, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several defendants, including Corrections Officer Jeffrey Lynch, for allegedly disclosing her HIV-positive status and transsexual identity. D'Villa claimed that this disclosure led to harassment and physical attacks by other inmates, violating her constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection, as well as the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. She also cited violations of New York's Correction Law and Public Health Law regarding inmate treatment and confidentiality.
During the trial, the district court dismissed claims against other defendants and narrowed the focus to whether Lynch violated D'Villa's privacy rights and whether Superintendent Sunny Schriber failed to adequately train Lynch. The jury found in favor of Lynch but against Schriber, awarding D'Villa $5,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Post-verdict, Schriber sought to overturn the verdict, claiming qualified immunity and inconsistencies with the verdict for Lynch. The district court ruled in Schriber's favor, stating the jury’s verdict against her was inconsistent with that for Lynch, and denied D'Villa's request for attorney's fees, deeming her not a prevailing party.
The district court issued an amended judgment favoring all defendants after previous rulings. D'Villa appealed, contesting the court's findings that the defendants had qualified immunity regarding her Eighth Amendment claim, the denial of her dismissal request for a juror, the granting of a motion by Schriber to set aside the verdict against her, and the denial of her application for costs and attorneys' fees. In reviewing the appeal, the court upheld the judgment favoring Schriber on D'Villa's privacy claim due to qualified immunity but rejected the district court’s conclusion regarding qualified immunity for the Eighth Amendment claim, leading to a vacatur of that judgment and remand for further proceedings. The court also vacated the denial of D'Villa's request for costs and fees, as the determination of her status as a prevailing party was not yet conclusive.
Upon remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for defendants Schriber and Lynch on the Eighth Amendment claim and denied D'Villa's request for attorney fees. The court emphasized the prior jury verdict on her privacy claim, stating that the jury's finding—either disbelieving Lynch's alleged statements or recognizing D'Villa's HIV-positive status and transsexual identity as publicly known—implied that the defendants could not have inflicted the serious injury necessary for an Eighth Amendment claim, which requires proof of "cruel and unusual" punishment. The district court further reasoned that D'Villa failed to present new evidence that would warrant a retrial and allowing a second trial could compromise judicial integrity.
D'Villa subsequently filed a notice of appeal against every aspect of the district court's judgment. The key issue on appeal involves whether the district court appropriately interpreted the jury's verdict regarding D'Villa’s privacy claims, which is critical for the resolution of her Eighth Amendment claim, necessitating an examination of both the preclusive effect of the jury's verdict and the factual implications it established.
The jury's verdict in the privacy trial does not serve as res judicata or collateral estoppel against D'Villa's Eighth Amendment rights claim. The prior ruling of qualified immunity by the district court barred D'Villa from presenting her Eighth Amendment claim to the jury, and the appellate court reversed this immunity in D'Villa's first appeal. Res judicata is not applicable since D'Villa was denied a full opportunity to litigate her claim. Similarly, the jury's verdict does not prevent her from asserting that Lynch made the alleged statements disclosing private information, as the earlier ruling on qualified immunity obstructed a complete appeal on the privacy verdict.
The only potential doctrine that could validate the district court’s reliance on the jury's verdict is the law of the case, which aims to maintain consistency in judicial decisions. However, this doctrine is discretionary and does not restrict the court's authority. The application of the law of the case to a jury verdict depends on the clarity of the verdict itself.
In granting summary judgment against D'Villa's Eighth Amendment claim, the district court interpreted the jury's verdict as indicating that Lynch either did not make the statements or that they were already publicly known. This interpretation overlooks the jury's verdict against Schriber, which was based on specific instructions linking her liability to Lynch’s alleged disclosure of D'Villa's private information. Consequently, the jury's verdict against Schriber implies that Lynch did indeed make the statements attributed to him, contradicting the district court's summary judgment ruling against D'Villa's Eighth Amendment claim. The inconsistencies in the jury's verdict further undermine the district court's conclusion.
The jury's verdicts in the Lynch and Schriber cases can be reconciled, suggesting that Lynch may have made the alleged statements disclosing secrets but lacked the intent to violate D'Villa's constitutional rights. The jury was instructed that a finding of negligence on the part of the defendants would necessitate a verdict in their favor. This implies that the favorable verdict for Lynch could indicate a lack of intent rather than a denial of making the statements or revealing secrets. Consequently, it remains possible that Schriber possessed the requisite intent for liability, or that Lynch had the necessary mental state for an Eighth Amendment claim.
The district court's summary judgment favoring Lynch and Schriber against D'Villa's Eighth Amendment claim was determined to be an abuse of discretion, leading to its vacatur and remand for further proceedings. Additionally, the court's denial of D'Villa's application for costs and attorneys' fees was vacated, as it was premature to determine her status as a prevailing party. Notably, D'Villa, who passed away during the proceedings, was represented by her executor, Reverend Wayne Powell. The document also corrects the misspelling of D'Villa's and Schriber's names in the official caption and clarifies that the jury's verdict on a state claim related to medical disclosure does not contradict D'Villa's Eighth Amendment claim, as it pertains specifically to her AIDS-HIV condition and not her transsexualism. The record suggests that D'Villa's HIV condition was known due to her medical treatment, while her transsexualism was not publicly disclosed until after her lawsuit was filed.
