Alton Coleman v. Betty Mitchell, Warden

Citations: 244 F.3d 533; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4549; 2001 WL 285809Docket: 98-3546

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; March 26, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Alton Coleman, convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Ohio, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He raises three main issues: 1) a procedural default on 34 out of 50 claims; 2) violations of due process rights due to prosecutorial misconduct and the introduction of "other acts" evidence; and 3) ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing due to inadequate investigation of his background and mental health for mitigation purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the district court's judgment.

The case stems from an incident on July 13, 1984, when Coleman and his girlfriend, Debra D. Brown, attacked Harry and Marlene Walters in their home after expressing interest in a camping trailer. Coleman struck Mr. Walters with a candlestick, and the couple was later found dead or severely injured. Evidence indicated that Mrs. Walters had been brutally beaten, and valuable items were stolen from the home. Coleman’s fingerprints were found at the scene, and he was implicated in multiple violent crimes across several states during that summer. Following an indictment on multiple charges, an Ohio jury found him guilty on all counts, leading to his death sentence, which was upheld by both the Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court, with the U.S. Supreme Court denying further review.

Coleman petitioned for post-conviction relief under Ohio law, which the trial court denied without an evidentiary hearing, adopting the state's findings. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Coleman's subsequent appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Coleman later filed an Application for Delayed Reconsideration, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, but this was denied for not showing good cause for the late filing. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently denied his request for reconsideration and lifted a stay of execution on his death sentence.

On January 6, 1995, Coleman filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court with 50 claims. The district court found 34 claims procedurally barred due to Coleman's failure to raise them on direct appeal and deemed the remaining claims without merit. The district court consolidated Coleman's habeas cases related to multiple convictions, but ultimately denied relief concerning the murder of Mrs. Walters. Coleman appealed this decision, which was severed to focus solely on the capital case.

Since Coleman's habeas petition was filed before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the pre-AEDPA standard of review applies. The court is required to review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, deferring to state court factual findings unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The district court determined that Coleman had procedurally defaulted on 34 claims due to Ohio's res judicata doctrine, which bars claims that could have been raised in prior proceedings. Coleman argues that his procedural default should be excused due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, but he must exhaust state remedies before seeking federal relief and cannot bypass state procedural rules.

To assess whether a state petitioner's claim is barred from habeas review due to procedural default, the court evaluates four factors: (1) identification of an applicable state procedural rule that the petitioner failed to follow; (2) confirmation that the state rule is "firmly established and regularly followed"; (3) assurance that the rule is an "adequate and independent" ground for barring federal review. If these conditions are met, the petitioner must demonstrate "cause" for the default and "prejudice" resulting from it, or that enforcing the default would lead to a "miscarriage of justice." A state procedural bar will only preclude federal habeas review if the last reasoned state court decision explicitly cites the procedural rule as the basis for barring the claims.

In the case of Coleman, the Supreme Court established that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can also be subject to procedural default. Coleman has defaulted his claim regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he did not present it timely under Ohio law. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected his claim in a delayed reconsideration application as untimely. Coleman contends he initially raised the claim in a post-conviction relief petition instead of a reconsideration application, arguing a lack of a clear procedural avenue for such claims in Ohio courts.

Subsequent to Coleman's direct appeals, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Murnahan clarified that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims must be pursued in a delayed motion for reconsideration. Coleman delayed 16 months after the Murnahan ruling to file his motion, which the Court of Appeals dismissed for being outside the 90-day filing requirement and for failing to show good cause for the delay.

On July 1, 1993, Ohio App. R. 26(B) was amended to allow defendants to apply for reopening appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, with applications due within ninety days of the appellate judgment, unless good cause for a late filing is shown. Coleman filed his application before the amendment took effect, but the amendment applies to ongoing cases unless its application would cause injustice, which Coleman did not demonstrate. He argued that the ninety-day deadline should have been tolled while his post-conviction relief petition was pending, asserting that there was no established rule for raising ineffective assistance claims in 1986. The court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Murnahan, it was established in Coleman's appellate district that such claims must be raised in a delayed motion for reconsideration rather than in post-conviction proceedings. Coleman failed to explain why he did not timely file a Murnahan motion after the decision, and without showing cause for his procedural default, a federal court cannot consider the merits of his habeas claim unless it would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman did not demonstrate such a miscarriage. Even if he had a valid excuse, his ineffective assistance claim was deemed meritless, as the standard requires showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, as outlined in Strickland v. Washington.

Coleman's appellate counsel raised 15 assignments of error in the Ohio First Appellate District and 11 in the Ohio Supreme Court. The court agrees with the district court that counsel was not deficient for not pursuing an additional 60 claims, as attorneys have the discretion to omit nonfrivolous points based on professional judgment, supported by *Jones v. Barnes*. Coleman's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is procedurally defaulted, lacking "cause and prejudice" to excuse this default.

Coleman alleges due process violations due to prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that the prosecution failed to disclose various items, including an FBI interview and exculpatory evidence. The court concurs with the district court that Coleman defaulted on his claim regarding psychological evaluations because it was not raised on direct appeal. According to *Brady v. Maryland*, nondisclosure of favorable evidence violates due process only if it is material to guilt or punishment. The court finds that even if the evidence had been disclosed, it would not have changed the outcome due to the overwhelming evidence against Coleman, thus no Brady violation occurred.

Additionally, Coleman contends he was denied due process by the introduction of "other acts" evidence, including unrelated murders. Such evidence is permissible under Ohio law when it is relevant to motive, intent, or the defendant's scheme, as outlined in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2945.59 and Ohio Evid. R. 404(B).

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2945.59 and Ohio Evid. R. 404(B) establish that evidence of other crimes or acts is inadmissible to prove a person's character to show conformity but may be admitted for purposes such as motive, intent, or identity. Coleman argued that evidence linking him to other murders was irrelevant and violated his due process rights, as it did not relate to the crime against Mrs. Walters. In contrast, the respondent maintained that the evidence was admissible due to its similarity to the Walters case, highlighting common factors such as targeting elderly couples, using deception, and employing similar methods of incapacitation and theft. The respondent suggested that this evidence demonstrated a consistent modus operandi, or "signature," indicative of Coleman’s identity as the perpetrator. The court noted that, in the context of a habeas corpus appeal, it would not address state law errors unless they resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. The trial court justified the evidence's admission by emphasizing the consistent method of operation in Coleman’s other offenses, particularly against elderly, defenseless victims. Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court's assessment that the "other acts" evidence was relevant and did not violate Coleman's due process rights, affirming that its admission was not fundamentally unfair.

Coleman argues that the district court incorrectly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing to reassess factual issues previously determined by state courts, claiming he was not given the chance to fully develop his federal constitutional claims. In habeas proceedings, state court factual findings hold a presumption of correctness, which Coleman must rebut with clear and convincing evidence. The record indicates Coleman had a fair opportunity to litigate his claims in Ohio courts but failed to do so, resulting in no violation of his due process rights regarding the evidentiary hearing. 

Coleman also challenges Ohio's capital punishment system, asserting that the district court properly dismissed his claims as either procedurally defaulted or lacking merit. Additionally, Coleman contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel during sentencing under the Sixth Amendment, alleging his attorneys did not adequately investigate mitigating factors, particularly concerning his mental health. Although there are doubts about whether this claim was appropriately raised on direct appeal, the respondent agreed to consider it. Coleman identifies four specific errors by his counsel: 1) not demanding a competency hearing related to his waiver of mitigation evidence; 2) failing to obtain necessary expert reports for the mitigation phase; 3) neglecting to challenge the constitutional validity of his waiver; and 4) not requesting the appointment of a mitigation specialist or psychologist. 

To establish ineffective assistance, Coleman must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficiencies prejudiced his defense, per the Strickland test, which evaluates the reliability of the trial outcome.

The "prejudice" prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to demonstrate that counsel's errors had a significant impact on the trial's outcome, beyond merely showing a conceivable effect. A reasonable probability must be established that, absent the errors, the result would have differed, sufficient to undermine confidence in that outcome. The concept of "residual doubt," which was chosen as a strategy by Coleman's counsel at his instruction, reflects uncertainty about guilt but is not a valid factor in death penalty sentencing because it does not pertain to the crime's nature or the offender's character. The Ohio Supreme Court emphasizes that residual doubt undermines the jury's verdict and is irrelevant under R.C. 2929.04(B) when considering death sentences.

Under Ohio law, a capital defendant must present mitigating evidence to counterbalance aggravating circumstances; otherwise, the jury is likely to recommend a death sentence. The case law, including Mapes v. Coyle, indicates that failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. However, this case differs because Coleman directed his counsel to pursue the residual doubt strategy rather than introduce mitigating evidence about his mental history. He now claims ineffective assistance for following his own instructions, arguing that his counsel should have recognized his inability to choose a proper sentencing strategy.

A criminal defendant must be competent to stand trial, defined as having the ability to consult with counsel and a rational understanding of the proceedings (Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)). The same competence standard applies when a defendant waives counsel (Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399). In this case, the standard is used to evaluate whether Coleman was competent to guide his counsel on sentencing strategy. Coleman's active participation in the trial, including addressing the jury and presenting motions, indicates he had a rational understanding of the proceedings and the implications of using a residual doubt theory at sentencing.

Recent court decisions have highlighted that failure to present mitigating evidence could indicate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; however, counsel may also reasonably decide against further investigation based on the defendant's input (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Coleman acknowledged that he limited his counsel's investigation and refused additional psychological testing. His counsel followed Coleman's direction to pursue the residual doubt theory, which Coleman explicitly endorsed. Thus, the attorney's actions were not deficient for adhering to the client's wishes. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Coleman was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during sentencing.