United States v. Marissa Giselle Massey

Citations: 443 F.3d 814; 2006 WL 723449Docket: 05-11514

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 23, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

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Marissa Giselle Massey appeals her 87-month sentence following her guilty plea to conspiracy to import over 100 grams of heroin and assault on a federal officer. She contends that the district court incorrectly enhanced her sentence by 2 levels for obstructing justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, arguing she lacked the capacity to willfully obstruct justice and that her actions did not materially hinder the investigation. The appellate court found no reversible error regarding the sentencing enhancement and affirmed the sentence, while also vacating and remanding the case to correct a clerical error in the judgment.

On October 9, 2004, Massey and two co-defendants arrived at Miami International Airport from Ecuador, where they were suspected of drug trafficking. After consenting to x-rays, it was revealed they had foreign objects in their pelvic regions. While at Jackson Memorial Hospital, Massey exhibited aggressive behavior, refused medical treatment, and attempted to obstruct the officers. She managed to hide two foreign objects in her pillow and resisted being restrained. After spitting on an officer and threatening violence, she later admitted to having a foreign object inside her. Following a medical emergency, the object was removed and tested positive for heroin. Ultimately, Massey was found to have concealed 147.3 grams of heroin, part of a total of 549.1 grams seized from all three defendants. She pled guilty to conspiracy to import heroin and assaulting a federal officer as part of a plea agreement.

Massey took Zoloft for her bipolar disorder and claimed she did not fully recall events during her hospital stay due to lack of medication and heroin intoxication. Her defense suggested this could mitigate her sentence, which the government acknowledged. The presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that all defendants were equally liable for 549.1 grams of heroin, warranting a base offense level of 28 under the Sentencing Guidelines for importation of heroin. After a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, Massey’s offense level adjusted to 30, with Count Nine set at 13. Her total adjusted offense level was decreased to 27 after a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, leading to a sentencing range of 87 to 108 months. Massey contested the 2-level enhancement, arguing her mental state and the circumstances made her actions not willful or materially obstructive. Despite her attorney emphasizing her unstable condition during sentencing, the district judge upheld the enhancement and sentenced her to 87 months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release. Massey raised two objections on appeal regarding the obstruction enhancement: that her actions were not willful and did not materially hinder the investigation. The appellate standards of review involve assessing factual findings for clear error and applying the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. Errors not raised in the district court are reviewed for plain error, requiring proof of significant impact on judicial proceedings.

Massey contends that her inability to willfully obstruct justice was due to the absence of Zoloft and the ingestion of heroin. The government counters that Massey did not raise the 'willful' aspect of U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 in her Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) or during the sentencing hearing, thus failing to preserve the issue for appeal, which should be reviewed under the plain error standard. A defendant must clearly articulate objections to preserve them for appeal. Although Massey’s attorney discussed her mental state and referenced the effects of drugs, the objection lacked specific terms like 'intent' or 'mens rea' and instead focused on 'material hindrance,' which is a different legal theory.

Despite this, the court found that the issue of Massey’s mental state was adequately presented. The review determined that Massey acted willfully to obstruct justice as defined under § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which requires conscious action aimed at obstructing justice. The facts indicate that Massey intentionally concealed heroin inside her body and attempted to hide additional objects while lucid and deliberate during her hospital stay. Her violent outbursts did not negate her conscious efforts to obstruct. Additionally, she did not provide scientific evidence to support her claims about the effects of drug absence on her mental state. Therefore, the court concluded there was no clear error in finding her actions to be willful under the guidelines.

Massey contends that her actions did not constitute a 'material hindrance' to the investigation or prosecution of the offense. She presents two main arguments: first, that the recovery of the drugs was inevitable because she could not leave the hospital without their extraction, making her concealment efforts futile; and second, that the government had already obtained sufficient information about the objects from x-rays and other evidence before their extraction. Massey asserts that these points warrant a clear error review due to their inclusion in her objection to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) and at sentencing.

Regarding her first argument, Massey cites Application Note 4(d) to Sentencing Guidelines 3C1.1, which stipulates that conduct must result in 'actual hindrance' to justify an obstruction adjustment, particularly when the conduct occurs at the time of arrest. She acknowledges that her arrest happened before her hospital transfer, indicating that her concealment efforts were not contemporaneous with her arrest. Therefore, only the aspect of the note concerning the destruction or concealment of evidence applies. She distinguishes this from the precedent set in United States v. Shriver, which pertains to false statements and not physical concealment of evidence.

Under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, the standard for materiality is relatively low, meaning that any evidence that could influence the outcome of the investigation suffices for consideration as material. Consequently, Massey's arguments do not hold under clear error review, as the timing of her actions does not align with the eligibility for obstruction adjustments.

Massey’s concealment of heroin is material to her prosecution, as illegal drugs are inherently significant in drug investigations. Despite her unsuccessful attempt to hide evidence, the relevance of this action remains, unless the government was already aware of the evidence's content prior to her concealment. Massey references United States v. Savard to support her argument that the obstruction enhancement should not apply, as in that case, the authorities already possessed the relevant information. However, unlike Savard, the government in Massey's case did not know all details regarding the hidden heroin. The weight of the drugs, including the 147.3 grams from Massey, was crucial for accurately calculating her sentence under the advisory Guidelines, which categorized her offense based on the total weight of heroin involved. The Guidelines specify different base offense levels for heroin compared to other drugs, making the specific weight of heroin critical for sentencing. At the time of her concealment, the government had no definitive knowledge of the drug type or weight, which could have influenced Massey's potential defenses. 

Additionally, a clerical error was identified in the judgment, listing the assault on a federal officer as Count 2 instead of Count 9, which necessitated correction. The court affirmed Massey’s sentence regarding the obstruction enhancement but vacated and remanded the case solely to rectify the clerical mistake.