United States v. Jose Oscar Calderon, Also Known as Jose Calderone, Also Known as Jose O. Calderon-Guzman, Also Known as Ramon A. Alis, Also Known as Ramon Alise, Also Known as Ramon Alix-Difo, Also Known as Ramon Difo, Also Known as Ramon Gonzalez-Castillo

Citations: 243 F.3d 587; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2971Docket: 2000

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; February 28, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Jose Oscar Calderon appeals a judgment from the Southern District of New York regarding his guilty plea for illegal reentry into the United States, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Calderon contests the venue, asserting that he was "found" in Arizona when detected illegally entering the U.S. and subsequently released on bail under a false identity, thus making Arizona the proper venue for prosecution. The court ruled that Calderon waived his venue objection by entering a guilty plea and chose not to address the merits of his claim.

Calderon's criminal history includes a 1991 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, leading to his deportation to the Dominican Republic in 1993. After illegally crossing the border in Arizona in 1994 and providing false information, he was released but later fled. In 1997, he was arrested in New York for conspiracy to possess a controlled substance, during which he admitted to illegally reentering the U.S.

In his pre-trial motions, Calderon argued that:
1. A defendant is "found" when the INS becomes aware of their presence and has knowledge of prior deportations.
2. The crime of illegal reentry is complete at the location where the defendant is found, not ongoing.
3. He was "found" in Arizona based on his arrest there, despite his use of a false identity.

Calderon contended that the INS should have recognized him from his fingerprints taken during both his deportation and Arizona arrest. The government maintained that Calderon was "found" in New York when he disclosed his true identity to an INS agent.

The district court denied Calderon's motion related to his identity concealment, ruling that fingerprint matching did not equate to constructive knowledge of his concealed identity. Calderon pled guilty to illegal reentry, with his attorney confirming no valid defenses were available. During the plea allocution, the court acknowledged a previous motion regarding venue, which the judge addressed but ultimately accepted Calderon’s plea without further venue discussion.

On appeal, Calderon argued that the Southern District of New York was an improper venue since he was found in Arizona, that his plea lacked a factual basis, and that it was unknowing due to an inadequate waiver of his venue defense. The court concluded that the plea was valid, knowing, and supported by an adequate factual basis, thereby waiving any venue objections. 

The court highlighted that a valid plea must be knowing and supported by facts, clarifying that understanding the charge's elements suffices without needing exhaustive knowledge of defenses. Despite Calderon's claims, the record indicated he was aware of the venue defense, which had been previously rejected. The court also noted that the factual basis for the plea was established through the allocution and the rejected pre-trial motion, affirming that a court can rely on all available facts when assessing a plea's validity.

Ultimately, Calderon's venue objection was deemed waived due to the valid plea, with the court stating that only jurisdictional challenges remain unwaived, which Calderon argued was preserved due to jurisdictional implications.

Venue is not a jurisdictional issue in federal courts but rather a matter of convenience for litigants. The authority of federal courts to adjudicate is granted by Congress and cannot be conferred by litigants. While the location of a lawsuit is defined by law, it is subject to the convenience of the parties involved. This principle is historically recognized in federal courts, as seen in various cases, including Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs.

In the criminal context, the non-jurisdictional nature of venue is supported by multiple authorities outside the circuit, affirming that a defendant's venue rights, as protected by the Constitution and Rule 18, are waivable personal privileges. A defendant waives these rights by pleading guilty, as established in cases such as United States v. Brown and United States v. Walden. Improper venue does not constitute a jurisdictional defect, as indicated in Yeloushan v. United States.

The Constitution guarantees defendants the right to trial in the district where the crime occurred, but this right can be waived. Supporting this, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), (b) allows for case transfers or dismissals without impairing the court's jurisdiction if there is no timely objection to venue. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 permits defendants to waive venue in writing, reinforcing that venue is not a jurisdictional limitation.

In conclusion, the court determined that Calderon's objection to venue was waived by his guilty plea, leading to the affirmation of his conviction.