United States v. David Paul Hammer

Citations: 239 F.3d 302; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 564; 2001 WL 92168Docket: 98-9011

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; January 4, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of United States v. David Paul Hammer, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a petition for rehearing filed by Hammer regarding his decision to waive appeals after being sentenced to death. The petition was denied as no judges who concurred in the initial decision requested rehearing, and a majority of active circuit judges did not support an en banc review. Judge Nygaard, however, expressed a dissenting opinion, advocating for en banc consideration due to significant unresolved issues in the case.

Nygaard criticized the panel's reliance on Hammer's purportedly unequivocal request to dismiss his appeal, arguing that Hammer's statements indicated confusion rather than clarity. Throughout the proceedings, Hammer exhibited inconsistent intentions, alternating between pursuing an insanity defense, pleading guilty, and expressing a desire for execution while simultaneously filing and withdrawing appeals. The panel noted Hammer's "vacillation" but concluded that his initial intent to waive appeal after sentencing should be upheld as his true desire.

Nygaard contended that the panel's interpretation overlooked the complexity of Hammer's mental state and the implications for death penalty jurisprudence, suggesting that a deeper examination of these issues was warranted.

The panel noted Hammer's inconsistent stance regarding his appeal, emphasizing that he had changed his position multiple times, including stating he would not seek to revisit the appeal if dismissed. Despite this assurance, Hammer later filed for executive clemency and sought to reinstate his appeal, undermining the panel's decision to proceed with his execution without a thorough review. The panel's reliance on Hammer's statements at a specific moment is criticized as unreasonable, given his history of indecision and the need for a comprehensive assessment of his intentions. The excerpt argues for the establishment of a meaningful standard to evaluate waiver requests in capital cases, highlighting the risk that some defendants may genuinely wish to waive appeals while others, potentially wrongfully convicted, might not have the clarity needed for such a decision. A competency evaluation found Hammer competent; however, this alone is insufficient to affirm his irrevocable choice to forgo appeal. The author advocates for a requirement of consistent expression of intent to waive appeals over time and suggests that all capital cases should undergo full review regardless of waiver motions.

Justice Marshall expressed strong disagreement with Chief Justice Burger's assertion that Gilmore had competently chosen to waive his right to appeal and accept execution. Marshall argued that the short period since the crime (less than five months) and the sentence (just over two months) was insufficient for meaningful consideration of such a grave decision. He highlighted Gilmore's erratic behavior as evidence of a lack of deliberation. In the case of Hammer, who expressed uncertainty about his waiver of appellate review, Marshall contended that the court should view such a waiver with skepticism. He criticized the panel for holding Hammer to his initial intent shortly after sentencing, despite his evident confusion.

Marshall further noted that Hammer's admission of murdering his cellmate to achieve a capital sentence inverted the rationale for the death penalty, turning it into an incentive instead of a deterrent. He referred to this scenario as the "Hammer dilemma," illustrating the flawed logic behind retributive justice. Despite Kant's argument for capital punishment as a means to honor an offender's autonomy, Marshall suggested that Hammer manipulated the system to advance his self-interest, undermining the moral rationale for execution. He questioned the meaningfulness of Hammer's acceptance of punishment, arguing that it lacked genuine acknowledgment of moral responsibility or remorse.

Moreover, Marshall criticized the panel's conclusion that Hammer was not using the state to facilitate his suicide, pointing out contradictions in Hammer's statements about preferring death over his prison existence. He asserted that Hammer's actions, including the murder and waiver of appeals, seemed to reflect a calculated effort to end his life, thus presenting significant challenges to the justification of the death penalty in this case.

Hammer's assertion of autonomy in seeking death parallels the arguments of those advocating for assisted suicide, revealing a fundamentally suicidal intent. He portrays death as liberation, implicating the court in his death wish, which raises ethical concerns about state-assisted suicide. This phenomenon echoes past cases, such as that of Gary Gilmore, who actively sought execution, thus manipulating the judicial system to fulfill his desire for death. Gilmore's actions transformed his executioners into enablers of his self-chosen fate, highlighting a deep conflict within the justice system regarding the nature of punishment and the rights of the accused.

The decision to allow Hammer to waive his right to appeal undermines the humanitarian principles that should govern the criminal justice system and contradicts Supreme Court precedents that stress the necessity of meaningful appellate review to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The unique severity and finality of death as punishment demand heightened scrutiny, ensuring that decisions appear rational rather than emotionally driven.

Additionally, the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3595 regarding the appellate review of death sentences is contested. The statute implies that a death sentence is subject to appellate review if the defendant chooses to appeal; however, an alternative interpretation suggests that all capital sentences should be automatically reviewed. This ambiguity necessitates clarity to uphold the integrity of the judicial process in capital cases.

The phrase "upon appeal" implies an expectation that death sentences will be appealed, challenging the panel's interpretation that Congress did not intend for mandatory review of death penalty proceedings. The panel's assertion that Congress could have explicitly stated the non-mandatory nature of appellate review in capital cases is countered by the presumption that capital offenders will seek such review. The panel acknowledges its discretion in granting or denying Hammer's motion to dismiss his appeal but concludes that the interests of justice do not necessitate a compelled appeal or a merits review of the district court proceedings. Citing Hammer's confession and his belief in a fair trial, the panel decides to grant the motion to dismiss and remands the case for scheduling the implementation of the death sentence. However, the panel's conclusion about the interests of justice is criticized as inadequate, leaving significant questions unanswered. A call for an en banc rehearing is suggested to address these critical issues.