United States v. Shi Yan Liu, A/K/A Simon Liu, Jie Hu and Shao Zhen Lin

Citations: 239 F.3d 138; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33747Docket: 2000

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 27, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendants Jie Hu and Shao Zhen Lin appealed their convictions for conspiracy to file fraudulent political asylum applications and for preparing and filing such applications. The convictions stemmed from their work at a New York immigration assistance agency, where they were implicated in submitting a fictitious asylum application on behalf of a government informant. 

The appeal followed the denial of their motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search authorized by a warrant issued by Magistrate Judge Theodore H. Katz. The defendants argued that the warrant lacked particularity and that the search conducted by INS agents was in "flagrant disregard" of the warrant's terms. The court found the warrant adequately specific, allowing for the seizure of documents related to fraudulent asylum claims, and rejected claims of improper conduct during the search, affirming the lower court's decision. The appeal was decided on December 27, 2000, with no persuasive arguments found in favor of the defendants.

Government agents may require wholesale suppression of evidence if they (1) engage in a widespread seizure of items beyond the warrant's scope and (2) do not act in good faith. Relevant case law indicates that complete suppression is not warranted when agents attempt to remain within the warrant's boundaries, even if practical considerations lead to extensive document seizures. The principle behind blanket suppression is rooted in a historical aversion to general searches, which violate fundamental rights and are condemned in state and federal law. The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause was designed to protect against such searches. A search that exceeds a warrant's bounds and lacks good faith is effectively akin to a general search, justifying suppression. In the case at hand, the appellants argue that government agents seized asylum application files without verifying the presence of fraudulent statements as required by the warrant, claiming that the judge erred by not granting their motion for wholesale suppression.

The INS agent supervising the search testified that he reviewed asylum application files for approximately 30 minutes, noting that nearly all files listed the same address, suggesting potential fraud. He ordered the seizure of all files in the cabinets, despite not having searched each individually. The court found that these actions did not constitute a general search but rather a systematic inventory aimed at items specified in the warrant, distinguishing it from 'indiscriminate rummaging' and 'exploratory' searches. Citing precedents, the court noted that agents did not exceed the terms of the warrant and that wholesale suppression of evidence is an extreme remedy not warranted in this case. Therefore, since the first criterion for finding a flagrant disregard of the warrant was not met, the court did not address whether the good faith of the agents should be assessed objectively or subjectively.

Appellants contended that the evidence did not sufficiently support the jury's conspiracy verdict, specifically arguing that it failed to demonstrate an agreement between Hu and Lin. However, the court determined that a rational juror could have concluded that such an agreement existed. Citing *Jackson v. Virginia*, the court emphasized that a verdict must be upheld if any rational juror could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence indicated that during a meeting on October 2, 1996, Hu proposed three fabricated persecution stories for Chau's asylum application, selecting one not for its truthfulness but for its potential to persuade INS officials. Hu directed Chau to sign a blank application to facilitate the submission of this fraudulent story.

Additionally, conversations between Lin and Chau suggested that Hu informed Lin of their agreement to file the fraudulent application together. Notably, on October 24, 1996, Lin, having received Chau's file, initially hesitated to process the application until Chau indicated that a prior advisor had suggested filing it in that manner.

Further, the appellants argued against the District Court's decision to issue a Pinkerton charge, which holds a conspirator liable for substantive crimes committed by co-conspirators if those crimes are foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy. The court noted that a Pinkerton charge is inappropriate when the jury must infer a conspiracy from unrelated criminal acts. In this case, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Hu and Lin conspired to submit a fraudulent application for Chau. The jury’s convictions were based on substantive counts directly linked to the fraudulent asylum applications, not a series of unrelated offenses. The District Court had properly instructed the jury that they could consider the Pinkerton theory only after establishing the existence of the conspiracy and the defendants' roles in it.

1. The warrant in question was deemed sufficiently particular.
2. INS agents did not significantly violate the warrant's terms, as the search conducted did not resemble a general search.
3. Evidence supported the jury's conclusion that a conspiratorial agreement existed between Hu and Lin.
4. The Pinkerton charge was correctly issued without error.
5. Other arguments presented by the appellants were found to lack merit.
6. The judgments of the District Court are affirmed. Additional notes reference subsequent indictments for fraudulent asylum applications and historical critiques of general warrants, establishing their relevance to the case. The analysis clarifies that a search must be assessed for good faith rather than merely its appearance as a general search.