Elisha D. Hack, Jeremy A. Hershman, Batsheva Greer, and Lisa B. Friedman v. The President and Fellows of Yale College D/B/A Yale Corporation and Yale University, Richard H. Brodhead, and Betty Trachtenberg, the Rutherford Institute, Amicus Curiae, the Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights, Movant
Docket: 1999
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 27, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves plaintiffs Elisha D. Hack, Jeremy A. Hershman, Batsheva Greer, and Lisa B. Friedman, who, as devout Orthodox Jews, challenge Yale University’s mandatory co-educational housing policy for unmarried freshmen and sophomores under 21, claiming it conflicts with their religious beliefs. They argue that Yale is a state actor, making its housing policy subject to scrutiny under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, they contend that Yale's housing requirement violates antitrust laws (Section 2 of the Sherman Act and tying arrangements under Section 1) and the Fair Housing Act (41 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). The district court dismissed their complaint, and the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, agreeing with the lower court's finding that Yale does not qualify as a state actor under the relevant legal standards. The court noted the complexity and inconsistency in defining state action, referencing multiple precedents, including American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan and Lebron v. National RR Passenger Corp. Judge Moran dissented in part.
Plaintiffs argue that Yale University functions as an agency of the State of Connecticut, referencing the significant historical and legal ties between Yale and the state. They highlight that Yale is chartered by special legislation confirmed by the Connecticut Constitution and serves public objectives, including the requirement to submit its budget to the Connecticut legislature. The presence of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor as ex officio members of Yale's governing board is also cited as evidence of Yale's governmental nature.
Referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, plaintiffs assert that a three-prong standard determines whether a corporation is considered a government entity: (1) creation by special law, (2) purpose aligned with governmental objectives, and (3) permanent government authority to appoint a majority of directors. The first two prongs are satisfied in this case; however, the third is contested, as only two of nineteen board members are state officials, suggesting insufficient control.
Plaintiffs contend this majority requirement is an overly simplistic interpretation of Lebron, arguing that the influence of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor should be considered more significant. The document counters this claim, emphasizing that the Supreme Court's interpretation clearly distinguishes between government and private entities, citing examples like Comsat, which was deemed a private corporation due to limited government control. The court concludes that Yale operates as a private entity and is not subject to state control or actions under color of law.
Plaintiffs sought discovery regarding the relationships between Yale and the Connecticut and New Haven governments, but the district court dismissed their complaint before discovery began. The court found that the allegations did not establish Yale as a state actor under the Lebron standard, even considering the potential involvement of state officials in Yale’s board meetings. The plaintiffs' argument that discovery might yield evidence for an alternative theory of state action was deemed speculative and insufficient, as they did not specify what that evidence might be.
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that Yale’s policy requiring freshmen and sophomores to live in dormitories constitutes an illegal monopolization of the New Haven student housing market, violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. However, the court noted that many institutions have similar housing policies without facing antitrust scrutiny. The plaintiffs were unclear about what constituted the relevant market, mentioning various housing categories but focusing on unmarried freshmen and sophomores. The court concluded that Yale does not monopolize housing as it does not control the broader housing market in New Haven, and the economic power from its housing policies affecting a specific consumer class does not support a monopolization claim.
Plaintiffs' antitrust claim against Yale, asserting coercion into accepting a tied product, fails under legal scrutiny. A tying arrangement, as defined in relevant case law, occurs when a seller conditions the sale of one product on the buyer also purchasing a different product. The essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement involves the seller exploiting control over the tying product to force the buyer into purchasing the tied product, which the buyer may not desire or could obtain elsewhere on better terms.
To establish a tying claim, five specific elements must be proven: 1) the existence of a tying and a tied product; 2) actual coercion by the seller; 3) sufficient economic power in the tying product market; 4) anticompetitive effects in the tied market; and 5) a significant amount of interstate commerce involved in the tied market.
Plaintiffs argue that their dormitory housing is tied to their Yale education (the tying product) and that Yale's economic power in the educational market coerces them into paying for housing. They claim a Yale degree is unique, providing unmatched access to its alumni network and exceptional value to employers, thereby establishing sufficient market power.
While uniqueness can support a tying claim, the district court found that the alleged product market—confined solely to a Yale education—is implausible for survival against a motion to dismiss. Courts typically do not recognize a single brand as a relevant market when substitutes exist, reinforcing that the plaintiffs' market definition lacks credibility.
Plaintiffs argue for the uniqueness of a Yale education, asserting that alternatives are inadequate. However, annual rankings indicate many institutions offer excellent education, and 92.5% of Yale's 1997-1998 freshman class were from outside Connecticut, suggesting that dissatisfaction with Yale’s housing rules could prompt students to seek other options. The antitrust implications of housing policies do not hinge on the uniqueness of certain universities. The case Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College is distinguished; there, plaintiffs faced a sudden policy change impacting their housing investment, which is not the situation at Yale, where housing policies were disclosed prior to application, and no lock-in costs existed.
Plaintiffs also assert that Yale's co-educational housing violates the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII), which prohibits discrimination based on religion in housing practices. The district court previously ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue these claims, a conclusion that is disputed. Under the Fair Housing Act, an 'aggrieved person' is defined as someone who claims injury from discriminatory housing practices, requiring only an allegation of injury that is traceable to the defendants’ actions. The Supreme Court has emphasized a broad interpretation of standing under the Fair Housing Act, indicating that courts should not impose additional barriers beyond constitutional limits.
In assessing the standing of student plaintiffs under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the court references Havens Realty and Leblanc-Sternberg, establishing that standing can arise from non-economic injuries. The plaintiffs assert a tangible economic injury due to the unavailability of housing options, thus demonstrating injury in fact and gaining standing to pursue their FHA claims. The court disagrees with the district court's ruling on standing and addresses Yale's argument that the students failed to state an FHA claim.
The plaintiffs do not allege any discriminatory intent from Yale, nor do they identify a facially discriminatory policy, or provide facts supporting a claim of disparate impact discrimination. The FHA aims to eliminate residential segregation and promote integrated living patterns, making it unlawful to deny housing based on religion or to impose discriminatory terms related to housing. However, it does not mandate that landlords provide accommodations based on an individual's religion.
To establish an FHA claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate either that Yale implemented a policy denying them housing based on discriminatory intent or that a neutral policy had a discriminatory impact on Orthodox Jews regarding housing availability or terms.
Judicial evaluation of the students' claims under disparate treatment or disparate impact theories requires a focus solely on the allegations in the complaint, assuming their truth and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Claims must be deemed sufficient unless it is clear that no set of facts could support a claim for relief, particularly in civil rights violations. The court cannot dismiss the complaint merely for relying on an incorrect legal theory if sufficient facts are alleged. However, plaintiffs must articulate the necessary facts for their claims.
The central issue is identifying the practice challenged by the students, which the dissent interprets as a neutral housing policy that effectively discriminates against Orthodox Jews. The plaintiffs suggest that Yale's lack of parietal rules has a discriminatory impact, yet their requests for relief indicate they do not seek the implementation of stricter rules. Instead, they seek a declaratory judgment that Yale's refusal to grant religious exemptions from on-campus housing requirements burdens their free exercise of religion, an injunction against enforcement of this policy for those unable to reside on campus due to religious convictions, and reimbursement for housing charges incurred under duress.
The FHA claim's factual basis includes a reference to prior allegations and outlines the law's provisions, but mainly asserts that by mandating co-educational housing contrary to the students' religious beliefs, Yale has discriminated against them in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Relevant allegations include that Yale permits exemptions for age or marital status but denies them for religious reasons, and that the students assert Orthodox Judaism prohibits them from living in situations where they could be exposed to members of the opposite sex undressed or dressed immodestly. Each plaintiff requested a waiver to live off-campus.
Plaintiffs allege that their counsel and third parties requested reasonable accommodations from Yale regarding their beliefs, but Yale denied these requests. They assert that Yale's requirement for freshmen to live on campus was expanded to sophomores due to a financial motive related to housing revenues. The plaintiffs argue that Yale's refusal to exempt them from housing they find immoral constitutes a violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). However, rather than seeking alternative housing that accommodates their beliefs, they request exclusion from on-campus housing entirely. The claims do not indicate animus toward Orthodox Jews nor any discriminatory exemptions granted to other groups. Since the plaintiffs' request for exclusion contradicts the FHA's purpose of promoting integration, their claims are not actionable under the FHA. The complaint lacks evidence of discriminatory intent, a discriminatory policy, or a disparate impact from Yale's facially neutral policy. The dissent references a prior case where discriminatory intent was evident, but the plaintiffs here do not provide similar evidence. Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded a claim under the FHA, affirming the district court's dismissal of their claims.
A prima facie case of racial discrimination requires demonstrating that the defendant's practice results in actual or predicted racial discrimination. To establish such a claim, plaintiffs must show a causal link between a neutral policy and the minority group's representation in the affected population. The students did not allege that Yale's policy led to under-representation of Orthodox Jews in its housing, resulting in the failure of their claim. The court emphasized that allegations crucial to a disparate impact claim cannot be inferred from the complaint, which is evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6). Additionally, the students' second theory of liability—that Yale discriminated against them by favoring secular reasons for exemptions over religious ones—was unsupported by specific allegations of a system of ad hoc exemptions. The identified exemptions, such as age and marital status, applied to all students, including Orthodox Jews. Even if the claim of widespread exemptions were assumed, it would not constitute a violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) since plaintiffs did not show intent to discriminate, a facially discriminatory policy, or evidence of disparate impact leading to housing denial. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the FHA claim and the state law claims due to lack of supplemental jurisdiction was affirmed. Additionally, the dissenting judge noted that Yale provided housing to plaintiffs on the same basis as other students.
Yale University requires students, especially freshmen and sophomores, to reside in its dormitories, with exceptions for married students, those over 21, and those who have completed their second year. Plaintiffs argue that this policy is primarily driven by Yale's need for revenue from student housing rather than educational necessity, as they are obligated to pay for rooms they are not required to occupy. They seek reimbursement for housing costs and a court order exempting them from this mandatory on-campus housing. Efforts to find alternative single-sex housing were unsuccessful, further underscoring their claims.
The plaintiffs allege that Yale’s housing policy, while facially neutral, disproportionately impacts Orthodox Jews by imposing additional financial burdens and making housing effectively unavailable. They argue that Yale has failed to adopt alternative housing policies that would fulfill educational goals without imposing such costs. The document acknowledges that, despite a complex legal landscape regarding disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the necessary elements of such a claim are present in this case.
Defendants incorrectly argue that a claim under the FHA requires proof of discriminatory intent. The text clarifies that discriminatory animus is not necessary for a disparate impact claim, as established in previous cases. The students' claims, supported by precedent, highlight that economic penalties faced by Orthodox Jews due to Yale's housing policy are sufficient to establish standing under the FHA, without the need for specific instances of housing application rejection or particular forms of relief. The allegations indicate that the conditions imposed by Yale render supposedly available housing effectively inaccessible to a protected group.
Remand for a merits decision on plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claims is warranted due to the lenient pleading standards under federal rules. The evaluation of claims utilizes a disparate impact framework, which aligns closely with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as established in Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington. This approach adopts a burden-shifting model from Title VII employment discrimination cases, where the effect of a policy can be sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The foundation of disparate impact analysis originates from the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which recognized that neutral practices could be discriminatory if they disproportionately impact certain racial groups without the need for intent. Griggs emphasized the need to eliminate unnecessary barriers to employment related to race, placing the burden on employers to demonstrate a clear relationship between job requirements and performance. However, subsequent Supreme Court rulings, particularly Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, shifted the focus by diminishing the relevance of intent and transferring the burden of persuasion to plaintiffs, while also easing the standards for employers to justify their practices as business necessities.
After extensive dialogue, lobbying, and negotiations, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166), aimed at strengthening Title VII protections against discrimination. The Act overturns several modifications from the Wards Cove decision, clarifying that disparate impact claims are separate from intentional discrimination claims, and reassigning the burden of proof. Under the new provisions, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant must prove that the challenged practice is "job related" and consistent with "business necessity." The Act seeks to reaffirm the standards of "business necessity" and "job related" as defined in earlier Supreme Court cases, notably Griggs v. Duke Power Co. However, scholars and courts differ on Congress's intentions, leading to conflicting interpretations regarding the status of Wards Cove post-enactment. This ambiguity has resulted in varying standards in subsequent court rulings, complicating the application of the Act, especially in cases that do not retroactively apply to claims before its passage. Additionally, while Title VII standards are generally accepted for Title VIII claims, adapting employment principles to housing contexts presents challenges.
"Job performance" is more closely aligned with employment qualifications than "tenant performance" is with rental criteria, highlighting a higher error cost in employment contexts. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) encompasses a diverse range of cases, necessitating a piecemeal approach to evolving legal precedents. This case introduces new facts that should be assessed under the developing Title VIII framework, allowing the plaintiffs' claims to advance toward discovery and resolution, despite potential lack of remedy.
Disparate impact claims under the FHA have evolved, initially recognized by the Eighth Circuit in 1974 based on equal protection precedents, although later invalidated authority. The Supreme Court's ruling in Arlington Heights confirmed the existence of such claims under Title VIII, where a housing developer and potential tenants challenged a city's zoning decision as discriminatory. The Court dismissed equal protection claims but remanded for consideration of disparate impact claims.
On remand, the Seventh Circuit established four evaluative factors for determining violations of FHA § 3604(a) based on discriminatory impact: 1) the strength of the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect, 2) any evidence of discriminatory intent, 3) the defendant's interests in the action, and 4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel housing provision or to restrain interference by property owners. Conversely, the Third Circuit determined that proof of discriminatory effect alone suffices to meet the prima facie burden for such claims.
The Rizzo court adapted the Griggs framework for disparate impact claims to the housing sector, establishing that a defendant can rebut a claim by demonstrating that the practice serves a legitimate interest and that no less discriminatory alternative exists. If the defendant provides this evidence, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that such alternatives are available. Various circuit courts have developed their own tests for disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), generally rejecting the Arlington Heights II approach which considered intent as part of the prima facie case. Instead, the consensus emerged that demonstrating discriminatory effect alone suffices for establishing a prima facie case. Notably, in Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, the court ruled that the prima facie case could be established by showing that the challenged practice results in racial discrimination, independent of intent. Once established, the defendant must then prove that their actions serve a legitimate governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives exist. Huntington also dismissed the Arlington Heights II factors from the prima facie case, asserting that their inclusion would undermine the effectiveness of Title VIII, instead allowing them to be considered in the ultimate merits determination. The district court must evaluate the justifications provided by the defendant against the discriminatory effects identified by the plaintiff.
Substantial interests in housing policy do not automatically outweigh significant disparate effects, as established by Title VIII. While adherence to the Title VII burden-shifting approach is important, the court must reconsider the balancing of interests in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991's codification of disparate impact analysis. A prima facie case of disparate impact housing discrimination requires evidence that a facially neutral practice disproportionately burdens a protected class. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged practice adversely affects members of the protected class regarding the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing, without needing to prove discriminatory intent. Additionally, plaintiffs are not required to address factors from Arlington Heights II in establishing their prima facie case. Often, parties may agree that a prima facie case has been met due to the clear adverse impact of housing practices. Not all policies causing disparate impacts are unlawful; a valid justification from the defendant may be sufficient to avoid liability once a prima facie case is established.
In cases of disparate impact under Title VII, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged employment practice is both "job related" for the position and consistent with "business necessity," as outlined in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are not explicitly defined in the statute but are derived from Supreme Court precedents, particularly Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The distinction between "consistent with" and "necessity" indicates a need for harmony rather than conflict, raising questions about Congress's intent regarding the required standard for justifying such practices.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 appears to restore pre-Wards Cove interpretations of "business necessity," requiring defendants to justify both the legitimacy of their business goals and the necessity of their means. Courts have interpreted this as requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the practice is "reasonably necessary" to achieve important business objectives. This obligation includes providing evidence of a "genuine business need" for the challenged practice. Overall, the interpretation aligns with the Act’s intent to ensure that business practices are necessary for legitimate goals while preventing discriminatory impacts.
A defendant can avoid liability for discriminatory housing practices if they demonstrate that the practice was necessary for achieving a significant business goal. However, the plaintiff must show that the defendant unreasonably rejected an alternative practice that could meet the same objective with less discriminatory effect. Relevant factors in this assessment include the costs and burdens associated with the alternative practice. If the proposed alternative would incur significant costs or disrupt operations, the defendant's refusal may be deemed reasonable. Conversely, if the alternative practice is comparably effective without imposing substantial new burdens, refusal to adopt it constitutes unlawful housing discrimination.
An alternative housing practice must be feasible, comparably effective, and not significantly more burdensome than the original practice. The legal framework acknowledges that proving intentional discrimination is unnecessary for a disparate impact claim; evidence of disparate impact alone suffices. The 1991 Act clarifies this distinction by omitting references to "pretext," reinforcing that disparate impact claims are separate from those alleging intentional discrimination. The Act allows for compensation for intentional discrimination but does not require proof of intent for disparate impact cases, rejecting prior notions that focused on pretextual discrimination.
A plaintiff can succeed in a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) if they demonstrate that a housing policy disproportionately burdens a protected group. The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must either show that the policy is essential for a legitimate business objective or that they unreasonably declined to adopt a feasible alternative that would achieve the same goal with minimal additional costs. In a related context, the allegations against Yale regarding refusal to accommodate religious obligations misinterpret the law, as the alternative practices requirement is distinct from the accommodation duty, which is less stringent. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 mandates reasonable accommodations for individuals with handicaps but does not extend this duty to religious beliefs. Conversely, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires accommodation of religious practices under Title VII, evidenced by its amendments clarifying the definition of religious discrimination.
The term 'religion' encompasses all religious observance, practice, and belief, requiring employers to accommodate employees' religious expressions unless they can show that such accommodation would impose undue hardship on their business operations. Employees may sue under Title VII for discrimination if their religious needs are not accommodated. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) lacks a definition for 'religion' and does not mandate reasonable accommodations for religious practices, as established in previous cases. The court emphasized that it cannot impose Title VII's accommodation requirements on the FHA, as doing so would overstep its authority and alter congressional intent. The lower court correctly ruled that the FHA does not obligate Yale to accommodate students' religious obligations. While plaintiffs may not explicitly seek accommodation, Yale could potentially adopt an exemption policy for students with similar religious needs, which may reduce the financial burden on Orthodox Jews who face additional housing costs. However, it is noted that Yale is not required to change its housing policies based solely on plaintiffs' requests. Dismissing a complaint before discovery is a serious action that should only occur when it is clear that no facts could support the plaintiffs' claims.
Caution against dismissing complaints is particularly critical in cases involving pro se plaintiffs or civil rights violations. In the case at hand, plaintiffs have standing to pursue Fair Housing Act (FHA) antidiscrimination claims concerning the alleged unavailability of student housing at Yale for Orthodox Jews. The dissenting opinion argues for remanding the case to the district court for discovery and further examination of the facts. Key inquiries should include whether Yale's housing policy has a discriminatory effect on Orthodox Jews, whether the mandatory on-campus policy is essential for Yale's objectives, and if alternatives exist that could meet educational and financial goals without imposing undue burdens. The excerpt also references various legal precedents indicating that a plaintiff's failure to cite the correct legal theory or statutory section does not necessarily justify dismissal, as long as the allegations support a viable legal claim. The district court must evaluate if the allegations could allow for relief under any applicable legal theory, emphasizing the flexibility in federal pleading standards.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio has diminished the effectiveness of federal civil rights protections against employment discrimination, prompting the need for legislative action to enhance these protections. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, specifically Sections 2(2) and (3), introduces a distinction between "intentional discrimination" and employment practices that are unlawful due to their disparate impact.
Section 102 of the Act amends the Civil Rights Act of 1964, establishing that a claim of disparate impact is valid if a complainant shows that a specific employment practice adversely affects individuals based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the employer fails to prove that the practice is job-related and necessary for the business. Additionally, it allows for analysis of a respondent's decision-making process as a single practice if separating elements for examination is impractical.
The Act stipulates that if an employer demonstrates a practice does not lead to disparate impact, they are not required to justify it as a business necessity. It also clarifies that a defense of business necessity cannot be used against claims of intentional discrimination. The interpretative memorandum from the Congressional Record is designated as the sole legislative history relevant to the Act in relation to Wards Cove, and the Act aims to codify concepts of "business necessity" and "job relatedness" as established in prior Supreme Court cases, notably Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio has diminished the effectiveness of federal civil rights protections, necessitating legislative action to enhance protections against employment discrimination. The 1991 Act was enacted to address recent Supreme Court rulings by broadening the scope of civil rights statutes to better protect discrimination victims. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(m), "demonstrates" is defined as meeting both the burdens of production and persuasion. While there is no legal requirement to update Fair Housing Act (FHA) standards in line with Title VII revisions, it is advisable to do so due to their identical statutory foundations, shared goals, efficiency in adaptation, and the clarity it provides for the rule of law. The Black Jack framework dictates that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the governmental defendant to prove that its actions serve a compelling governmental interest. This standard has been applied to both governmental and private defendants, requiring them to show that their actions are justified and less discriminatory alternatives do not exist.
The test for public defendants does not apply to private defendants, as clarified in Mahoney. Plaintiffs are not required to meet the prima facie standard established in Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc. Instead, Robinson's case allowed the plaintiff to demonstrate racial discrimination by establishing his race, application status, rejection, and availability of the housing, thus inferring discriminatory motivation. Similarly, in Soules v. U.S. Dept. of Housing, the court recognized that proof of discriminatory effect is sufficient to state a claim but focused on intentional discrimination. Recent Seventh Circuit cases, such as Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of Addison, have questioned whether the Arlington Heights II factors should be considered a prima facie hurdle, suggesting they are more appropriate for summary judgment or trial analysis. The courts have also expressed caution regarding the restructuring of employer practices in Title VII cases, emphasizing that courts may lack the expertise to mandate alternative hiring methods. Additionally, there is inconsistency among courts regarding the necessity of proving discriminatory intent versus demonstrating a discriminatory effect in landlord actions, leading to differing opinions on the application of these concepts. Under 42 U.S.C. 3602(h), "handicap" includes certain physical or mental impairments but excludes current illegal substance use. Landlords must allow reasonable modifications to premises, though they are not obligated to cover the costs.
