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United States v. Eric R. Meyer
Citations: 234 F.3d 319; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30452; 2000 WL 1770672Docket: 99-1919
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; December 4, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Eric R. Meyer was convicted of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance after a new trial following the reversal of his initial conviction due to an instructional error. In his appeal, Meyer claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a mistrial or a cautionary instruction after a witness referenced murder cases. He also contested the sufficiency of evidence for sentencing that linked him to a murder related to the drug conspiracy and argued that the sentencing court violated his due process rights by applying the murder guideline. The court affirmed the conviction, noting that Meyer was involved in a narcotics distribution conspiracy from 1991 to 1995, which included co-defendant Gordon Hoff and Hoff’s son, Gordon Hoff, Jr. (also known as "Rock"). Initially, Hoff supplied both Rock and Meyer with drugs, but over time, Rock began supplying Meyer directly. Meyer frequently obtained narcotics from Rock on credit and assisted in various drug-related activities. The court highlighted that during the conspiracy, Dennis Fenner, a source of marijuana for Hoff, was murdered, and while Hoff suspected Rock, investigators ultimately concluded that Meyer was responsible for Fenner's murder at Hoff's request. In a 1996 pre-trial evidentiary hearing, Rock testified about a 1994 plot by Hoff to kill Fenner, fearing exposure to law enforcement. Rock recounted that Hoff arranged a meeting at Rock's farm, asking him to drive Meyer, who carried a nine-millimeter Smith & Wesson handgun previously owned by Rock. Upon arriving, Rock and Meyer toured an abandoned house. While Rock stepped away, he heard gunshots and returned to find Fenner's body, with Meyer holding the gun and Hoff congratulating him. Rock assisted in burning Fenner's body and disposing of the ashes, later accompanying Hoff and Meyer in Rock's vehicle. Hoff also killed Fenner’s dog to eliminate suspicion. At Meyer's sentencing in December 1996, Rock reiterated details of Fenner's murder, revealing Hoff had rewarded Meyer with a motorcycle for the act. Rock's credibility was questionable; he acknowledged his involvement in disposing of Fenner's body, admitted to murdering Kirk Larson, and was serving a twenty-year sentence for that crime. Rock claimed his motive for killing Larson was personal jealousy, although his father suggested it was to protect his drug dealings, which would have resulted in a harsher sentence. Rock's former girlfriend denied having an affair with Larson, and he admitted to owning books on murder and body disposal. Additionally, he had previously threatened to kill someone with a gun at the site of Fenner’s murder. Judge Crabb characterized Rock as "a seriously disturbed, violent young man," while Hoff dismissed Rock's account as a "total lie." Carole Tenney Hoff, who lived with Rock in April 1994 but was not yet married to him, testified at an evidentiary hearing and at Meyer's sentencing hearings. She recalled Hoff telling his son that Fenner, who had been speaking to the police, could not be trusted, shortly before Fenner's disappearance. Tenney heard Hoff and Meyer speaking loudly the night before Fenner vanished, claiming they wouldn't have to worry about Fenner anymore. The next morning, she discovered Rock was missing and saw Hoff, Rock, and Meyer together in a vehicle. When she asked Rock if Meyer had shot Fenner, he seemed surprised and claimed ignorance. Tenney's testimony had inconsistencies: she speculated Hoff or Meyer made the threatening remark, though it could have been Rock; her account of seeing the three men together conflicted with Rock's description; she could not explain her question to Rock about Meyer's involvement; and she acknowledged never having seen Meyer with a firearm, although she had seen Rock with one. Additionally, Tenney admitted to previously lying to the police to protect herself and Rock and had falsely notarized a quitclaim deed for Hoff after Fenner's murder. FBI Agent Charles Southworth later confirmed Tenney had lied on several occasions and altered her statements after being warned of potential prosecution. Chance Gaines, who was incarcerated with Meyer, testified that Meyer confessed to his involvement in Fenner's murder and was called to testify at Meyer's second trial and subsequent sentencing hearing. Gaines' trial testimony was restricted to Meyer's involvement in a narcotics conspiracy, with explicit instructions not to mention Fenner's murder. Despite this, Gaines referenced "murder cases" during direct examination, claiming Meyer intended to have conspiracy and murder charges dismissed, implicating Rock as the actual perpetrator. On cross-examination, Gaines revealed he was unaware that the prosecutor, Mr. Vaudreuil, had previously prosecuted him. When questioned about his mention of "murder cases," Gaines struggled to clarify his statements, prompting Judge Shabaz to caution against the sensitive topic. Ultimately, Meyer's attorney chose not to pursue the issue further, and it was not addressed again during the trial. After Meyer's conviction, Gaines testified at the sentencing hearing about Fenner's murder, recounting that Meyer, Hoff, and Rock plotted to eliminate Fenner, who was perceived as a liability due to his knowledge of a murder in Oklahoma. Hoff lured Fenner to Rock's farm under false pretenses, while Meyer and Rock concealed themselves to ambush him. Gaines claimed Meyer admitted to shooting Fenner but stated he could not disclose this. Additionally, Gaines recounted that contrary to Rock's claim, they disposed of Fenner's body elsewhere. Gaines' credibility was questioned, as he acknowledged receiving a sentence reduction for his cooperation with the government, and another inmate testified that Gaines had confessed to lying about Meyer’s role in the murder. Meyer’s sentence was significantly influenced by the murder of Fenner, as both Judge Crabb and Judge Shabaz determined Meyer was responsible for this crime during their respective proceedings. Judge Crabb utilized the murder in calculating Meyer’s offense level under the murder guideline, leading to a life sentence per U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(d)(1). Judge Shabaz affirmed this finding, considering it part of the law of the case and supported by evidence, including credible testimony from witnesses and the August 1996 evidentiary hearing. Meyer contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial or a jury instruction after a witness mentioned "murder cases," and for exacerbating the issue during cross-examination. Legal standards require a deferential review of trial counsel performance, presuming adequacy unless proven otherwise. To succeed in asserting ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard and that this deficiency likely affected the trial's outcome. The decision not to pursue a mistrial or request a cautionary instruction was deemed reasonable after reviewing the trial record. Although Gaines made unfortunate references to murder cases that could lead jurors to suspect Meyer, the specifics of his remarks indicated Rock, not Meyer, as the murderer. Rock's prior testimony, where he admitted to pleading guilty to second-degree murder and suggested that Meyer had incriminated him, further shifted suspicion away from Meyer. The defense's strategy aimed to highlight Rock's motives, framing his testimony as an attempt to deflect blame onto Meyer and Hoff. The choice not to seek a limiting instruction or mistrial was a reasonable tactical decision, given the ambiguity of Gaines' comments, and such a motion would likely have been denied. This decision did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Judge Shabaz's finding that Meyer killed Fenner is a factual determination reviewed for clear error. Shabaz acknowledged Judge Crabb's earlier ruling but also made an independent assessment based on new evidence, including Gaines' testimony. Meyer challenges the credibility of the government’s witnesses, arguing that their testimony is legally unreliable and insufficient to support Shabaz's conclusion. Judge Shabaz was not prevented from relying on the testimonies of government witnesses Rock, Tenney, and Gaines, despite their motives to lie and inconsistencies in their accounts of the Fenner murder. The district judge, responsible for credibility determinations, chose to accept their testimonies, which, although flawed, were not legally incredible. The core agreement among the witnesses—that Meyer shot Fenner—remains plausible despite discrepancies in their details. Meyer argued that his sentencing under the first-degree murder guideline violated his due process rights since the jury convicted him only for narcotics conspiracy. This argument was previously rejected, as Judge Crabb found that Meyer was directed to murder and had committed another murder. Consequently, the court affirmed Meyer's conviction and sentence. Additionally, while ineffectiveness claims are generally unsuitable for direct appeal, this case allows for consideration due to it relying solely on the trial record and differing representation. The court did not address whether the standard of evidence required for the murder finding was clear and convincing or just preponderance, as Meyer argued the witnesses' reliability was inadequate for either threshold.