Clyde M. Kellogg v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation
Docket: 00-1893
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; December 4, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Clyde M. Kellogg appeals a district court's summary judgment favoring Union Pacific Railroad regarding his discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Kellogg, a long-time employee with a 26-year tenure at Union Pacific, experienced a severe panic attack in 1997, leading to a diagnosis of major depression and anxiety. Following medical advice, he returned to work with restrictions on hours and scheduling. However, upon attempting to return under these conditions, his supervisor indicated that Union Pacific could not accommodate him. Kellogg communicated his willingness to return and sought other positions within the company, but was unsuccessful. He was placed on Long-Term Disability and later notified of his eligibility for short-term disability benefits. Eventually, after his long-term benefits lapsed in March 1999, he was terminated. Kellogg subsequently filed charges with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission, which issued a right-to-sue letter. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Kellogg's claims were not substantiated under the ADA.
Kellogg filed a lawsuit against Union Pacific in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) due to the company's refusal to allow him to return to his role as Senior Manager of Intermodal Stack Train Operations and to hire him for other positions, citing his anxiety and depression. He also claimed that Union Pacific breached a Release and Settlement agreement related to a prior workplace injury in 1991. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, concluding that Kellogg did not demonstrate he was disabled under the ADA and that the Release and Settlement agreement did not guarantee him continued employment.
In reviewing the summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as the district court, affirming if no material factual disputes exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To establish an ADA claim, Kellogg must prove: (1) he is disabled as defined by the ADA; (2) he is qualified to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he faced adverse employment action due to his disability. Failure to prove any element warrants summary judgment. If he meets this burden, a presumption of discrimination arises, requiring Union Pacific to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
Kellogg must show he is disabled under the ADA by demonstrating he has a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. Working is assumed to be a major life activity, and substantial limitation is defined as significant restriction in the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs compared to an average person with similar training and skills. Importantly, inability to perform a specific job does not equate to a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
Evaluating whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working requires consideration of the disability's nature, severity, duration, and impact, as outlined in EEOC regulations (29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(2)(i), (iii)). Additional factors include the individual's reasonable access to geographical areas, the job from which the individual has been disqualified due to the impairment, and the broader class of jobs affected by the impairment (29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)). Courts assess this on a case-by-case basis, asking if the impairment presents a significant barrier to employment.
Kellogg, through counselor James T. Rogers' affidavit, claims his restriction to a forty-hour work week substantially limits him in working across various job categories. Rogers' assessment is supported by a medical diagnosis, doctors' restrictions, and his extensive experience in vocational counseling. Union Pacific acknowledges Kellogg's mental impairment but argues it does not significantly limit his ability to work.
Case law establishes that being limited to a forty-hour work week is not, by itself, a substantial limitation under the ADA. Previous rulings (Taylor v. Nimock's Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 960-61; Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145) indicate that restrictions on working overtime do not constitute substantial limitations. Kellogg previously worked sixty to eighty hours weekly, a norm for his former role as Senior Manager of Intermodal Stack Train Operations. Although Kellogg cannot meet the demands of his previous position, he asserts he is qualified for other forty-hour jobs with Union Pacific. However, given the legal precedent and Kellogg's ability to work forty hours, he does not meet the ADA's definition of disability based on the impact of his anxiety and depression.
The analysis focuses on Kellogg's reasonable geographic job access and the extent of his disqualifications due to impairment. Kellogg asserts that he is broadly impaired from competing for jobs, supported by Rogers's affidavit. However, the district court found that this affidavit did not create a factual dispute necessary for Kellogg's claim to proceed. The evidence, including Rogers's affidavit and Kellogg's own testimony, contradicts the notion of significant impairment; Kellogg claims he is qualified for many positions at Union Pacific and can perform the essential functions of his previous job without accommodation. Although doctors suggest a 40-hour work week limit, Kellogg views this as a guideline rather than a strict limitation, indicating he is capable of various roles.
Kellogg also claims Union Pacific regarded him as disabled under the ADA, alleging he was fired due to anxiety and depression and that the company did not assist him in securing other positions. Union Pacific counters that Kellogg was given opportunities to return to his role but that his requested accommodation was inadequate. Additionally, the company asserts that other candidates were more qualified for the positions Kellogg applied for. To substantiate a "regarded as" disabled claim under the ADA, Kellogg must demonstrate that Union Pacific perceived him as disabled, which requires showing that he has an impairment treated as a substantial limitation on major life activities, though he is not actually limited in such activities. The analysis for this claim mirrors that of actual disability, focusing on whether Union Pacific viewed Kellogg as unable to perform beyond a specific job.
An employer's mere knowledge of an employee's disability is insufficient to support a "regarded as" claim under disability law. Case law indicates that awareness alone does not equate to treating an employee as having a permanent disability that significantly restricts life activities. For instance, an employer's concern about an employee's medical issues does not imply such treatment, as established in Taylor and Ceretti. In contrast, in Heyman, an employer did regard an employee as disabled due to knowledge of a serious health condition and a related death of a prior employee. Additionally, employers are not obligated to accommodate disabled employees in a manner that adversely affects the rights of other employees or undermines the hiring of more qualified candidates, as noted in Mason.
In the case of Kellogg, who suffered a work-related injury in 1991 and entered into a Release and Settlement Agreement with Union Pacific, the contention revolves around the nature of this agreement. Kellogg believes that the term "maintain" within the agreement implies an indefinite employment relationship, while Union Pacific argues that it does not guarantee a permanent position. The determination of whether the contract is ambiguous—capable of multiple reasonable interpretations—is crucial and is assessed objectively according to Nebraska law. Ambiguity arises if a contract's language is vague or open to conflicting interpretations, as clarified in relevant case law. The interpretation process relies on the ordinary meaning of the terms, independent of the parties' subjective views.
The Release and Settlement Agreement is clearly defined and unambiguous. It specifies that Kellogg will retain his position as Manager of Service Scheduling and that monetary payment is the "sole consideration" for the agreement, which Kellogg accepts as full settlement for all injuries and damages related to the agreement's subject matter. Once Union Pacific transferred its payment obligation to an annuity company, it was released from all further responsibilities under the agreement. The overall interpretation suggests that Union Pacific did not guarantee Kellogg lifelong employment as compensation for his injuries; instead, it provided monetary compensation while ensuring Kellogg would not lose his current position or seniority. Despite concerns about Union Pacific's lack of support in helping Kellogg find a suitable role after his medical leave, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific was upheld. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
