Faye D. Copeland v. James Washington, Faye D. Copeland v. James Washington

Citations: 232 F.3d 969; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29971; 2000 WL 1753159Docket: 99-3693, 99-3694

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 30, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Faye D. Copeland was convicted in state court of five counts of first-degree murder under accomplice liability, receiving the death penalty for four counts and life imprisonment without parole for one. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed her convictions and denied post-conviction relief. During federal habeas review, the district court upheld the convictions but found the sentencing phase constitutionally flawed due to improper closing arguments by the prosecutor and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object. Consequently, the district court ordered a new sentencing hearing or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The state appealed the sentence reduction, while Copeland cross-appealed for a new trial, citing multiple errors including the handling of evidence regarding battered spouse syndrome and sufficiency of evidence.

The appellate court concurred with the district court that the prosecutor's misconduct compromised the fairness of the sentencing hearing but denied Copeland's request for a new trial based on her claimed errors. The facts indicate that Copeland and her husband operated a fraudulent scheme that led to the murders of five homeless men, with her involvement including assisting in the fraud, covering up evidence, and displaying knowledge of the crimes, although there was no direct evidence of her committing violence. The state's case relied on her accomplice liability.

The petitioner argues that the prosecutor's closing argument during the penalty phase of her trial, along with the defense counsel's failure to object, compromised her right to a fair sentencing hearing. The prosecutor made inflammatory statements, drawing parallels between the petitioner’s actions and gang violence in Los Angeles, expressing personal outrage and grief over the case, and making biblical allusions. He asserted that the petitioner’s crimes represented an unprecedented disregard for human life, urging the jury to impose the death penalty as the ultimate sentence. 

The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged the impropriety of the prosecutor's comments, particularly the comparison to gang shootings and the assertion that this was the worst crime in Missouri history, which could have been deemed reversible error if an objection had been timely raised. However, the court ultimately did not find that these comments led to a manifest injustice due to the strong evidence of guilt presented earlier in the trial.

On habeas review, the district court identified serious prejudice against the petitioner caused by the prosecutor's remarks, noting that while guilt was established, the case for the death penalty was weak. Evidence pointed to another individual, Ray, as the principal actor in the crimes, while the petitioner played a minor role. The prosecutor's argument improperly amplified the severity of the case and implied that lesser murders had resulted in the death penalty.

The state conceded that the prosecutor's comments were improper but contended that the absence of Supreme Court precedent regarding such comments during the penalty phase precluded the petitioner's claim under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

The parties are divided on the appropriate standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Taylor clarifies this standard, indicating that a federal habeas court may grant a writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners only if the state court's adjudication was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the 'contrary to' clause allows for a writ if the state court reached a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court on a legal question or decided a case differently based on materially indistinguishable facts. The 'unreasonable application' clause permits a writ if the state court identifies the correct legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the facts of the case, with an emphasis on whether the application was objectively unreasonable.

The excerpt also discusses whether previous interpretations of the standard of review remain valid after Williams, noting that the Supreme Court rejected a more lenient standard used by the Fourth Circuit. Additionally, prior Eighth Circuit cases indicated that federal habeas relief is warranted only under extreme circumstances involving prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The state argues that AEDPA prevents the petitioner's claim due to a lack of Supreme Court discussion on the impact of improper closing arguments in capital cases. However, the excerpt contends that there are relevant Supreme Court decisions addressing this issue, such as Caldwell v. Mississippi and Romano v. Oklahoma, which pertain to improper closing arguments during penalty phases.

Supreme Court rulings establish that improper closing arguments during the guilt phase can constitute constitutional error if they render the trial fundamentally unfair, as noted in Donnelly v. DeCristoforo and Darden v. Wainwright. The Tenth Circuit in Paxton v. Ward recognized prosecutorial misconduct in penalty phase closing arguments, warranting relief even when the state claimed no precedent existed for such arguments. The case at hand requires an evaluation of whether existing Supreme Court precedents were unreasonably applied, potentially denying the petitioner due process at her sentencing hearing. 

Recent Eighth Circuit cases, including Shurn, Antwine, and Newlon, have vacated death sentences due to improper closing arguments, providing a valuable comparative framework. In Newlon, the prosecutor's comments included personal beliefs about the death penalty and appeals to juror emotions, while Shurn involved similar arguments from the same prosecutor. In Antwine, the prosecutor minimized the implications of the death penalty. 

In the current case, the prosecutor made inappropriate references to facts not in evidence and invoked jurors' fears, suggesting a form of 'mob justice' rather than rational deliberation. Such statements, central to the prosecutor's argument, likely prejudiced the jury. The district court correctly identified the argument as improper, and the lack of objection constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, the petitioner's death sentence is vacated.

The petitioner claims entitlement to a new trial due to improper remarks made by the prosecutor during the guilt phase, arguing they violated her due process rights. Key points of the prosecutor's inappropriate comments included stating it was the strongest case for deliberation in Missouri and comparing his traditional marriage to the petitioner's. The district court acknowledged the remarks as improper but determined that they did not significantly impact the case, given the strong evidence of guilt, and noted that the remarks were isolated and countered by the defense.

During the penalty phase, the petitioner was permitted to introduce expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome but contended that the state's expert should not have been admitted and that her counsel inadequately investigated the case. Specifically, she cited a neighbor's report of an incident where her husband attacked her, which her counsel failed to present. The district court found this omission harmless due to other testimony indicating her husband's abusive behavior.

Additionally, the petitioner argued that Dr. Jacks' testimony, which indicated she did not exhibit symptoms of battered spouse syndrome, violated her rights. However, since the state could present its expert witnesses, this was not deemed erroneous. Dr. Jacks later indicated that had he known about the neighbor's report, his testimony might have differed. Despite concerns over these claims, the court had already identified constitutional flaws in the penalty phase due to the prosecutor's closing argument, thus rendering further exploration unnecessary.

The petitioner was not allowed to present expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome during the guilt phase because her counsel failed to provide the necessary notice for a diminished responsibility defense as mandated by Missouri law. Nevertheless, the petitioner’s family members were able to testify about her experiences, and thus, a new trial was not warranted.

The petitioner contends that the state's appeal is moot due to the absence of a stay on the district court's order, but the state argues that the appeal is valid as the district court mandated a new sentencing hearing or life imprisonment without parole within 45 days after the order becomes final. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the petitioner claims insufficient evidence supported her first-degree murder convictions, asserting a violation of her due process rights; however, the court finds ample evidence, such as her involvement with the victims' belongings and communications indicating her complicity, thus affirming the district court's ruling. The petitioner also challenges the denial of a certificate of appealability concerning claims of trial judge bias and Miranda rights violations, but the district court concluded these claims lacked merit and did not demonstrate a substantial constitutional right violation. Ultimately, the court determined that the prosecutor's closing argument during the penalty phase infringed on the petitioner's due process rights, leading to the granting of a writ of habeas corpus. The district court's order for a new sentencing hearing or life imprisonment without parole is affirmed, and it found no grounds for a new trial based on the petitioner's other claims. Ray Copeland, the co-defendant, was later convicted and sentenced to death but died shortly after incarceration. The court emphasizes the need for heightened scrutiny in capital cases, as noted in precedent.

Welsh S. White's analysis indicates that courts are increasingly scrutinizing closing arguments during sentencing hearings, classifying improper arguments into categories, particularly those where the prosecutor personally endorses the death penalty. The defendant has waived the argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel related to a lack of notice for a diminished capacity defense, as per the district court's ruling. It is noted that a more prudent approach for the state would have involved both filing an appeal and seeking a stay, referencing Burdine v. Johnson, where failure to obtain a stay led to the defendant's release. The petitioner argues that her actions do not meet the legal standards for imposing the death penalty as outlined in Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona. However, since relief from the sentencing hearing is granted, this argument is not addressed. Additionally, the defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of her individual participation to justify the aggravating factors of murder for profit and murder to silence witnesses, but this claim is also not discussed due to the granted relief from the sentencing hearing.