Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 9, 2019; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
An appeal in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, involves a property dispute between TimBrian, L.L.C. and Jefferson Parish, with the latter being granted a summary judgment in July 2017 declaring it the owner of a disputed property. The district court's judgment in favor of Jefferson Parish is reversed, while TimBrian's Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed, leading to a remand for further proceedings. The property in question has been used by the Jefferson Parish School Board as a playground and was acquired by TimBrian in a tax sale for $111,318.29, with a recorded Tax Sale Certificate from September 2010. TimBrian sought to quiet title through a Petition for Monition in 2014, resulting in a judgment that confirmed its ownership. The School Board later filed a Petition to Annul the Tax Sale, claiming partial ownership of the property and asserting that the sale was null. The School Board sought to nullify the tax sale and the homologating judgment while asserting it had been in possession of the property since 1939, claiming predial servitudes. TimBrian countered with claims for damages and a declaratory judgment of ownership. The School Board then amended its petition to include Jefferson Parish, asserting its ownership and claiming that both entities were entitled to notice of the tax sale. Jefferson Parish subsequently filed a cross-claim against TimBrian and the School Board for a declaratory judgment of property ownership.
On May 23, 2016, Jefferson Parish sought a summary judgment declaring it the owner of a property and dismissing TimBrian's reconventional demand, which the district court denied as premature due to unresolved discovery issues. After further discovery, Jefferson Parish and the School Board re-filed their summary judgment motion. TimBrian opposed this and filed a cross-motion to dismiss Jefferson Parish's claims. Following oral arguments, on July 21, 2017, the district court granted Jefferson Parish's motion, declaring it the property owner by dedication from Hypolite de Courval in 1837, while denying TimBrian's motion and dismissing its reconventional demands. The judgment did not address claims from the School Board against Jefferson Parish and TimBrian.
On July 31, 2017, the parties filed a Joint Consent Motion for New Trial to amend the judgment to include a legal description of the property, which was granted on August 1, 2017. TimBrian subsequently filed for a devolutive appeal, which was granted; however, on March 28, 2018, the appeal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the judgment was not designated as a partial final judgment. Following this, the parties requested and received a declaration of the amended judgment as a partial final judgment on May 10, 2018. TimBrian then filed another devolutive appeal from this amended judgment.
TimBrian's assignments of error challenge the district court's granting of the summary judgment to Jefferson Parish and the School Board, arguing it was unsupported by credible evidence, and contest the denial of its own summary judgment motion. Additionally, TimBrian contends that the judgment did not comply with the Louisiana Constitution and claims that the School Board had confessed it did not own the property, asserting there was no contract between the School Board and Jefferson Parish to support possible property rights. The discussion will address TimBrian's exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action, the grant of Jefferson Parish's summary judgment, and the denial of TimBrian's motion for summary judgment.
TimBrian seeks the dismissal of the School Board from the appeal and the entire litigation, requesting that the School Board's brief and its extensive exhibits be removed from the record. In response to TimBrian's claims of no cause of action and no right of action, the School Board contends that it possesses a real right or property interest in the Property despite not being the owner. The School Board has maintained continuous possession of the Property since 1939, utilizing it for various purposes related to Metairie Academy, such as playgrounds and walkways.
The School Board argues that TimBrian's exceptions should have been addressed in the district court rather than on appeal. TimBrian counters that the School Board's claim for enforcement of a real right does not pertain to the current appeal, asserting that any rights claimed depend on the adjudicated ownership of the Property. TimBrian claims the School Board cannot seek relief and is not aggrieved by the Judgment, thus warranting its dismissal from the case.
TimBrian further argues that appellate courts can raise exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action independently, citing Louisiana law. The distinction between the two is clarified: a no right of action exception addresses whether the plaintiff has standing to bring the suit, while a no cause of action exception examines whether a legal remedy exists against the defendant. For a party to have standing, they must demonstrate a tangible stake in the litigation. The exception of no right of action allows for the introduction of evidence and is reviewed de novo, while a cause of action is defined by the facts supporting the plaintiff's right to assert the action.
The exception of no cause of action serves to assess the legal adequacy of a petition by evaluating whether the law provides a remedy for the alleged facts, with all pleaded facts accepted as true and no evidence allowed for support or contradiction (La. C.C.P. art. 931). In this case, the School Board, while not the property owner, claims various interests in the Property, such as servitudes and usufruct due to its possession since 1939. Consequently, the court finds that the School Board has established a cause of action regarding its property interests, overruling TimBrian's exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action.
TimBrian contests the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jefferson Parish, asserting it lacked legal and factual support, particularly that Jefferson Parish failed to demonstrate the original owner's intent to dedicate the Property. Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, focusing on whether there are genuine material facts and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Chauvin v. Shell Oil Co.). A summary judgment is granted if the motion and supporting documents indicate no genuine issue of material fact (La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3)). Only specific documents can support or oppose a summary judgment motion, including pleadings, affidavits, and depositions (La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4)).
Before addressing the merits, the court considers TimBrian's objections to the expert testimonies of Peter Title and Raymond Landry. According to La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2), the court may only consider documents filed in relation to the summary judgment motion and must address any objections to documents in a timely manner. TimBrian raised two objections to the expert reports in its opposition memorandum.
TimBrian raised two objections regarding the entry of Peter Title's Report, claiming that Title is a cumulative expert and making a general objection to the facts and conclusions in both Mr. Landry's and Mr. Title's reports. TimBrian argued that since the Parish Motion lacked a Statement of Facts or Uncontested Material Facts, it objects to all unsupported facts and conclusions in the reports, citing Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Art. 966, which requires the court to specify any inadmissible documents. Despite TimBrian's objections being presented in its reply memorandum, the district court did not address them during the hearing on the summary judgment motions, nor did the trial judge mention them in the subsequent judgment dated July 21, 2017. Consequently, the trial judge erred by not ruling on these procedural objections before deciding on the summary judgment motions.
However, this error was deemed inconsequential as TimBrian failed to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding ownership and title to the property in question. Under Louisiana law, the mover must establish that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and a material fact is one that influences the plaintiff's cause of action. Both Jefferson Parish and TimBrian claim ownership of the property located between the southern edge of Square 16 of the Metairieville Subdivision and the northern boundary of Metairie Road. Jefferson Parish contends that the original owner, Hypolite de Courval, donated the property for public use in 1837, asserting that TimBrian holds no ownership claim. In contrast, TimBrian argues that North Metairie Road was never formally dedicated to public use and claims ownership based on a tax sale purchase of the property assessed in de Courval's name for $111,318.29.
TimBrian submitted multiple documents in support of its motion for summary judgment, including affidavits from Charles Stern, Jr. and William Reeves, Ph.D., which contest Jefferson Parish's claims regarding the public dedication of the Property in 1837. Stern asserts that the Property was never dedicated to the public and that Jefferson Parish does not own it, while Reeves claims there is no historical evidence of a 'North' Metairie Road. Additionally, deposition excerpts from Jefferson Parish's expert, Raymond Landry, affirm the existence of North Metairie Road and the Parish's ownership of the Property. TimBrian also referenced a 2015 'Act of Deposit' by Jefferson Parish, which claims ownership based on the 1837 dedication by Hypolite de Courval. The court identified genuine factual disputes surrounding the existence of North Metairie Road, the ownership and dedication of the Property, and the validity of the tax sale. As a result, the district court's summary judgment in favor of Jefferson Parish was overturned, while its denial of TimBrian's motion for summary judgment was upheld. The case is remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, the legal description of the Property is provided, alongside claims from the School Board regarding TimBrian's refusal to sell the Property and interference with existing rights. The prior judgment only resolved ownership issues and did not conclude the ongoing litigation among the parties.
The July judgment favored Jefferson Parish's motion for summary judgment, confirming its ownership of the disputed property, established through dedication by Hypolite de Courval in 1837. Conversely, it rejected TimBrian's motion, dismissing all reconventional demands asserting ownership of the property. The judgment was partial, leaving unresolved the School Board's claims, including predial servitude rights, and TimBrian's claims related to a reimbursement of $111,318.29 from a tax sale, as well as Jefferson Parish's ownership interest. TimBrian introduced peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action for the first time on appeal, with the court opting not to address these procedural objections based on the evidence presented. The court refrains from commenting on the correct appellate procedure for cases where the trial judge did not rule on a mover's procedural objections when their supporting evidence met the burden required under Louisiana Civil Code Procedure article 966.
