Washington C. Alston v. Scott L. King, Individually, as Mayor of the City of Gary, Indiana, and as Special Administrator of Gary Sanitary District, Otho Lyles, Iii, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Commissioners of the Gary Sanitary District, Roland Elvambuena, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Commissioners of the Gary Sanitary District

Citations: 231 F.3d 383; 17 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1013; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27428Docket: 99-3224

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 1, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Washington Alston, the former Director of the Gary Sanitary District, filed a lawsuit against Scott King, the Mayor of Gary, Indiana, and others following his termination from employment. Alston claimed retaliatory discharge, violation of procedural due process, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and breach of contract. The court found that King had not provided Alston with a required pretermination hearing, which violated his employment contract. The district court ruled in favor of Alston on the breach of contract and procedural due process claims, awarding him $40,600 and $92,500 in damages, respectively. However, an earlier appeal reversed the procedural due process damages due to an erroneous jury instruction, leading to a remand for a new damages trial.

On remand, the district court held a trial focused solely on damages related to the procedural due process claim. Prior to this trial, King requested to exclude testimony regarding compensatory damages already awarded under the contract claim, arguing that the new trial should only consider damages for emotional distress resulting from the lack of a pretermination hearing. The court tentatively granted this motion, indicating that the admissibility of evidence would need to be determined during the trial. Ultimately, during the damages trial, Alston only presented his own testimony to establish damages.

King requested a judgment as a matter of law for nominal damages at the conclusion of Alston's case, which the district court granted, awarding one dollar after determining that Alston did not prove damages linked to the procedural due process violation. Alston appealed, claiming the court wrongly restricted the damages to emotional distress from the lack of a hearing, excluding damages from his termination. The court clarified that damages for a procedural due process violation must stem from the denial of constitutionally required processes, as outlined in Carey v. Piphus. This case established that damages can include those related to termination if a causal link exists between the termination and the lack of a hearing. Conversely, if an employer can demonstrate that the employee would have been terminated regardless of the hearing, damages related to that termination are not available. In this instance, King argued, based on undisputed facts, that Alston would have been terminated for cause due to misappropriated funds. Alston contended that the evidence indicated only improper documentation, not theft, but failed to prove that such mismanagement was not grounds for termination. The court maintained that, given the established cause for Alston's termination, any damages from it could not be attributed to the procedural due process failure. Furthermore, even if there were disputed facts regarding the termination's inevitability, the court did not exclude evidence on the termination; the motion in limine simply limited the scope of damages to emotional distress resulting from the absence of a pretermination hearing, consistent with Carey and previous rulings in Alston's case.

The court's inquiry into the trial reveals that the evidentiary rulings were influenced by Alston's failure to properly present evidence, rather than any opinion on the appropriateness of damages. Alston's attempt to introduce various forms of evidence related to his termination was largely unsuccessful due to procedural issues, particularly the reliance on hearsay and lack of personal knowledge. For example, testimony regarding damage to his reputation and removal from the Black History Month program was excluded because it was based on hearsay. Alston did not call relevant witnesses who could have substantiated his claims, such as those involved in his removal from the program or prospective employers. Testimony about the press conference was also excluded for failing to establish a connection to damages. Additionally, Alston's narrative style of testimony was problematic, leading to the exclusion of statements about his feelings and experiences due to lack of foundation and speculative nature. The court repeatedly warned him about improper testimony, yet he persisted in a narrative approach. While he claimed the court excluded beliefs regarding the unjust nature of his termination, the record shows the court allowed such testimony unless it involved hearsay. Overall, the limitations on Alston's testimony stemmed from his inability to present admissible evidence rather than any improper exclusion by the court.

Alston contends that despite unfavorable evidentiary rulings, he provided adequate evidence of damages to prevent a judgment as a matter of law. His testimony on emotional distress was limited, consisting mainly of claims of "humiliation, embarrassment, stress, and rejection" due to the denial of a hearing. He also stated this denial led to depression, alcohol abuse, and negatively impacted his relationship. However, during cross-examination, he contradicted himself by stating he was not abusing alcohol and had never sought counseling, and he noted his engagement occurred more than a year after his termination.

Alston's testimony about his termination included being escorted to collect his belongings while fellow employees reacted with a mix of crying, mocking, or confusion. For claims of emotional distress, the plaintiff must provide a reasonable and detailed explanation of the injury rather than relying solely on conclusory statements. The court referenced previous cases establishing that mere expressions of being "depressed" or "humiliated" are insufficient unless supported by specific circumstances demonstrating emotional distress.

The court highlighted that the denial of a hearing, which is the action causing the distress in this case, is not inherently degrading enough to justify Alston's claims of emotional distress without additional evidence. Thus, his unsubstantiated claims of humiliation alone do not prevent a judgment as a matter of law.

Alston's testimony regarding emotional distress included claims of alcohol abuse and the end of his engagement; however, he contradicted these claims during cross-examination by admitting he had no alcohol issues at the time of the first trial and that his engagement occurred over a year after his termination. He failed to provide evidence linking his post-termination problems to the denial of a hearing, which undermined his claims of emotional distress damages. Conversely, Alston described the circumstances of his termination, noting that he was escorted by a police officer to his former office, where he was publicly ridiculed by co-workers while packing his belongings. This scenario was deemed sufficient to establish a jury issue regarding emotional distress connected to the lack of procedural due process. A reasonable juror could determine that the humiliation stemmed from the abrupt nature of the termination rather than the termination itself, suggesting that a suspension with a hearing would have mitigated the embarrassing situation. Consequently, Alston presented enough evidence to challenge a judgment as a matter of law, leading to the conclusion that the district court wrongly granted judgment and only awarded nominal damages. The court's decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, the district court initially found Alston liable for a misappropriation set-off, which was later determined by a jury.