Anthony George Battle, the petitioner-appellant, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which challenged his second murder conviction and death sentence, previously affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in 1999. Battle raised six arguments against the imposition of his death sentence, but the court found them unconvincing and upheld the district court's decision.
The facts reveal that Battle was serving a life sentence for the 1987 murder of his wife when he killed correctional officer D’Antonio Washington at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta on December 21, 1994. He was found near the scene with blood on his clothing, and DNA analysis confirmed it was Officer Washington's blood. A hammer, also with blood, was recovered from behind a vending machine, which an inmate testified was borrowed by Battle for repairs. Battle confessed to the murder, expressing no remorse during an interview with federal agents, despite later claiming delusions contributed to his actions.
Prior to trial, Battle underwent extensive evaluations regarding his competency, involving testimonies from three defense experts and two government experts. The defense experts diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia and deemed him incompetent to stand trial, while the government experts, after numerous evaluations, also noted similar symptoms but reached different conclusions about his competency. The case included a detailed examination of these evaluations and testimonies, spanning twelve days at a competency hearing.
Drs. Johnson and Hazelrigg evaluated Battle shortly before his competency hearing, concluding he exhibited personality disorders with schizotypal traits but was not schizophrenic, contrary to the defense experts' diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. They believed Battle was malingering regarding his reports of implants and deemed him competent to stand trial. The magistrate judge recommended finding Battle competent, which the district court adopted after reviewing the competency hearing materials. The court noted Battle's delayed report of the implants and the doctors' observations over seventy-five days.
Approximately three and a half months later, during the trial, the district court chose to assess Battle's competency by observing him during jury selection instead of holding a new competency hearing. Although Battle initially resisted attending, he ultimately agreed. The court had mandated medication for him, but he refused it on the trial's first day. After consulting on the implications of his refusal, the court decided only to provide medication during the trial.
The defense requested a continuance for another evaluation, which the court denied, reaffirming its belief in Battle's competence based on its observations. Throughout the trial, Battle displayed disruptive behavior, expressed disagreement with his attorneys, and articulated feelings of discomfort and distraction. Despite his dissatisfaction with their strategic focus, particularly regarding the insanity defense based on his belief in the implants, his lawyers proceeded with this approach, claiming he had implicitly authorized it. Battle testified as a defense witness, admitted to murdering Officer Washington, and acknowledged the act was wrong. Ultimately, the jury found him guilty.
During the penalty phase of trial, two jurors were excused for inappropriate behavior and replaced with alternate jurors who had observed the entire trial. Battle testified, making a derogatory comment about Officer Washington, after which the jury recommended the death penalty, and the court sentenced him accordingly. Battle expressed a desire to forego appeals upon receiving his sentence but later filed an appeal raising thirteen issues, which were affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. He subsequently sought collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied after considering trial evidence and hearing testimony.
In challenging the district court’s decision, Battle raised six issues, including claims of procedural and substantive competency regarding his trial competence, violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the indictment’s failure to include statutory aggravating factors, the dismissal of jurors, the assignment of his motion to a judge, and limitations on post-conviction discovery.
Battle asserted that the district court erred in determining his competency and failing to conduct a competency hearing at trial's onset, arguing that his behavior suggested a 'bona fide doubt' about his mental state. This claim was categorized as procedural and was deemed waived, as it was not raised on direct appeal. He also claimed he was incompetent during his trial, a substantive claim that is not subject to procedural default and must be evaluated on its merits. Competency is defined as having the mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in one's defense, with the burden on Battle to provide clear evidence of incompetency to warrant a hearing.
The standard of proof for establishing a defendant's incompetence to stand trial is high, requiring that facts must clearly generate legitimate doubt. A district court's finding of insufficient evidence for substantial doubt in a petitioner's competency is subject to clear error review. In Battle's case, he primarily cited his self-reported symptoms regarding implants and disruptive behavior during trial, along with a history of mental illness and claims of incompetence by his lawyers. However, the court found that disagreements between a defendant and their attorney do not indicate incompetence. The court noted that Battle's complaints about the implants surfaced only in August 1995, after the murder and investigation, and were deemed fabricated. Courtroom outbursts and a history of mental illness alone do not prove incompetence; evidence must show an inability to assist counsel or comprehend charges.
Battle underwent a thorough competency evaluation before trial, lasting twelve days with multiple expert testimonies, leading the court to find him competent based on the more persuasive government witnesses. The court's decision was justified despite conflicting expert opinions, as it was supported by the record. Following a review of Battle’s trial history and additional testimony during the 2255 proceeding, the court confirmed Battle's understanding of the charges and his capability to assist his counsel effectively. The trial judge observed Battle's rational interactions throughout the trial, concluding there was no clear error in the findings.
Additionally, a declaration from Battle's trial lawyer, claiming he was "mentally ill" at the time, was deemed unpersuasive, particularly since the lawyer did not raise competency as an issue on direct appeal. The court underscored that mental illness does not equate to incompetence to stand trial, emphasizing that Battle did not meet the stringent requirements for a substantive competency claim.
Battle claims violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights due to his lawyers presenting an insanity defense without his explicit consent. The district court found that he tacitly consented to this defense, despite his ambivalence, as he did not publicly object or testify against it during his 2255 proceeding. Although he felt the label of insanity was insulting and was dissatisfied with his lawyers' strategy, the court concluded there was no clear error in finding that he consented to the defense.
Battle also argues for vacating his death sentence on the grounds that the indictment lacked the necessary aggravating factors, as required by the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA). He cites the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, which characterized these factors as essential elements for Sixth Amendment purposes. However, since Ring was decided after his case was final on direct review, it does not apply retroactively, barring his claim under the Teague v. Lane precedent. Furthermore, even if his argument were considered, the indictment included sufficient details of the crime, and the evidence against him was strong, making it unlikely he could demonstrate prejudice.
Lastly, Battle contends that the jury composition during the penalty phase was improper, arguing that the trial court violated Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not discharging alternate jurors when the jury retired to deliberate in the guilt phase.
Battle contends that the trial court's violation of Rule 24(c) and the subsequent seating of two alternate jurors during penalty-phase deliberations infringed upon his rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b), which mandates that a capital defendant's sentencing hearing occur before the jury that determined guilt. Under the version of Rule 24(c) applicable at Battle's trial, alternate jurors not replacing regular jurors should be discharged once the jury retires for deliberation. Battle did not object to the trial court's failure to discharge the alternates at the guilt phase, resulting in a waiver of that objection. Even if he had preserved the issue, a Rule 24(c) violation is not considered a per se reversible error, and Battle failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the violation.
Furthermore, the district court’s decision to seat alternate jurors before penalty-phase deliberations, after discharging two jurors for just cause, did not violate his statutory right under § 3593(b)(1). The alternates had been present during the evidence presentation for both phases but were absent from the guilt-phase deliberations. The Seventh Circuit has previously ruled that seating an alternate juror during penalty-phase deliberations does not contravene § 3593(b). The statute does not require that the same jury deliver the penalty phase's verdict, and provision exists for a different jury if the original jury is discharged for good cause. The court's choice to keep alternates helped avoid a mistrial after extensive proceedings. Battle's argument of potential prejudice lacks merit, as a single juror can prevent a death sentence by voting against it, regardless of the opinions of other jurors. Consequently, the district court's decision is affirmed, and the stay of execution on Battle’s death sentence is lifted.