Alma Angel-Ramos v. Janet Reno and Immigration and Naturalization Service
Docket: 99-3126
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 19, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Alma Angel-Ramos entered the United States illegally from Mexico on August 1, 1989, and lived there continuously until her arrest in 1995 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) during a raid at her workplace. Following her arrest, she was served with an order to show cause regarding her deportability due to her illegal entry. Angel-Ramos applied for suspension of deportation, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application, determining that she failed to demonstrate the required seven years of continuous presence in the U.S. This assessment was based on the BIA precedent set in *Matter of N-J-B*, which stated that the continuous presence period ends when an order to show cause is served. The IJ found that Angel-Ramos had less than six years of continuous presence before her order was issued. Upon appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision on different grounds, referencing its own ruling in *Matter of Nolasco*, which reiterated that the service of an order to show cause terminates an alien's period of continuous physical presence. Consequently, the BIA concluded that Angel-Ramos did not meet the seven-year requirement for suspension of deportation, thus upholding the denial of her application.
To qualify for suspension of deportation, an alien, such as Ms. Angel-Ramos, must demonstrate continuous presence in the U.S. for seven years, as mandated by section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This continuous presence is calculated from the alien's entry date until the application filing date. However, following the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the INA was amended, replacing section 244 with section 240A, which introduced new terminology and modified requirements for immigration proceedings. Notably, the "stop time" rule was established, stipulating that an alien's continuous presence ends upon service of a notice to appear or upon conviction of certain offenses.
While the majority of IIRIRA's amendments do not apply to aliens like Ms. Angel-Ramos, who were already in deportation proceedings as of April 1, 1997, special transitional rules were created for these individuals. Specifically, IIRIRA section 309(c)(5) states that the stop time rule applies to notices to appear issued at any time, generating confusion since "notice to appear" was not previously used. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed this ambiguity in Matter of N-J-B, clarifying that the stop time rule also applies to orders to show cause, thereby extending its applicability to ongoing deportation proceedings at the time of IIRIRA's enactment.
The Attorney General withdrew the Matter of N-J-B decision as precedent due to its focus on notices to appear instead of orders to show cause. Subsequently, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) was enacted, specifically amending IIRIRA sec. 309(c)(5) to clarify that the stop time rule for determining an alien's continuous presence applies to all orders to show cause issued at any time. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Nolasco ruled that this amendment was unambiguous and indicated Congress's intent for the stop time rule to apply to pending deportation applications as of the IIRIRA's effective date. The BIA emphasized that since orders to show cause are only issued in deportation proceedings, the stop time rule must apply to these proceedings. The legislative history of NACARA further supported this conclusion, as the Senate Appropriations Committee clarified that the stop time rule was intended to apply broadly to individuals in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997, indicating a clear legislative intent to encompass deportation cases under the rule.
The BIA interpreted NACARA section 203(a)(1) based on an explanatory memorandum from the Senate Appropriations Committee, which indicated that this section amends the transition rule for suspension of deportation eligibility for individuals in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of April 1, 1997. This interpretation aligns with the majority decision in Matter of N-J-B, establishing that orders to show cause have the same "stop time" effect as notices to appear. Consequently, the BIA concluded that the stop time rule applies to these orders and pending applications, meaning an alien's period of continuous presence in the U.S. ceases when served with an order to show cause. Four other circuits have supported the BIA's interpretation.
Furthermore, the language of IIRIRA section 309(c)(5) and NACARA section 203(a)(1) explicitly states that the stop time rule applies to orders to show cause issued at any time, reflecting Congress's intent for retroactive application. Ms. Angel-Ramos argues against retroactive application, citing due process concerns, but the INS contends that Congress's clear intent overrides the presumption against retroactivity. Consequently, since the stop time rule applies to her case and she has less than seven years of continuous presence due to the order to show cause, she is not statutorily eligible for suspension of deportation.
Ms. Angel-Ramos contends that NACARA section 203(a)(1) infringes upon her due process and equal protection rights. She argues that delays in her case led to the application of new but later withdrawn legal precedents, which she claims constitutes a due process violation. Furthermore, she asserts that the section's differential treatment of certain alien classes violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The review acknowledges that due process is applicable in deportation proceedings. However, it concludes that Ms. Angel-Ramos has not demonstrated a due process violation, noting that the continuance of her case was a result of her own motions and that the law in effect at the time of the decision was appropriately applied.
Regarding the Equal Protection claim, the court finds no violation, as NACARA section 203(a)(1) allows for the stop time rule to apply to pending deportation cases while exempting certain alien classes. The court emphasizes that Congress has broad authority to classify aliens and that its decisions are generally beyond judicial review. The distinction made by Congress, aimed at alleviating administrative burdens for aliens from conflict-affected countries, is deemed legitimate. Consequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision is affirmed.
The notes clarify the legal requirements for suspension of deportation and cancellation of removal under different statutes, highlighting the conditions that must be met by an alien to qualify for relief.
IIRIRA section 309(c)(5) establishes transitional rules regarding the suspension of deportation, stating that the provisions concerning continuous residence or physical presence in section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act apply to all notices to appear issued before or after the Act's enactment. The amendment specifies that these provisions also pertain to orders to show cause issued under prior law. Despite these rules, Ms. Angel-Ramos is ineligible for relief under both the current and previous laws. She entered the U.S. on August 1, 1989, and filed for suspension of deportation on May 13, 1996, resulting in fewer than seven years of continuous physical presence, which does not meet the eligibility criteria. Additionally, there is no indication that procedural defects deprived her of any statutory rights or due process, distinguishing her case from Batanic v. INS, and thus her due process rights remain intact despite any delays in her case.
Congress established specific exemptions to the "stop time rule" for certain classes of aliens regarding continuous physical presence calculations. The exemptions apply to aliens who meet specific criteria, including:
1. **General Provisions**: Aliens not convicted of an aggravated felony and who were not apprehended after December 19, 1990, can qualify.
2. **Eligibility for Salvadoran Nationals**: Must have entered the U.S. on or before September 19, 1990, and registered for benefits from the American Baptist Churches settlement by October 31, 1991, or applied for temporary protected status by the same date.
3. **Eligibility for Guatemalan Nationals**: Must have entered on or before October 1, 1990, and registered for benefits from the same settlement by December 31, 1991.
4. **Asylum Applications**: Guatemalan or Salvadoran nationals who filed for asylum with the Immigration and Naturalization Service by April 1, 1990, are also included.
5. **Family Relationships**: Spouses or children of individuals whose deportation or removal has been suspended or canceled can be exempt, provided specific conditions regarding the timing and status of the individual are met.
6. **Unmarried Sons or Daughters**: They may qualify if their parent meets certain requirements, with an additional condition for those aged 21 or older regarding their entry date.
7. **Other Nationals**: Aliens from specific countries who entered before December 31, 1990, and filed for asylum by December 31, 1991, are included if they were nationals of certain Eastern European countries or former Soviet states.
The Attorney General's decisions on these matters are final and not subject to judicial review, although other eligibility determinations for discretionary relief remain open to judicial review as per section 242(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Ms. Angel-Ramos seeks remand to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) based on a December 7, 1999, memorandum from the General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This memorandum outlines a proposed regulation permitting the Attorney General to convert specific deportation proceedings into removal proceedings for certain aliens. The eligible group includes individuals who: (1) are not lawful permanent residents, (2) would qualify for suspension of deportation under former INA § 244 except for the stop time provision in INA § 240A(d), and (3) meet the criteria for cancellation of removal under § 240A, which includes having at least 10 years of continuous physical presence in the U.S., good moral character, no serious criminal convictions, a qualifying relative, and no disqualifying criminal offenses under the stop time rule.
Ms. Angel-Ramos asserts that she meets these criteria and argues for remand for administrative closure of her case. However, the INS argues that she is subject to a final administrative order, disqualifying her from this relief. While a case can be administratively closed if reopened for an independent reason, the memorandum does not support reopening solely for closure. Without a remand for an independent reason, her request cannot be granted. Additionally, she does not meet the seven years of continuous presence requirement under INA § 244, as she entered the U.S. on August 1, 1989, less than seven years before filing for suspension of deportation on May 13, 1996.
