United States v. David Paul Hammer

Citations: 226 F.3d 229; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22293; 2000 WL 1234611Docket: 98-9011

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 31, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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David Paul Hammer appeals his conviction and death sentence imposed on November 4, 1998, for the murder of fellow inmate Andrew Marti at USP/Allenwood, Pennsylvania. The incident occurred on April 13, 1996, and Hammer was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 for first-degree murder. While initially indicted on two charges, the section 1118 charge was dismissed, leading to a trial solely on the section 1111 charge. Hammer, who initially claimed an insanity defense, ultimately pleaded guilty, resulting in a jury trial focused only on sentencing. The jury recommended the death penalty on July 24, 1998.

Afterward, Hammer filed a pro se motion to discharge his counsel and proceed without representation concerning the appeal. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, where two psychiatrists testified regarding Hammer's mental competency to waive his rights. They determined that he was competent and that his decision to forego an appeal and expedite his death sentence was well-reasoned. The district court agreed, concluding Hammer's waiver was both competent and voluntary, thus dismissing the appeal.

On October 9, 1998, the court discharged Hammer's counsel, appointed stand-by counsel, and set a sentencing date. On November 4, 1998, Hammer was sentenced to death, with an appeal filed on his behalf on November 12, 1998. The court's opinion detailed the trial evidence: Hammer incapacitated Mr. Marti under the pretense of transferring him to another prison, then used a sleeper hold and subsequently strangled him with a homemade cord. The jury found that Hammer intentionally killed Mr. Marti and established two statutory aggravating factors: prior convictions for felonies and that the murder was premeditated. 

Hammer filed a pro se motion to dismiss the appeal on November 27, 1998, but later withdrew it. He filed another dismissal motion on March 23, 1999, which was tabled, and on July 23, 1999, stand-by counsel withdrew the dismissal motion. The case proceeded to briefing after the court granted this withdrawal on August 3, 1999. On May 8, 2000, Hammer again sought immediate dismissal of his appeal, leading to further deliberations and requests for reconsideration.

Concerns arose regarding whether a competent defendant could waive an appeal under the Federal Death Penalty Statute. The court appointed John J. Gibbons, Esq. as amicus curiae to address this issue. A briefing schedule was established, and a July 18, 2000, argument was set, with consideration for Hammer's video appearance from prison. Both the amicus and the government submitted briefs, presenting conflicting views on appeal waiver. On June 30, 2000, Hammer requested to withdraw his May 8 motion, suggesting the dismissal issue might be moot. Finally, on July 13, 2000, Hammer reiterated his desire to dismiss the appeal.

Hammer urges the court to dismiss his appeal and expedite his death sentence, expressing his intent to be executed promptly. During the July 18, 2000, oral argument, he presented himself well, demonstrating control and respect towards all parties involved. Hammer claimed he never authorized the filing of the appeal, which was done by stand-by counsel without his consent, although he later accepted it. He acknowledged his responsibility for the murder of Andrew Marti and asserted that he had a fair trial, emphasizing the jury's decision as a societal statement. Hammer questioned how justice would be served by continuing the appeal and rejected the notion that it was mandatory. He expressed a preference for the certainty of execution over prolonged incarceration, stating he had been imprisoned for 22 years and faced an extensive sentence. He requested that if his motion to dismiss was granted, the case should return to the district court to schedule his execution, voicing concern that delays could lead to involvement from higher authorities. Hammer characterized himself as a "politically correct execution candidate" due to his race and the circumstances of his crime, and he firmly stated he would not seek clemency or appeal, reiterating his acceptance of guilt and the death penalty's legality.

Hammer expressed that he would only feel free upon death but denied any intent to commit suicide. He accepted the court's judgment and took responsibility for the murder of Andrew Marti, advocating for the death penalty to be enacted swiftly to maintain its significance. Hammer argued that the process of dying is not cruel and unusual, but rather the prolonged wait for execution is. He reiterated that accepting punishment was his way of making amends. 

The panel noted Hammer's inconsistent stance regarding his appeal, prompting them to confirm that he would not seek to reverse his request for dismissal if granted. The government contended that Hammer had irrevocably chosen to appeal, which would require the court to hear the case on its merits. However, this argument was made prior to Hammer's request to dismiss the appeal. Citing precedent, the panel treated Hammer's motion as compliant with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), allowing dismissals at the appellant's request. 

The court recognized its discretion in granting or denying the motion, noting that Hammer's clear request to dismiss his appeal alleviated the government's concerns about potential future reversals. Consequently, the court would consider Hammer's motion to dismiss without concluding that he had irrevocably elected to appeal. Additionally, the panel sought clarification on whether the Federal Death Penalty statute permits a defendant sentenced to death to waive their right to appeal, as this influenced their discretionary decision-making process regarding the appeal.

In cases where a death sentence is imposed, the defendant has the right to appeal, with a notice of appeal required to be filed within a specified timeframe. Appeals in these cases take precedence over others and may be consolidated with appeals regarding the underlying conviction. The court of appeals conducts a comprehensive review of the trial record, including trial evidence, sentencing hearing materials, procedural conduct during sentencing, and specific findings related to aggravating factors as outlined in relevant federal statutes.

The court must address all substantive and procedural issues raised in the appeal, specifically assessing whether the death sentence was influenced by improper factors such as passion or prejudice, and whether evidence supports the necessary aggravating factors. If the court finds that the death sentence was improperly influenced, lacks evidentiary support for aggravating factors, or involves legal errors warranting a reversal, it will remand the case for reconsideration or impose an alternative sentence. The court cannot reverse a death sentence for harmless errors, including erroneous findings, if the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that such errors were harmless.

While section 3595 allows for an appeal, it does not mandate that a defendant must appeal a death sentence, aligning with the general principle that parties are not obligated to appeal adverse decisions in federal litigation. This interpretation is supported by the absence of a requirement for mandatory appellate review in the statute, despite the dissenting opinion in Whitmore v. Arkansas, which highlighted the importance of preventing wrongful executions and noted that many states have mandatory appellate reviews for death sentences.

Amicus argues against the interpretation that section 3595 requires an appeal for the court of appeals to exercise jurisdiction in death penalty cases. Section 3595(a) explicitly states that a death sentence is subject to review only upon an appeal by the defendant, establishing a prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction. The subsequent requirement for timely notice of appeal serves as a limitation rather than a mandate for the defendant to appeal, which amicus acknowledges. Amicus references sections 3595(b) and 3595(c)(1), noting that they outline the review scope and issues the court must address if an appeal is filed, but these do not create independent appellate jurisdiction. Section 3595(c)(2), regarding remanding to the district court, also only applies when an appeal is initiated. The court concludes it has discretion to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the appeal, and finds no basis in the Federal Death Penalty Act to deny Hammer's motion. Amicus's argument regarding the Eighth Amendment's implications on a defendant waiving direct appellate review is deemed unpersuasive. The court cites precedent that the death penalty does not inherently violate the Eighth Amendment and emphasizes that while meaningful appellate review is important, it can be waived, as established in various Supreme Court cases. Additionally, the Court has not recognized a societal interest in appellate review of capital sentences.

The opinion acknowledges the contributions of amicus curiae in arguing for the mandatory nature of an appeal under the Federal Death Penalty statute in cases where the death penalty is imposed. However, the court emphasizes that Hammer, a confessed murderer who pleaded guilty, has not demonstrated a legally cognizable interest in continuing the appeal. The court reviewed the entire record and determined that the interests of justice do not necessitate forcing Hammer to appeal or reviewing the district court's proceedings. The decision is made to grant Hammer's motion to dismiss the appeal, which will be dismissed, and the case remanded to the district court to schedule a new date for implementing the death sentence. Additional notes highlight that Hammer provided extensive testimony, that his mental competency was confirmed without dispute by all counsel, and that despite some moments of reconsideration, he consistently expressed his desire to waive the appeal. Furthermore, the court noted that the legal grounds for the appeal had largely been previously rejected by the court.