Dr. Emory M. Ghana v. J. T. Holland

Citations: 226 F.3d 175; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22152; 2000 WL 1224729Docket: 97-7043

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 29, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Emory M. Ghana filed a Bivens action against J.T. Holland, the warden of FCI Allenwood, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed his lawsuit due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), specifically under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The key issues before the U.S. Court of Appeals concerned whether the exhaustion requirement applies to cases pending at the statute's enactment.

Ghana, convicted of murder in 1972 and transferred to federal prison in 1991, claimed two incidents violated his religious rights associated with Afrikan Hebrewism. First, he alleged wrongful removal from the Common Fare (CF) diet, which accommodates prisoners with special religious dietary needs, after being observed consuming non-CF food. Second, he contended that he was denied access to a cassette player and Rastafarian cassettes during his time in administrative segregation, despite regulations allowing portable radios in the Special Housing Unit (SHU).

Before filing his suit, Ghana pursued the initial stages of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) grievance process, submitting informal complaints and Requests for Administrative Remedy, both of which Warden Holland denied. However, he did not appeal these denials to the BOP's Regional Director or General Counsel, which are required steps in the grievance process.

On February 2, 1996, Ghana filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Holland, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments stemming from his removal from a CF program and denial of religious cassettes in the SHU, primarily invoking the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Ghana sought $100,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages, along with various forms of injunctive and declaratory relief, which were deemed irrelevant to the current proceedings. Holland responded with a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, claiming Ghana had not exhausted available administrative remedies. The court found the summary judgment motion premature and dismissed it without prejudice, while staying discovery.

On November 27, 1996, the court dismissed Ghana's claims without prejudice, stating he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as mandated by the PLRA, effective April 26, 1996. The court ruled that the exhaustion requirement could be applied retroactively to pending litigation. Furthermore, even without the PLRA's application, pre-PLRA law required exhaustion unless only money damages were requested, which was not the case since Ghana sought additional relief. 

On November 25, Ghana filed for leave to amend his complaint to request only damages, but the court did not receive this until November 28. After the dismissal order on November 27, Ghana sought reconsideration, reiterating his intent to amend the complaint to eliminate the basis for dismissal related to exhaustion. However, both his motions to amend and reconsider were denied by the court on December 10 and December 17, respectively, on the grounds that any amendment would still necessitate compliance with the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a).

Ghana, representing himself, filed a notice of appeal against a December 17, 1996 order that denied his request for reconsideration. The appeal was initially terminated on April 15, 1997, due to non-payment of the docketing fee. Ghana subsequently filed motions to re-open the appeal and to proceed in forma pauperis, both of which were granted, and counsel was appointed. Following the appeal, Ghana was returned to a New Jersey state facility.

Regarding jurisdiction, Ghana's notice of appeal was interpreted liberally to encompass unspecified prior orders related to the December 17 order, despite his failure to explicitly mention them. However, he waived any argument concerning the denial of leave to amend his complaint, as he did not raise this issue in his opening brief, which is required under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. His late attempt to address this in his reply brief was deemed insufficient to challenge the District Court's decision.

Additionally, the District Court dismissed Ghana's complaint without prejudice, which is typically not appealable. However, a prisoner may appeal such a dismissal if they indicate an intent to stand by their complaint or cannot amend it. Ghana claimed that exhausting administrative remedies would be futile since the Bureau of Prisons' process could not provide monetary relief. Thus, the court concluded it had jurisdiction to hear his appeal.

Ghana's original complaint for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief regarding alleged constitutional violations by Holland was dismissed by the District Court, which cited two main reasons. First, the dismissal was based on the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) of the PLRA, which applies even though Ghana filed his complaint before the PLRA's effective date. The PLRA aims to reduce frivolous prisoner lawsuits and enhance prison management by ensuring that complaints are properly addressed. The amended § 1997e(a) mandates that prisoners must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing any federal lawsuits related to prison conditions.

Ghana argues that § 1997e(a) should only apply to actions initiated after the PLRA took effect, a position the government acknowledges as generally correct. However, the court has not yet ruled on the retroactive application of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The analysis of this retroactivity follows the Supreme Court's precedents, particularly Landgraf v. USI Film Products, which sets forth a framework for determining whether new statutes apply to pending cases. This involves checking for explicit congressional intent regarding the statute’s reach, and if such intent is absent, assessing whether applying the statute retroactively would negatively impact rights, increase liabilities, or impose new obligations concerning past actions. If retroactive effects are found, there is a presumption against retroactive application unless clear congressional intent exists to support it.

The application of statutory rules reveals a conclusion differing from that of the District Court. Following the guidance of Landgraf, the analysis begins with the express provisions of the statute. Section 1997e(a) lacks explicit direction regarding the exhaustion requirement for pending cases, as established in Martin, where it was noted that the statute does not contain language indicating it applies retroactively. Courts of appeals uniformly interpret § 1997e(a) as applicable solely to new actions, based on its wording, "no action shall be brought," which clearly addresses actions not yet initiated. The absence of terms like "no action shall be maintained" further supports this interpretation. 

This textual understanding aligns with the reasoning in Gibbs v. Ryan, where the court ruled that § 1915(g) of the PLRA, concerning prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis, did not retroactively affect previously granted statuses. The term "bring" was interpreted to mean the initiation of legal proceedings, indicating no intent for the "three strikes" provision to apply to pending cases.

The document also considers whether the Supreme Court's decision in Martin influences this reasoning. In Martin, the Court ruled on the non-retroactive application of § 1997e(d)(3) regarding attorney's fees in prisoner civil rights cases, concluding that applying the provision to services rendered before the PLRA took effect would constitute retroactive application, which was not supported by clear congressional intent.

The Court's analysis hinges on the application and potential retroactivity of § 1997e(d)(3) of the PLRA. It clarifies that the issue of retroactivity would not arise if Congress had explicitly stated a prospective application or if statutory construction rules eliminated retroactivity. The Court rejected claims of Congressional intent for prospective application, as articulated in Martin. The language comparison between § 1997e(d)(3) and § 1997e(a) is examined, with the conclusion that § 1997e(a) applies only to actions initiated after the PLRA's enactment, supported by the imperative language in § 1997e(a), which addresses future conduct. Consequently, the Court determined that § 1997e(a) does not affect cases pending at the time of the PLRA's enactment, thereby rejecting the District Court’s dismissal of Ghana's complaint on this basis.

However, the Court concurred with the District Court's alternative rationale for dismissal, noting that Ghana was obligated to exhaust administrative remedies under prevailing law before the PLRA. It acknowledged the established precedent requiring federal prisoners with mixed claims to exhaust remedies, while some circuits did not mandate exhaustion for those seeking only monetary damages. The Supreme Court's decision in McCarthy v. Madigan clarified that exhaustion was not required for federal prisoners seeking only monetary damages, emphasizing the necessity for parties to exhaust administrative remedies generally. The Court highlighted that the exhaustion requirement was a matter of judicial discretion, where factors such as the individual’s need for prompt access to courts were balanced against institutional interests in favor of exhaustion. Ultimately, the Court noted that the specific circumstances of McCarthy warranted a finding that exhaustion was not required due to the limitations of the BOP’s grievance procedures.

Prisoners with mixed claims must exhaust administrative remedies before filing complaints, a rule reaffirmed shortly after the McCarthy decision. When Ghana filed his original complaint, this exhaustion requirement was in effect. The District Court correctly dismissed his complaint under pre-PLRA law since he sought both injunctive and declaratory relief alongside monetary damages. Ghana's transfer from FCI Allenwood to a state prison rendered his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief moot, but he argued that he only needed to seek monetary damages, thus exempting him from the exhaustion requirement per McCarthy. The court disagreed, stating that Ghana's appeal was not moot in the constitutional sense and that it still had jurisdiction to review the District Court's dismissal. The court found no basis for reversing the dismissal due to Ghana's transfer, as it did not affect the correctness of the District Court's order. Ghana's reliance on Young v. Quinlan was insufficient, as that case did not clearly establish a precedent allowing for reversal based on mootness arising after the district court's decision. Ultimately, the court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Ghana's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Hon. Robert J. Ward of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed several points regarding Ghana's litigation history and the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Ghana, experienced in § 1983 and Bivens litigation, has a lengthy history of filing lawsuits, including seven in a short period from September 1995 to January 1996, and at least 38 in New Jersey between 1976 and 1983. His conduct has been criticized for causing confusion and delays in cases. Despite claiming to practice Afrikan Hebrewism since 1972, he has inconsistently identified as Jewish in various actions.

The excerpt outlines the former provisions of § 1997e, which mandated that federal courts could require exhaustion of administrative remedies in certain cases involving confined adults. The court noted three categories where new statutes, even absent explicit legislative authorization, can be applied to past events, including those affecting jurisdiction and procedural rule changes. The court rejected Ghana's argument to pursue damages while simultaneously exhausting administrative remedies and stated that his failure to appeal a prior disposition undermined his claims. The court also dismissed Ghana's argument regarding mootness due to his release from federal custody as unpersuasive. Prior to the PLRA, the exhaustion of remedies was at the court's discretion, a principle that did not change with Ghana's request for injunctive relief becoming moot.