Crosby v. Seminole Landing Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc.

Citation: 265 So. 3d 266Docket: 2170070

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; May 4, 2018; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Edward and Valerie Crosby are appealing an order from the Baldwin Circuit Court that purportedly extended a temporary restraining order (TRO) against them. The court's second TRO, which followed the first, was issued to remain in effect until a hearing on the Seminole Landing Property Owners Association, Inc. (SLPOA)'s request for a preliminary injunction could be held. A trial on the merits was consolidated with the preliminary injunction hearing and was scheduled for November 29, 2017, but has yet to occur. SLPOA's complaint, filed on August 4, 2017, sought injunctive relief related to a building the Crosbys were constructing, which was alleged to violate setback provisions in the property's restrictive covenants by being less than two feet from a side-lot line instead of the required ten feet. The SLPOA had previously notified the Crosbys of the alleged breach before filing an ex parte TRO application on August 9, 2017, which the Crosbys were not served with at that time. The trial court issued the first TRO on August 14, 2017, mandating an immediate halt to construction, with the order set to expire on August 23, 2017. The Crosbys received personal service of the complaint and TRO on August 17, 2017, and subsequently requested a one-week continuance for the hearing, which was granted, rescheduling it to September 20, 2017. On that date, the Crosbys moved to dissolve the first TRO, arguing it did not comply with Alabama civil procedure rules. At the hearing, SLPOA's attorney noted that the building was completed by the time the first TRO was issued and expressed uncertainty about what could still be restrained. SLPOA wished to proceed with the trial on the merits at a later date, as the September 20 hearing was solely for discussing the TRO.

The trial court noted that the initial Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) had expired after ten days, as per Rule 65(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The court suggested that the parties maintain the status quo until a trial on the merits could be conducted. The Crosbys' attorney confirmed that the building was nearly complete and acknowledged the expiration of the first TRO while still seeking its dissolution. She insisted on an evidentiary hearing for a preliminary injunction before proceeding to the trial on the merits, citing unresolved legal issues regarding the applicability of restrictive covenants to the building. 

The attorney for the SLPOA concurred with maintaining the status quo, arguing that a TRO was moot since the building was already constructed. The Crosbys' attorney contended that any order to maintain the status quo would violate Rule 65, emphasizing that they were entitled to a hearing for a preliminary injunction. She indicated that the building was meant for a pump house and that the Crosbys intended to install a water-filtration system. 

The trial court decided to hold an additional hearing before the merits trial, indicating that SLPOA needed to respond to the Crosbys' motion to dissolve the first TRO. On September 27, 2017, SLPOA filed its response and moved for a preliminary injunction, including previously verified allegations. The Crosbys did not respond to this motion. On October 2, 2017, the court issued a second TRO, denying the motion to dissolve the first TRO and extending it for good cause until a hearing on SLPOA's request for a preliminary injunction could occur. This second TRO was treated as a new TRO rather than an extension of the first, as the initial TRO had already lapsed. The Crosbys appealed the second TRO, arguing that the first was improperly granted without notice, thus invalidating any extension. The court reaffirmed that it must address actual controversies and not moot questions, referencing prior case law.

The expiration of the first Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the Crosbys' presence at the September 20, 2017 hearing, and the issuance of a second TRO render any concerns about the first TRO moot. Legal precedent dictates that issues irrelevant to a case's outcome will not be adjudicated. Consequently, any claims regarding the validity of the first TRO will not be addressed. The Crosbys' appeal claiming lack of notice for the first TRO is also moot, given their participation in the hearing.

However, the Crosbys argue the second TRO should be dissolved on several grounds. They assert that it does not comply with Rule 65 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which details specific requirements for TROs and injunctions. Specifically, the second TRO purported to extend the first TRO without clearly outlining the actions to be restrained, failing to meet the detailed description requirement of Rule 65(d)(1). If deemed a preliminary injunction, it similarly lacks specificity as mandated by Rule 65(d)(2). Therefore, the court agrees with the Crosbys that the second TRO does not satisfy these legal standards and is due to be reversed.

Additionally, the Crosbys contend that the second TRO should be overturned for not requiring the SLPOA to post security, as stipulated by Rule 65(c). However, since the first TRO had already mandated SLPOA to post $500 in security, and there is no record indicating that this amount was returned after the first TRO expired, the court concludes that the security requirement was still in effect, negating the need for additional security.

The Crosbys challenged the sufficiency of the $500 security ordered in the initial temporary restraining order (TRO), but this issue was not raised before the trial court, leading to its exclusion from appellate consideration based on established legal precedent. Furthermore, they argued that by the September 20, 2017, hearing, the basis for the SLPOA's request for injunctive relief had become moot, as SLPOA acknowledged the lack of need for a TRO. However, the Crosbys indicated they would continue with their construction plans, prompting the trial court to issue a second TRO aimed at maintaining the status quo until trial. The appellate court noted ambiguity in the second TRO regarding whether it intended to halt interior work or construction, especially since the building was substantially complete. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the second TRO and remanded the case for the trial court to assess whether the need for a TRO remained. If needed, the trial court must comply with procedural rules. The appellate court also urged prompt progression to trial on the merits and denied the Crosbys' request for attorney fees. Additionally, it was noted that the trial court was not informed of the Crosbys' intention to dissolve the TRO until the hearing.