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New Orleans Bulldog Society v. La. Soc'y for the Prevention Animals

Citation: 265 So. 3d 46Docket: NO. 2018-CA-0519

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 5, 2019; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods ruled on an appeal by the New Orleans Bulldog Society (NOBR) concerning the trial court's judgment regarding attorney's fees and penalties, as well as a declaratory judgment involving the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (LSPCA). The trial court awarded NOBR $5,000 in attorney's fees and $1,687.50 in costs but denied its request for penalties. The appellate court amended and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

NOBR, a nonprofit focused on dog welfare in Greater New Orleans, sought information from LSPCA, a private nonprofit with a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) with the City of New Orleans for animal control services. NOBR's itemized public records request included inquiries about LSPCA's policies on euthanasia, specific cases, and staff time related to animal control. The City Attorney's Office initially stated it was not the custodian of the records and directed NOBR to LSPCA. In response, LSPCA claimed it was not a 'public body' under the Public Records Law (PRL) and asserted compliance with its reporting obligations under the CEA.

After LSPCA's motion to dismiss NOBR's petition for a writ of mandamus was granted by the trial court, which concluded that LSPCA was not a quasi-public entity and had fulfilled its obligations, NOBR appealed. The appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court's decision, determining that LSPCA was indeed subject to the PRL.

LSPCA was determined to be an 'instrumentality of a municipality' for fulfilling certain municipal services as per the CEA, with the court noting that its contractual reporting obligations do not equate to 'public records' under Louisiana law. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld this ruling, confirming LSPCA's role in enforcing municipal animal control laws but limited document production to those relevant to its official functions as defined in the CEA. Following remand, LSPCA was ordered to produce uncontested documents in response to a public records request from NOBR, although it raised various objections, including claims of veterinary privilege and relevance to its duties. NOBR accepted LSPCA's responses without litigating the objections and provided billing information for attorney's fees. LSPCA subsequently sought a declaratory judgment on fees, while NOBR filed a motion to assess a total of $24,181.25 in fees and costs. The trial court ruled in favor of NOBR, awarding $5,000 in attorney's fees and $1,687.50 in costs, citing the Supreme Court's mandate for LSPCA to disclose relevant documents, and referenced the case as an expansion of the Public Records Law to include private entities.

The trial court referenced factors from the Louisiana Supreme Court in State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Williamson to assess reasonable attorney's fees, analyzing the itemized time sheets and costs submitted by NOBR. Following the judgment, NOBR appealed, raising four assignments of error, of which three will be addressed. The trial court has significant discretion under La. R.S. 44:35(D) in awarding attorney's fees, considering ten established factors for reasonableness, and the appellate review involves ensuring these factors were adequately considered, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.

In Assignment of Error No. 1, NOBR contends the trial court erred in determining it only partially prevailed in the lawsuit. The appellate court agrees with the trial court's finding of partial success, as La. R.S. 44:35(D)(1) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees only if a party prevails in full or partially, with discretion to award an appropriate portion. The appellate court cites Ferguson v. Stephens to illustrate that a party may be deemed fully successful if they achieve the primary objective of their suit. In Ferguson, the court reversed the trial court's denial of attorney's fees, finding the plaintiff fully prevailed in accessing the requested public records despite partial dismissals against other defendants.

In Roper v. City of Baton Rouge, the Court of Appeal First Circuit ruled on a case where the plaintiff, Roper, partially prevailed in her mandamus action against city officials for failing to adequately respond to her public records request. The trial court found only one defendant acted 'arbitrarily or capriciously' and awarded attorney's fees against that defendant, which the First Circuit affirmed, citing sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's discretion. The Court noted that the other defendants cooperated with the request. It determined that since Roper prevailed on some but not all claims, the trial court's award of fees was discretionary under Subsection 44:35D.

In a related argument, NOBR contended it fully prevailed in its case against LSPCA regarding the enforcement of the Public Records Law (PRL). However, the Court found that NOBR did not fully succeed in its suit's objective, which was to obtain specific documentation from LSPCA. Although NOBR secured a ruling that LSPCA was a quasi-public entity subject to the PRL, the Supreme Court limited the scope of document production. On remand, LSPCA produced uncontested documents while objecting to others based on veterinary privilege and relevancy. NOBR claimed these objections were untimely, while LSPCA argued it had raised objections earlier in the litigation. NOBR accepted LSPCA's partial production, which impeded further court review of the objections. Ultimately, NOBR did not achieve a judgment requiring the production of all requested documents, only those relevant to LSPCA's duties under the CEA. Consequently, the Court concluded that NOBR, similar to Roper, was partially successful, affirming the trial court's finding that NOBR did not prevail in full.

NOBR's second and third assignments of error contend that the trial court did not adequately apply the Williamson factors in determining attorney's fees, resulting in an insufficient award of $5,000. The Louisiana Supreme Court has identified ten factors to assess the reasonableness of attorney's fees, which must be considered regardless of whether a party fully prevails. LSPCA argues that these factors are irrelevant when a party prevails only in part. However, the Court maintains that the Williamson factors should still guide the determination of reasonable fees.

NOBR achieved a partial success by validating its public records request against LSPCA, which initially claimed it was not subject to the Public Records Law (PRL). NOBR's litigation efforts required extensive responsibility, including oral arguments before both the Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court and necessitating a motion for a status conference to compel LSPCA to produce documents. The importance of the case is underscored by its introduction of new legal principles regarding the PRL's applicability to private entities performing public functions.

NOBR's counsel has requested $22,493.75 in fees for 131.75 hours of work, supported by invoices, and notes multiple court appearances. The litigation's complexity and the detailed work performed, including multiple presentations before judicial panels, further justify the requested fee amount. Overall, the Court finds that NOBR's efforts and the significance of the litigation warrant a reevaluation of the attorney's fees awarded.

The litigation involved complex, novel issues under Louisiana law, with NOBR's counsel possessing over 30 years of combined legal experience. NOBR successfully expanded the PRL and obtained certain documents, demonstrating diligence and skill. The trial court's familiarity with the case was deemed adequate, despite a different judge overseeing the attorney fee hearing. NOBR contended it deserved full attorney's fees due to its overall success, while LSPCA argued that NOBR prevailed only in part and acted in good faith in its objections. NOBR rejected the relevance of good faith in determining fees and criticized the trial court's reliance on a 'white paper' regarding LSPCA's good faith. The court acknowledged that while good faith is not a primary factor, it is relevant in this context. Attorney fees are only permissible if authorized by statute or contract, specifically under La. R.S. 44:35(D)(1) and (F), with fees not exceeding those approved by the attorney general. The trial court utilized the Attorney General's Maximum Hourly Fee Schedule, which caps fees at $225 for attorneys with over ten years of experience and $125 for those with less than three years. The court emphasized that if a plaintiff only partially prevails, the award of attorney fees is at the court's discretion.

The court has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees, with an appellate review based on an abuse of discretion standard, defined as arbitrary or capricious decisions. The trial court awarded $5,000 in attorney's fees and covered litigation costs, based on the reasoning that it may assess costs equitably without reversal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. The trial court acknowledged that NOBR prevailed partially, and while it considered the Louisiana Attorney General's Maximum Hourly Fee Schedule and the Williamson factors, the appellate court found the $5,000 fee insufficient. It determined that the trial court abused its discretion and increased the attorney's fee award to $10,000. The judgment was affirmed in part and amended regarding the attorney's fees. Additionally, the release of veterinary records is restricted under Louisiana law and the American Veterinary Medical Association's ethical guidelines. NOBR's claim regarding the relevance of a legislative "white paper" to its attorney's fees was found to lack merit, as the trial court referenced it to illustrate litigation that expanded the Public Record Law (PRL) to private entities. The citation La.R.S. 44:35(D)(1) was amended in 2018 and is relevant to the case's legal context.