United States v. Jonathan Miller A/K/A "Wacky Jack" Jonathan Miller

Citations: 224 F.3d 247; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20904; 2000 WL 1161009Docket: 00-5052

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 17, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jonathan Miller, also known as "Wacky Jack," appealed his conviction for unlawful firearm sales. He pled guilty to selling firearms without a license, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). Miller sought a reduction in his offense level under the "sporting purposes" provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2)), arguing he possessed the firearms for sporting purposes before selling them unlawfully. The District Court denied this argument, and the Appeals Court affirmed the decision for different reasons.

Miller was indicted on five counts related to federal firearms violations, including selling multiple firearms to an undercover agent. After his arrest in 1999, he entered a plea agreement, leading to the dismissal of four counts and a guilty plea to one count of selling firearms without a license. At sentencing, the District Court classified Miller as a "prohibited person" due to a prior felony conviction, setting his base offense level at fourteen. Additionally, because he sold multiple firearms, his offense level was increased to fifteen, nine levels above the potential reduction he sought under the sporting purposes provision.

Miller sought a reduction to level six under section 2K2.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, arguing that the firearms he possessed were for "sporting purposes or collection." The District Court denied this request, concluding that Miller's sale of the firearms constituted "unlawful use," thus disqualifying him from the reduction intended for lawful possessors. The court noted that the issue raised was a question of first impression in the Circuit and expressed its legal interpretation on the matter. It determined that section 2K2.1(b)(2) applies only where the firearms were not unlawfully used, and since Miller’s actions involved illegal transactions, he was ineligible for the reduction. Consequently, the court ruled that defendants convicted of firearm trafficking cannot receive this reduction. After granting a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the court sentenced Miller to twelve months and one day in prison. Anticipating an appeal regarding the sentencing calculation, the court stayed Miller's sentence pending the outcome. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and Miller's appeal concerning the sentence calculation was permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). The Sentencing Commission intended section 2K2.1 to govern various firearms offenses, including specific offense characteristics that could adjust offense levels, such as the "sporting purposes reduction" outlined in section 2K2.1(b)(2). This provision specifies that only defendants who possess firearms solely for lawful purposes without unlawful use may qualify for the level six reduction.

Section 2K2.1(b)(2) establishes three criteria for an offense level reduction: (1) the defendant must not fall under subsections 2K2.1(a)(1) or (a)(5); (2) the defendant must possess all firearms and ammunition solely for lawful sporting or collection purposes; and (3) the defendant must not have unlawfully discharged or otherwise used the firearms or ammunition. Each requirement must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

The District Court found that Miller met the first requirement, not being subject to the aforementioned subsections. However, it concluded that Miller's illegal sale of firearms constituted unlawful use, preventing him from satisfying the third requirement. Conversely, the analysis presented here asserts that Miller failed to meet the second requirement, as selling the firearms means he did not possess them solely for lawful purposes.

The government agrees that Miller is not subject to subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5) but identifies him as a "prohibited person" due to a 1983 Pennsylvania conviction, justifying a base offense level of fourteen, which was raised to fifteen due to a multi-firearm transaction.

The second criterion explicitly requires possession of firearms solely for lawful sporting or collection purposes, a definition that excludes trafficking-related activities from eligibility for reduction. The language of section 2K2.1(b)(2) is clear that it does not encompass terms like "traffic," "sell," or "transfer," which are present in other subsections. For instance, section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides for increased offense levels if firearms are possessed in connection with other felony offenses. This omission in the "sporting purposes" guideline underscores the intent to exclude trafficking from reductions.

The Sentencing Commission's omission of trafficking, sale, or transfer language in section 2K2.1(b)(2) indicates an intention not to apply this provision to defendants convicted of such offenses, as supported by precedents like Russello v. United States. Miller was convicted for selling firearms without a license, which disqualifies him from receiving an offense level reduction under section 2K2.1(b)(2). He contends that "possessed" should refer to possession for lawful sporting purposes up until his illegal sale. However, the language of section 2K2.1(b)(2) does not impose a temporal limitation. Application note 10 clarifies that lawful purposes, including sporting use, must be evaluated based on circumstances surrounding the offense, which include the nature of the firearms, the defendant's criminal history, and actual use. Courts have consistently ruled that firearms must be possessed or used solely for lawful purposes to qualify for a reduction, rejecting the notion that lawful use among multiple intended uses suffices. Thus, the inquiry extends to the conduct leading to the conviction, reinforcing that both intended and actual use are critical in determining eligibility for the reduction.

Miller contends that an interpretation barring all defendants convicted of unlawful firearm sales from receiving an offense level reduction under section 2K2.1(b)(2) would effectively nullify this provision for those, like him, whose initial offense levels are set under section 2K2.1(a)(6). The District Court assigned Miller an initial offense level of fourteen due to his status as a "prohibited person," defined under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) as someone convicted of a crime punishable by over one year of imprisonment. However, Miller is not automatically disqualified from a section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction, as he may qualify if he meets its criteria.

While the court held that section 2K2.1(b)(2) does not apply to defendants convicted of trafficking offenses, this does not invalidate the provision. Some "prohibited persons" may have been convicted solely for illegal firearm possession. Thus, it is consistent to allow defendants whose initial offense levels come from section 2K2.1(a)(6) to be eligible for a section 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction, but to limit this reduction to those convicted of illegal possession for sporting or collection purposes.

Miller argues that the historical context of section 2K2.1 indicates an intention to allow reductions for trafficking offenses. Before consolidation on November 1, 1991, the guideline encompassed separate sections for possession, trafficking, and transportation offenses, with the "sporting purposes reduction" found only in possession guidelines. Following consolidation, Miller asserts this indicates an intent to allow reductions for all firearms offenses. However, the mere consolidation is insufficient to contradict the clear language of section 2K2.1(b)(2), as the Sentencing Commission could have explicitly extended the "sporting purposes" reduction to all firearms offenses but chose not to do so.

Miller argues for a reduction in his offense level based on application note 8 to section 2K2.1, which allows for a potential reduction if a defendant can show that their firearms possession did not involve violations of firearms laws or other unlawful purposes. Miller contends that since section 2K2.1(b)(2) does not exclude defendants whose offense level is determined under section 2K2.1(a)(7), all such defendants should qualify for a reduction. However, the court disagrees, noting that application note 8 does not mention section 2K2.1(b)(2) and fails to establish the necessary proof of lawful purpose required for the reduction under section 2K2.1(b)(2). The court emphasizes that the issue is whether Miller's firearms possession was solely for lawful sporting purposes, not whether it qualifies under other guidelines. Additionally, Miller did not bring up application note 8 in the District Court, undermining his claim. The court concludes that since Miller cannot prove lawful purpose in possessing the firearms, it need not address the legality of his firearms sale. Consequently, the court affirms the District Court's sentencing of Miller to twelve months and one day of incarceration.

Application note six to section 2K2.1 defines a "prohibited person" as someone under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, per 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Under Pennsylvania law, a felony of the third degree carries a maximum sentence of seven years, making Miller, previously convicted of "theft by unlawful taking," a prohibited person. Section 2K2.1(a)(6) assigns a base offense level of fourteen if a defendant is a prohibited person or convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30). The District Court did not assess why Miller possessed firearms prior to his illegal sale conviction, and it was noted that this Court has the capacity to make such an inquiry if necessary, although it ruled that the section did not apply in this case.

Sections 2K2.1(a)(1) and (a)(5) outline various base offense levels based on prior felony convictions and the nature of the firearms involved. The levels range from 26 for offenses involving specific firearms and at least two prior felony convictions, down to 18 for offenses involving certain firearms. While Miller did not clearly state his arguments from Section IV in his "Statement of the Issues," insights were drawn from his brief indicating reliance on those arguments. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Guidelines' commentary is highlighted, emphasizing that such interpretations must be followed unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent, as failure to adhere to this commentary could lead to a reversal of the sentence on appeal.

The Eighth Circuit previously rejected a similar argument to that of Miller in United States v. Smeathers, where a convicted felon was found guilty of unlawful possession after firing a rifle he purchased for hunting. The court determined that the circumstances surrounding the conduct leading to the conviction were pertinent to whether the firearm was possessed solely for sporting purposes. Federal law prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a felony (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). The District Court ordered Miller to surrender to the U.S. Marshal if the judgment was upheld, which was affirmed, implying the discharge of any stay of sentence. Additionally, the dissent argues that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) and Application Note 8 should be interpreted together, indicating that a reduction in the offense level for unlawful sales may apply under specific conditions. The dissent contends that the majority did not allow the sentencing judge to consider whether Miller's pre-sale possession met the necessary criteria, recommending a remand for further determination of Miller's case.