Terrance Matthews was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and two counts of witness intimidation. He received a total sentence of 292 months for the conspiracy charge and concurrent ten-year sentences for the intimidation charges. On appeal, Matthews raised four issues: the alleged improper admission of wiretap evidence due to sealing violations, the admission of a non-involving hearsay conversation, sufficiency of evidence for witness intimidation, and the admission of evidence from a 1991 arrest under Rule 404(b).
The court's review of the trial proceedings revealed that Matthews was implicated in a conspiracy involving significant cocaine distribution in Jacksonville and Miami, with evidence including wiretaps on key participants and the testimony of a cooperating courier named Nathaniel King. However, the appellate court found that the admission of Matthews's 1991 arrest was erroneous and not harmless, leading to the reversal of his convictions. The wiretap evidence primarily did not pertain to Matthews, as he was not mentioned in many relevant conversations, although one intercepted call did involve a discussion of a cocaine sale with another conspirator.
Moore informed Alston he would need "power pellets," referring to ecstasy pills, indicating a request for drugs. Alston assured Moore he would arrange this. Approximately 90 minutes later, a call between Matthews and Alston was intercepted. Matthews inquired if Moore had contacted Alston and whether he had quoted Moore a price for a kilogram of cocaine, using "twenty-six street" as code for $26,000. Alston denied giving that price and indicated that Matthews wanted him to provide the cocaine so Matthews could sell it to Moore. At trial, Alston could not confirm if he sold this specific kilogram to Matthews.
In 2001, the DEA arrested several individuals involved in the conspiracy, including Alston, who later pled guilty and testified against Matthews. Alston claimed to have sold over 400 kilograms of cocaine and received sentence reductions for cooperating with the government and accepting responsibility, resulting in a 135-month sentence instead of a potential 324 to 405 months. A pending Rule 35 motion could further reduce his sentence.
Alston detailed his role in the conspiracy, noting he partnered with James Brown to source cocaine, with connections to buyers in Jacksonville. Initially, they used a courier named Peewee, but after a DEA incident, buyers began traveling to Miami for purchases. Alston's primary supplier was George Morales, although he occasionally bought cocaine from Matthews, typically in small quantities. Their business relationship ended due to issues with the quality of Matthews’s cocaine. While incarcerated, Matthews sent Alston four letters, which were confirmed to be from him despite using pseudonyms.
The first letter from Matthews to Alston expresses concern about rumors alleging that Alston is cooperating with the government, urging him not to "be another sucker" for those involved. Matthews advises Alston to seek spiritual guidance, emphasizing the uncertainty of life and the need to be "right with Jesus," especially following the death of Sleep, a mutual acquaintance. Alston interprets this as a veiled threat related to his cooperation with authorities. The letter also warns Alston against being a "Judas," suggesting betrayal.
In the second letter, Matthews reiterates details about Sleep's violent death and encourages Alston to continue his religious practices. He questions why Alston isn't exonerating Matthews regarding involvement in criminal activities, indicating that the streets are discussing Alston's potential testimony against him. Matthews implies that he and others would support Alston if he faced wrongful accusations.
The third letter accuses Alston of lacking true faith and suggests that if he genuinely believed in Jesus, he would assist Matthews by revealing the truth about his non-involvement in the cocaine conspiracy. Matthews stresses the need for Alston's loyalty and friendship, underscoring the importance of honesty.
In the fourth letter, Matthews references recent events surrounding Sleep's death again and expresses frustration over Alston's lack of communication, suggesting that Alston's silence is complicating matters for Matthews, who is also facing legal challenges. Matthews's correspondence consistently seeks Alston's assurance that he will help clarify the situation regarding their alleged criminal connections.
A request was made for a person to stop cooperating with authorities regarding another individual, Matthews, who was implicated in a conspiracy but allegedly innocent. The speaker expressed concern for Matthews, describing him as sick and confused, and emphasized the personal toll of false accusations on relationships, citing a specific incident of violence against an associate, Sleep, who was shot after being perceived as cooperating with law enforcement.
Alston interpreted this message as a veiled threat to discourage his cooperation. Testimony from James Brown revealed his extensive involvement in the cocaine trade, including selling hundreds of kilograms. After pleading guilty to conspiracy charges, Brown received a reduced sentence due to his cooperation, with a pending motion for further reduction. His dealings with Alston were corroborated, with both testifying about purchasing cocaine from Matthews in the late 1990s.
Antonio Austin detailed his role in the conspiracy, selling cocaine and identifying Alston and Brown as his suppliers. He first purchased cocaine from Matthews in 2000 and witnessed further transactions. Jason Moore, another conspirator, expressed concerns about a lieutenant possibly cooperating with authorities, leading to a violent act intended to intimidate him, resulting in gunfire that injured his family but did not prove fatal.
Moore pled guilty to distributing 15 to 50 kilograms of cocaine and received a 324-month prison sentence due to his extensive criminal history. He anticipated a sentence reduction from a pending Rule 35 motion filed by the Government. During his testimony at trial, Moore detailed his involvement in a cocaine conspiracy, including purchasing cocaine from Alston and Brown and using Peewee as a courier until August 2000. He met Matthews in 1998 or 1999, and Matthews offered him cocaine at a lower price, leading to several purchases totaling approximately two kilograms between 1999 and 2001. An incident in Miami involved Moore trying to covertly transport cocaine back to Jacksonville, which was discovered by his associates, Wells and Richardson.
After his sentencing, Moore received a letter from Matthews, written under a pseudonym but acknowledged by both parties, suggesting that Moore was cooperating with the Government and warning of the dangers of being labeled a "snitch." The letter referenced another individual, Sleep, who was allegedly killed for cooperating and warned Moore to remain strong and avoid cooperation. Matthews expressed concern about his own indictment and claimed he had friends in prison relaying information about Moore's cooperation.
Rodney Cannon, another conspirator, pled guilty to distributing one kilogram of powder cocaine and 150 to 500 grams of crack cocaine. After receiving sentence reductions for acceptance of responsibility and minor role, Cannon was initially facing 120 to 135 months but was ultimately sentenced to 78 months after the Government filed a motion for substantial assistance. Cannon confirmed he sold four to six kilograms of cocaine monthly in Jacksonville, primarily sourced from his brother, Jason Moore.
Cannon had knowledge of Moore's cocaine supply chain, initially from Alston and Brown, later from Matthews, with Moore transporting it personally or via couriers like Peewee. Cannon estimated that he and Moore acquired approximately fifty kilograms of cocaine from Matthews between 1999 and 2001, despite not meeting Matthews until March 2000. His testimony detailed only two specific transactions, each involving one to two kilograms, both delivered by Matthews to Moore outside of Cannon's presence.
Shawn Richardson, involved in the conspiracy, initially faced a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence but received a significant reduction after the Government's motion under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) for substantial assistance, alongside reductions for acceptance of responsibility and his minor role, resulting in a 48-month sentence. Richardson testified about purchasing four to five ounces of cocaine weekly from Moore and Smith, priced at $750 to $800 per ounce. He ceased dealings with Moore after discovering two kilograms of cocaine hidden in his rental car without his consent. After this incident, Moore transported the cocaine to Jacksonville himself.
Anthony Wells, another conspirator, faced a similar ten-year minimum but received a reduced sentence of 72 months after the Government's motions for substantial assistance and other reductions. He sold cocaine and marijuana, sourcing from Moore and Smith, and purchased cocaine on consignment. Wells also witnessed the Miami incident involving the hidden cocaine and corroborated Richardson's account, recalling Matthews expressing concern over the logistics of transporting the cocaine.
Two members of the Miami-Dade Police Department testified about a 1991 incident related to Terrance Matthews after the conspirators concluded their testimonies.
On December 31, 1991, a police officer received a tip about a black male selling drugs from a Chevrolet in Miami. The officer observed Matthews engage in three drug exchanges, leading to his arrest after the third transaction. Matthews was found with cocaine, $2000 cash, and the trunk of the Chevrolet contained 251 grams of cocaine, marijuana, $1500, and three guns, all packaged for sale. During questioning, Matthews described himself as a “worker” in the drug trade, indicating his lower status in the hierarchy. Testimony from the officers was admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to demonstrate Matthews's intent to distribute drugs. The jury was instructed multiple times that this evidence should not be considered as proof of the charged acts but rather to establish Matthews's state of mind and intent.
In closing arguments, the Government asserted that the 1991 incident was relevant to proving Matthews's intent to distribute cocaine, noting the evolution from small bags to larger quantities by 1999. The defense countered that the evidence was introduced due to the Government's weak case and questioned the credibility of its witnesses. The Government rebutted this claim, emphasizing the importance of the 1991 evidence in establishing Matthews's intent. Ultimately, Matthews was convicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and obstruction of justice.
Matthews subsequently challenged the admission of two telephone conversations as evidence, arguing that they were not recorded in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a), which requires such recordings to be protected from editing or alterations.
Upon expiration of a wiretap order, recordings must be made available to the issuing judge and sealed per the judge's instructions. The seal is essential for the use or disclosure of the recorded communications. The order, which authorized interceptions starting March 16, 2001, was set to terminate either upon achieving its objectives or after thirty days. The district court determined that the order ceased when interceptions stopped on April 10, 2001, and the tapes were sealed two days later. This delay was deemed reasonable due to the court's other obligations and the time required for sealing. Three circuits have ruled that sealing within one or two days of expiration qualifies as "immediate" sealing. The court agrees with this interpretation, emphasizing that requiring sealing before the order's expiration is impractical when the order ends upon achieving objectives. The term "immediately" must have meaning, and sealing within one or two days is a workable definition.
Additionally, Matthews contends that the conversation between Alston and Moore, which pertained to an ecstasy sale, is inadmissible hearsay since it does not further the cocaine distribution conspiracy he is involved in. He argues that the conversation is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, violating rules of evidence. The admission of evidence under the relevant hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with factual findings assessed under a clearly erroneous standard.
The district court's application of Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 was reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. During a conversation between Moore and Alston, Moore indicated he would contact Matthews. Subsequently, Matthews called Alston, inquiring whether Moore had communicated with him and if he had discussed a price for a kilogram of cocaine. Alston interpreted Matthews's inquiries as coded language regarding a drug transaction, to which he responded negatively about the price but agreed to sell it to Matthews.
Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), statements by a coconspirator are not considered hearsay if made during the conspiracy's course and furtherance. Matthews contended that the government failed to demonstrate that the conversation was related to a conspiracy involving him. However, the court found no clear error in concluding that Moore’s statement about contacting Matthews was relevant to the cocaine conspiracy. While Matthews noted discussions of ecstasy occurred, the court reasoned that the conversation could pertain to multiple conspiracies without being inadmissible hearsay.
The evidence was deemed relevant, as it supported the notion of Matthews's involvement in the conspiracy by demonstrating a connection between Alston, Moore, and himself. Matthews's claim that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial due to mentions of ecstasy was also rejected. The court determined that the brief mention of ecstasy did not outweigh the probative value of the conversation, given the context of substantial drug use among the conspirators.
The district court acted within its discretion by not excluding certain conversations as evidence in Matthews's case. Matthews contested the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), which criminalizes the use of intimidation or corrupt persuasion to influence testimony in official proceedings. The indictment included charges for both intimidation and corrupt persuasion, but the jury was instructed to consider only the intimidation aspect. The sufficiency of evidence is reviewed de novo, favoring the Government's perspective.
Whether a communication constitutes a threat is a factual question for the jury. The court emphasized that if the evidence did not meet the Government's burden, retrial would not be permitted due to double jeopardy. Although the jury received initial instructions regarding both intimidation and corrupt persuasion, they were ultimately instructed to find Matthews guilty only if the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he used intimidation.
While not overwhelming, the evidence, including letters from Matthews to Alston and Moore discussing a murder linked to cooperation with the Government, was deemed sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Matthews intended to intimidate them to prevent their testimony. Specific statements made by Matthews suggested an awareness of the recipients' cooperation against him, which the jury could interpret as intimidation, despite Matthews's potential alternative explanations.
Matthews's challenge regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is deemed without merit. The court addressed 18 U.S.C. § 876, which prohibits threatening communications via mail. Additionally, Matthews contested the district court's admission of Rule 404(b) testimony concerning his 1991 arrest. Rule 404(b) restricts the use of evidence from other crimes to prove character but allows it for purposes such as motive, intent, and identity. The relevant two-step test established in United States v. Beechum requires determining if the extrinsic offense is relevant to an issue besides character and ensuring that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.
The court evaluated whether Matthews's 1991 arrest evidence was admissible to prove intent in the current case. The government argued that Matthews's not-guilty plea raised intent as a central issue in his defense against conspiracy charges related to cocaine distribution. However, the court noted that it is implausible for a jury to find Matthews committed the acts described by witnesses without the requisite guilty intent. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an agreement among conspirators, Matthews's knowledge of the agreement's general purpose, and his voluntary participation. The jury was correctly instructed on the conspiracy's requirements, emphasizing that a formal agreement is not necessary for establishing conspiracy.
The Government's case against Matthews hinges on witness testimony regarding his involvement in large cocaine transactions between 1999 and 2001, with quantities ranging from one to twenty kilograms sold at prices of $18,000 to $23,000 per kilogram. The evidence presented was intended to demonstrate Matthews's participation in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, asserting that intent to conspire can be established without complete knowledge of all details or participants in the scheme. The Government contended that even minimal involvement or a general understanding of the plan suffices for a conspiracy conviction. However, mere presence at a crime scene or incidental actions that support a conspiracy do not equate to membership in it. The prosecution's reliance on the credibility of cooperating witnesses, whose criminal backgrounds undermined their reliability, was scrutinized during the trial. The court noted that the Government's need for extrinsic evidence stemmed from concerns that jurors might not find the witnesses credible enough to believe Matthews intended to conspire to distribute cocaine. Ultimately, the law prohibits inferring current criminal behavior from past actions without sufficient evidence, and the Government's argument that Matthews had a continuous intent to distribute cocaine dating back to 1991 was rejected.
The defendant's intent to distribute cocaine from 1999 to June 2001 is emphasized, highlighting a shift from dealing small quantities to kilograms, indicating a larger scale of operation. The Government's argument regarding the admissibility of prior drug dealing evidence in cases where the defendant pleads not guilty to conspiracy is criticized as flawed. It asserts that such evidence cannot be automatically admissible solely based on the plea.
A reference to United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza illustrates a case where prior arrests were deemed admissible because the defendant's defense centered on intent. The ruling emphasized that a defendant’s choice to focus on a different defense strategy does not lessen the prosecution's obligation to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The discussion around Diaz's case serves to clarify that evidence of prior criminal activity could be relevant to establish intent, regardless of the defendant's defense focus. The passage concludes by noting that the second quoted paragraph from Diaz-Lizaraza is merely hypothetical and not directly applicable to the current case.
"Dicta" refers to statements in a legal opinion that are not essential for resolving the case and thus lack binding authority. The document critiques the idea that a defendant must specifically stipulate intent to preclude the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence, asserting disagreement with the Diaz-Lizaraza case. It emphasizes that if intent is genuinely disputed, a simple stipulation will not suffice to exclude Rule 404(b) evidence. A formal stipulation could complicate jury instructions unnecessarily, particularly when the core issue is whether the defendant committed the alleged acts rather than intent.
The government relies on the precedent set in United States v. Delgado, which holds that a not guilty plea makes intent a material issue, obligating the government to prove intent, potentially through Rule 404(b) evidence unless the defendant takes steps to remove intent as an issue. The document distinguishes other cases cited by the government, clarifying that in those instances, the evidence was relevant to intent rather than character, and was admitted due to the defendant's claims that necessitated proof of criminal intent.
Extrinsic offense evidence is admissible to establish intent when the prosecution anticipates that the defendant will deny intent related to the charged offense, particularly if the defense does not affirmatively state that intent will not be contested. In *United States v. Hicks*, the court found intent was clearly at issue due to the defendant being apprehended with a substantial amount of cocaine. Similarly, in *United States v. Wyatt*, the defendant claimed to be acting as an honorary deputy while involved in a conspiracy to land a marijuana-laden plane.
The government reference to prior cases showed that when intent is disputed, such as in *Cardenas*, where the defendant denied involvement in a cocaine delivery, the admission of 404(b) evidence may be justified if the defendant does not indicate that intent will not be a defense. However, if the charged conduct is not open to an innocent explanation—like the extensive cocaine sales attributed to Matthews—then the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove intent is inappropriate. The court must ensure that there is a plausible scenario where the defendant might have committed the alleged acts without the requisite intent for such evidence to be admissible.
A case's outcome hinges on the strength of evidence proving the defendant's actions. In Terrance Matthews's case, if the jury believed his co-conspirators, there was no doubt about his intent to conspire to distribute cocaine. The admission of evidence from Matthews’s 1991 arrest was deemed unnecessary and prejudicial, as it primarily indicated criminal propensity rather than intent related to the current charges. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, relevant evidence must make a fact more or less probable, but the past arrest did not contribute to proving Matthews's intent, given that the charged conduct had no innocent explanation.
Even if past drug dealings could be relevant, the incremental value of such evidence was negligible since intent could already be inferred from the charges. The court's admission of the 404(b) evidence was an abuse of discretion, as it failed the Beechum analysis that balances probative value against potential prejudice. The danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any slight probative value, leading to an additional finding of abuse of discretion under Rule 403. Despite this, the government argued for affirming Matthews's conviction, citing that nonconstitutional errors such as this do not warrant reversal unless they likely affected the defendant's rights. Reversal is only necessary if the error substantially influenced the verdict, which was not the case here, as there was sufficient evidence supporting the conviction independent of the erroneous evidence.
A judgment cannot be upheld if there is a reasonable doubt that an error substantially influenced the jury's decision, as established in Kotteakos v. United States. The Government has the burden to prove that any error was harmless. In this case, there is a significant likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict, leaving the court in grave doubt about the influence of the error. The Government argued it needed extrinsic offense evidence to support the credibility of its witnesses, who had received sentence reductions and were in close proximity during incarceration, raising concerns about their reliability. The sole evidence presented by the Government included a phone call between Matthews and a co-conspirator discussing a drug deal, but this was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor's attempts to connect Matthews's past drug dealings to the current charges likely unduly influenced the jury. Given the lack of credible evidence without the erroneously admitted testimony, the court cannot conclude that the error did not impact the jury's decision. Consequently, Matthews's convictions are reversed.
