Wood Materials LLC v. City of Harahan

Citation: 262 So. 3d 1034Docket: NO. 18-CA-391

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 18, 2018; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiff-appellant City of Harahan appeals the trial court's May 4, 2018 judgment, which upheld the exception of prescription in favor of defendants-appellees, Wood Materials, L.L.C. and Wood Resources, L.L.C., thereby dismissing the City's reconventional demand against the Wood Companies with prejudice. The case centers on the Wood Companies' composting operations in the Non-Urban Batture District within the City's limits, where they have engaged in various activities since the 1960s, including composting since 2010. The East Jefferson Levee District issued permits for their composting site and related activities in 2011, which were renewed through 2016.

In 2012, following Hurricane Isaac, the City contracted the Wood Companies to manage organic debris, for which it paid them $23,413.00. In June 2016, the Wood Companies sought a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Proposed Ordinance No. 2016-3, which intended to restrict certain activities in the Batture, claiming their operations were nonconforming uses protected under Louisiana law. In response, the City filed a reconventional demand to declare the composting facility's operation unlawful and sought an injunction.

The Wood Companies invoked the exception of prescription, arguing that the City had known about their composting activities since at least February 15, 2012, exceeding the three-year prescriptive limit established by Louisiana law. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, supporting the Wood Companies' position that the City's claims were time-barred.

The City contended that La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3) applies to actions challenging zoning use regulation violations, allowing municipalities (excluding Orleans Parish, New Orleans, and East Baton Rouge Parish) a five-year period to file actions from the date they received written notification of a violation. The City argued that its action against the Wood Companies had not expired under this provision. However, the trial court found that the City had received actual written notice of the alleged violation by October 2012 and ruled that the City's lawsuit, filed more than three years later, was prescribed under La. R.S. 9:5625(C). Consequently, the trial court maintained the Wood Companies' exception and dismissed the City's reconventional demand with prejudice. The City appealed this judgment, claiming the trial court misinterpreted La. R.S. 9:5625, asserting that the five-year prescriptive period in La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3) should apply instead of the three-year period in La. R.S. 9:5625(C). The appellate review will adhere to a de novo standard regarding statutory interpretation, focusing on legislative intent and the clarity of the statute's language. The appellate court will seek to understand the legislature's purpose, interpreting ambiguous language within the broader context of the statute.

The court's primary aim in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent, prioritizing the spirit of the law over a literal interpretation when necessary to avoid absurd outcomes. Statutes should be applied logically and consistently with legislative goals. Zoning laws are intended to enhance community development by designating specific areas for particular building types and uses, thereby minimizing conflicts between different land uses. Zoning is recognized as a legislative function derived from governmental police power, granted to local governments by the Louisiana Constitution. Relevant statutes, such as La. R.S. 33:4721 and La. R.S. 33:4723, empower municipalities to regulate various aspects of land use to promote public health, safety, and welfare while considering the character of districts and the appropriate use of land.

The excerpt also details La. R.S. 9:5625 regarding the enforcement of zoning and building regulations, specifying that civil or criminal actions related to violations must be initiated within five years of the first violation. For violations existing before August 1, 1956, actions must be initiated within one year of that date. Notably, certain actions related to nonconforming signs and billboards are exempt from these time limits.

Any prescription accrued over a two-year period related to zoning, building, or subdivision violations, excluding nonconforming signs and billboards, is not affected by this Section. Properties involved in such violations will maintain the same legal status as land uses or construction features that are nonconforming due to newly adopted restrictions. The governing authority retains the right to remove nonconforming signs and billboards according to R.S. 33:4722.

For East Baton Rouge and Jefferson parishes, all civil or criminal actions related to zoning or building violations must be initiated within three years after the parish or its agency receives written notice of the violation. Actions concerning use regulation violations must be filed within five years from the first act of violation. If the parish initiates an investigation following a violation notification and finds the violation has ceased, the prescriptive period is interrupted; any new or recurring violation resets this prescriptive period.

The provisions outlined in this Section take precedence over any conflicting laws but do not apply to the parish of Orleans or the city of New Orleans. Properties designated as historic districts or landmarks are exempt from these provisions, but actions to enforce zoning restrictions must be brought within ten years from the first act of violation.

The provisions under this subsection apply exclusively to zoning or planning restrictions established by municipalities or parishes responsible for such regulations. The prescriptive period for enforcing zoning restrictions in the Vieux Carre section of New Orleans begins when the city agency receives written notice of the violation. However, rights obtained through prescription prior to August 15, 2007, remain unaffected.

The City asserts that the trial court erred by applying a three-year prescriptive period from La. R.S. 9:5625(C) in its action against the Wood Companies for violating use regulations. The City claims that the five-year prescriptive period in subsection (A)(3) should apply since it had no actual written notice of the violation until July 25, 2011, which is within the five-year timeframe before the City filed suit on July 25, 2016. Conversely, the Wood Companies argue that all political subdivisions within Jefferson Parish must adhere to the three-year period outlined in subsection (C), which starts upon receiving actual written notice of the violation. They contend that the City acknowledged written notice of their composting activities by October 2012, making the 2016 suit prescribed.

An analysis of La. R.S. 9:5625 indicates varying interpretations in its language, prompting a review of the legislative history to understand its intent. Originally, La. R.S. 9:5625 outlined a singular set of prescriptive periods for all parishes. The 1993 amendments introduced specific prescriptive periods for parishes with populations exceeding 325,000.

House Bill 931, enacted in 1993, introduced subsections (C) through (F) to La. R.S. 9:5625, establishing specific legal timelines for civil and criminal actions related to zoning and building restrictions. Subsection (C) applies exclusively to parishes and municipalities with populations exceeding 325,000. It mandates that any legal action regarding violations of zoning, building, or subdivision regulations must be initiated within three years from the date written notice of the violation is received, with a maximum limit of five years from the first act of violation. For parishes with populations between 325,000 and 400,000, including those within such parishes, actions for use regulation violations must also be brought within five years.

The legislative intent behind the 1993 amendment was to apply these provisions geographically, specifically affecting only East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parishes, the only parishes over the specified population threshold at that time. Consequently, entities within Jefferson Parish, including the City of Harahan, must adhere to these prescriptive periods for enforcement actions involving zoning and building regulations.

In 2011, in response to population changes following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and based on the 2010 U.S. Census, Senate Bill 9 was proposed to amend certain provisions of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, including those within La. R.S. 9:5625, to address limitations based on population classifications.

Senate Bill No. 9, titled "Census," aims to clarify its applicability to specific political subdivisions and adjust population categories. The 2011 amendment to La. R.S. 9:5625(C) eliminated the prior population threshold of 325,000 and instead specified East Baton Rouge Parish and Jefferson Parish as the affected areas. The amendment indicates that La. R.S. 9:5625(C) applies to all political subdivisions within these parishes, not just to the parishes themselves or particular governmental entities. The legislative intent was to maintain the applicability of La. R.S. 9:5625(C) to all of Jefferson Parish, including the City of Harahan, rather than restrict it based on the City’s interpretation. 

The City of Harahan contends that La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3) governs its enforcement actions since it views itself as an "instrumentality" of the State, not of Jefferson Parish. It argues that subsection (C) pertains exclusively to zoning violations by the Jefferson Parish government, while municipalities operate under subsection (A)(3). However, this argument lacks merit, as subsection (C) explicitly states its provisions apply to all political subdivisions within East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parishes. A literal interpretation that distinguishes between the parish and its subdivisions would contradict the legislative intent and lead to illogical outcomes, implying that smaller subdivisions would have more enforcement latitude than the parish itself. The legislative history does not support the City's position, which is not backed by any legal authority.

The trial court correctly concluded that the City of Harahan is subject to the prescriptive periods for enforcement actions outlined in La. R.S. 9:5625(C). The City contends that this statute does not apply to use violations outside of East Baton Rouge Parish, asserting that such violations in other parishes are governed solely by La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3). The City argues that La. R.S. 9:5625 differentiates between zoning/building/subdivision regulations and use regulations, imposing a five-year prescriptive period for use violations statewide, excluding Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, with the start date differing based on parish. Specifically, in East Baton Rouge, the period begins with the first act of violation, while in other parishes, it starts upon actual written notice of the violation. The City maintains that La. R.S. 9:5625(C) applies only to zoning and building violations, asserting that use violations are exempt from its three-year prescriptive period. However, the court disagreed with the City's interpretation, affirming that enforcement actions for use violations are indeed covered by La. R.S. 9:5625(C) and rejecting the City's argument that such violations are excluded from this statute except in East Baton Rouge.

The interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:5625(C) establishes a three-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions regarding zoning, building, subdivision, or use regulations in Jefferson Parish, commencing from the date of written notice. A five-year peremptive period applies to these actions, except for use regulation violations, which are governed by the three-year period. The inclusion of an exception for use violations indicates legislative intent that these actions fall under subsection (C), not the five-year period in subsection (A)(3). 

The court found that the City of Harahan's interpretation, which would subject use violations to the longer period, misreads the statute and renders the exception meaningless. The City received written notice of the alleged use violation related to the Wood Companies' composting activities by October 2012 but did not initiate enforcement until July 25, 2016, exceeding the three-year limit. Therefore, the City’s enforcement rights were prescribed before the filing of its reconventional demand. The trial court's decision to maintain the exception of prescription and dismiss the City’s demand was affirmed. 

A dissenting opinion highlighted the City of Harahan's status as a Lawrason Act municipality, referencing prior case law that underpins its governance structure.

The term "municipality" is defined in the Louisiana Constitution as an incorporated city, town, or village. Harahan qualifies as both a "local governmental subdivision" and a "political subdivision." The term "instrumentality" lacks a formal definition in Louisiana law; however, based on jurisprudence, the City of Harahan does not fit the common understanding of "instrumentality" concerning Jefferson Parish. In Polk v. Edwards, the Louisiana Supreme Court established criteria to assess whether an entity is an instrumentality of the state, emphasizing accountability, contract authorization, and regulatory autonomy. The court noted that political subdivisions like municipal governments are not considered instrumentalities of the state. The analysis in Slowinski v. England Economic and Industrial Development District further examined whether an entity functions as "an arm of the state" or operates with local autonomy. The court highlighted that legislative definitions of "instrumentality" in various statutes carry significant implications, suggesting that the legislature's intentional language should be respected. The principle of statutory construction dictates that the legislature is presumed to have considered the significance of every term in a statute. Reference to La. R.S. 9:5625 reveals that amendments in 2011 specifically removed mentions of "municipalities," indicating a legislative intent to limit the application of certain laws to specific locations. The assertion that the current language of La. R.S. 9:5625(C) resulted from a drafting oversight is rejected.

The court asserts that it lacks the authority to rewrite laws, emphasizing that its role is to interpret legislation rather than create it, as established in prior case law. Legislative changes must originate from the legislature, not the judiciary. The specific provisions of La. R.S. 9:5625(C) and (D) apply exclusively to East Baton Rouge and Jefferson parishes or their instrumentalities. The court declines to extend the definition of "instrumentality" to include autonomous municipalities, such as the City of Harahan, and finds no absurd consequences arising from its exclusion from the statute. 

The interpretation of La. R.S. 9:5625's legislative history indicates that the 1993 amendments introduced a three-year prescriptive period for municipalities over 325,000 in population. Since Harahan has never met this population threshold, the court concludes that the three-year prescriptive period does not apply to it. The majority's interpretation, which posits that Harahan falls under the three-year period due to its location in Jefferson Parish (which exceeds 325,000), is seen as inconsistent with the statutory language. Consequently, the five-year prescriptive period applies because Harahan is not an instrumentality of Jefferson Parish, and the City had written notice of the Wood Companies' activities by February 15, 2012, with its reconventional demand filed on July 21, 2016.

The City of Harahan is not considered an instrumentality of Jefferson Parish, leading to the application of La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3), which establishes a five-year prescriptive period from the date the City received written notice of a violation, in contrast to the three-year period outlined in La. R.S. 9:5625(C). Consequently, the City’s cause of action was not time-barred when it filed its reconventional demand. The Batture, an area within the City’s municipal boundaries but outside its levees, is designated under City Ordinance 1333 and relevant state statutes. 

The 1993 amendments to La. R.S. 9:5625 did not modify subsection A, and although New Orleans and Orleans Parish met the population threshold for exceptions under subsection (F), the City of Harahan, though not exceeding 325,000, falls under Jefferson Parish’s jurisdiction, thus subjecting its enforcement actions to the prescriptive periods of La. R.S. 9:5625(C). The title of legislative acts serves to inform of the legislative intent, as established in Cobb v. Louisiana Bd. of Institutions. 

The City mistakenly cites Parish of St. Charles ex rel. Dept. of Planning and Zoning v. Bordelon to argue that all enforcement actions in parishes statewide are governed by La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3), with the exception of East Baton Rouge Parish. The Bordelon case involved St. Charles Parish and confirmed that the five-year period applied due to the timing of notice regarding a use regulation violation, making it factually distinct from the current case. In instances without written notice of a violation, La. R.S. 9:5625(C) mandates actions to be initiated within five years of the first act constituting the violation. Local governmental subdivisions are defined in the Louisiana Constitution, encompassing parishes, municipalities, and other local government units authorized to perform governmental functions.