Wood Materials LLC v. City of Harahan

Citation: 262 So. 3d 1034Docket: NO. 18-CA-391

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 18, 2018; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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The City of Harahan (the "City") appeals the trial court's May 4, 2018 judgment that upheld the Wood Companies' exception of prescription and dismissed the City's reconventional demand regarding an alleged "use violation" against the Wood Companies, with prejudice. The Wood Companies operate a composting facility within the City's limits in the Non-Urban Batture District and have been engaged in composting since 2010, having received necessary permits for their operations. The City had contracted the Wood Companies to manage debris following Hurricane Isaac in 2012, for which it paid them $23,413. 

In 2016, the Wood Companies filed a declaratory judgment action concerning the validity of Proposed Ordinance No. 2016-3, which sought to restrict their operations. The City countered with a demand claiming the composting facility violated the City Zoning Ordinance (CZO) and sought injunctive relief. The Wood Companies asserted that the City's claims were barred by prescription, citing that the City was aware of their composting activities by February 15, 2012, which is beyond the three-year prescriptive period outlined in La. R.S. 9:5625(C). The trial court affirmed the Wood Companies' argument, leading to the dismissal of the City's claims.

The City contended that La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3) applied to its action against the Wood Companies for zoning use regulation violations, arguing it had five years from receiving actual written notice of the violation to initiate legal action. The trial court, however, determined that the City had received such notice by October 2012, rendering its lawsuit, filed more than three years later, prescribed under La. R.S. 9:5625(C). Consequently, the court maintained the Wood Companies' exception and dismissed the City's reconventional demand with prejudice. The City appealed, asserting that the trial court misinterpreted La. R.S. 9:5625 by applying the enforcement provisions of La. R.S. 9:5625(C) instead of the five-year period in La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3).

The appeal involves a de novo review regarding the interpretation of La. R.S. 9:5625, focusing on legislative intent and the statute's language. The court emphasized that if a statute is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written; if ambiguous, its meaning must be sought within its context. The court also noted that legislative intent should guide statutory interpretation and that absurd consequences from a literal reading could warrant a more reasonable application of the law.

Statutes must be logically interpreted in line with the Legislature's intent. Zoning is intended to improve land use by designating specific building types to particular areas, minimizing hardship on property owners. It involves territorial division to accommodate different land uses, reducing conflicts between them. Zoning is inherently a legislative function, deriving authority from government bodies' police power. Local governments are explicitly empowered to enact zoning regulations under La. Const. art. VI, § 17. La. R.S. 33:4721 allows municipalities to regulate various aspects of land use to promote community welfare. Zoning regulations are to be developed with consideration of district characteristics and suitable land use. La. R.S. 9:5625 outlines the statute of limitations for enforcing zoning violations, establishing that actions must be initiated within five years of the first violation, with specific conditions for pre-1956 violations and use regulations. Additionally, any existing two-year prescription period for violations is unaffected by this statute.

In cases where zoning, building, or subdivision regulations have been violated and the prescription period has lapsed, the affected property will retain a nonconforming legal status similar to other nonconforming land uses or structures established by these regulations. The governing authority is permitted to remove nonconforming signs and billboards in accordance with R.S. 33:4722.

Specific provisions apply only to East Baton Rouge and Jefferson parishes or their instrumentalities. Actions regarding enforcement of zoning regulations must be initiated within three years of the governing authority receiving written notice of the violation, except for use regulation violations, which must be pursued within five years from the first act of violation. In East Baton Rouge, all civil or criminal actions for use regulation violations must also follow the five-year rule.

If an investigation is initiated following a violation notification and it is determined that the violation has ceased, the prescription period is interrupted. For any subsequent violations, the prescription will start anew upon written notification of the recurrence. Again, actions for use regulation violations in East Baton Rouge must be brought within five years from the initial act.

This Section supersedes any conflicting laws, and the provisions regarding East Baton Rouge and Jefferson parishes do not apply to Orleans Parish or New Orleans city. Additionally, properties designated as historic districts or landmarks are exempt from these provisions, but actions to enforce zoning restrictions must still be initiated within ten years from the initial violation. These provisions specifically pertain to municipal or parish zoning, planning, or building restrictions.

In the Vieux Carre section of New Orleans, the prescriptive period for enforcing zoning restrictions or regulations, or for violations thereof, begins when the city receives written notice of the violation. Rights obtained through prescription prior to August 15, 2007, remain unaffected. The City contends that the trial court incorrectly applied a three-year prescriptive period from La. R.S. 9:5625(C) to its enforcement action against the Wood Companies, arguing instead for a five-year period from subsection (A)(3). The City claims it did not receive actual written notice of the violation until July 25, 2011, making its 2016 enforcement action timely. Conversely, the Wood Companies assert that the three-year period applies and that the City had written notice of the violation by October 2012, thus making the 2016 suit prescribed. The interpretation of La. R.S. 9:5625, particularly subsections (A)(3) and (C), is complex, leading to a review of the legislative history. The statute originally enacted in 1993 provided uniform prescriptive periods statewide but was amended to create specific periods for jurisdictions with populations over 325,000, including the current provisions in subsections (C) through (F).

Actions related to zoning, building, or subdivision regulations—whether civil or criminal—must be initiated within specific timeframes based on the nature of the violation and the population of the governing parish. Generally, such actions must be commenced within three years of written notice of the violation. For violations of use regulations, the timeframe extends to five years from the first act of violation. 

In parishes with populations exceeding 325,000, specifically East Baton Rouge Parish and Jefferson Parish (as identified by the 1993 amendment), these time limits apply to all governmental entities within those parishes. Consequently, enforcement actions within Jefferson Parish, including the City of Harahan, must adhere to these prescribed periods—three years from written notice for zoning/building/subdivision violations and five years for use regulation violations.

The 2011 amendments, following population changes due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, aimed to adjust the applicability of these timeframes based on updated census data, reflecting shifts in populations and ensuring the provisions remained relevant to the affected areas.

Senate Bill No. 9, titled "Census," aimed to clarify applicability to specific political subdivisions or local areas and adjust population categories accordingly. The 2011 amendment to La. R.S. 9:5625(C) eliminated a previous population threshold of 325,000, instead specifying East Baton Rouge Parish and Jefferson Parish as the affected areas. This amendment indicates the Legislature's intent for La. R.S. 9:5625(C) to apply to all of East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parishes and all political subdivisions within them, including the City of Harahan, rather than just the parishes or specific governmental entities. The legislative history reveals no intention to impose a more restrictive prescriptive period for Jefferson Parish or its instrumentalities while allowing municipalities greater flexibility. The City of Harahan’s argument that La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3) governs its enforcement actions instead of subsection (C) is unsubstantiated, as subsection (C) explicitly applies to all political subdivisions within Jefferson Parish. A literal interpretation of the amendment, as proposed by the City, would yield illogical outcomes, suggesting that smaller subdivisions would have more leeway than the parish itself, contrary to the Legislature's intent.

The argument presented by the City of Harahan lacks support from the legislative history of the statute and fails to cite relevant legal authority. The Legislature's intent was to maintain, not limit or expand, applicability. Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that the City is subject to the prescriptive periods for enforcement actions outlined in La. R.S. 9:5625(C). The City contends that La. R.S. 9:5625(C) does not apply to use violations outside East Baton Rouge Parish, asserting that such violations in other parishes, including Jefferson Parish, fall solely under La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3). The City claims that La. R.S. 9:5625 differentiates between zoning/building/subdivision restrictions and use regulations, proposing that a five-year prescriptive period applies to use violations in most parishes, with the start date based on the first act constituting the violation or actual written notice. Additionally, the City argues that the three-year period in subsection (C) pertains only to zoning/building/subdivision violations and specifically excludes use violations. The City believes that the exception in subsection (C) aligns it with subsection (A)(3) regarding the five-year period commencement. However, the court disagrees, stating that the City's interpretation of La. R.S. 9:5625, which excludes enforcement actions for use violations from subsection (C) outside East Baton Rouge Parish, is incorrect and therefore rejects it.

The statute interpretation regarding Jefferson Parish establishes a three-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions against zoning, building, subdivision, or use regulations, starting from the date of actual written notice. A five-year peremptive period applies to these actions, except for use regulation violations, which are not subject to the five-year period. The inclusion of an exception for use violations in subsection (C) indicates legislative intent to govern these actions separately from the five-year period in subsection (A)(3). The City of Harahan’s view that all use regulations fall under the five-year period undermines the specificity of the exception in subsection (C). The Legislature did not intend for use violations to be governed by the longer prescriptive period, as indicated by its explicit language. Consequently, any enforcement action related to a use regulation must adhere to the three-year period, beginning when the City received written notice, which occurred by October 2012. The City did not file suit until July 2016, rendering its enforcement action time-barred. Therefore, the trial court correctly upheld the prescription exception raised by Wood Materials, L.L.C. and Wood Resources, L.L.C., dismissing the City’s reconventional demand with prejudice. The judgment is affirmed, despite a dissenting opinion referencing the City’s status under the Lawrason Act, which does not alter the prescriptive period findings.

"Municipality" is defined in the Louisiana Constitution as an incorporated city, town, or village. The City of Harahan qualifies as both a "local governmental subdivision" and a "political subdivision." Although "instrumentality" lacks a formal definition in Louisiana, jurisprudence suggests that Harahan does not function as an "instrumentality" of Jefferson Parish. In the case of Polk v. Edwards, the Louisiana Supreme Court identified factors to determine if an entity is an instrumentality of the state, including accountability to government branches, contractual autonomy, and rule-making authority. The court highlighted that political subdivisions, like municipal and parish governments, possess the powers of taxation and expropriation, distinguishing them from state instrumentalities.

The Supreme Court's analysis in Slowinski v. England Economic and Industrial Development District further supports this distinction, examining whether an entity operates as an "arm of the state" or is sufficiently autonomous like local governments. The legislature's explicit definitions of "instrumentality" in various statutes indicate intentionality, suggesting that if the legislature intended to include the City of Harahan as an instrumentality, it would have clearly articulated this in the law. Statutory construction principles indicate that every word in a statute is intended to have meaning, and the clarity of the law should be preserved unless it leads to absurd outcomes.

The review of La. R.S. 9:5625's legislative history aligns with this reasoning, reinforcing the conclusion that the City of Harahan is not an instrumentality of Jefferson Parish.

The 2011 amendments to the statute removed references to "municipalities" in sections C, D, and F but retained provisions in subsections C and D that apply specifically to municipalities in East Baton Rouge Parish. This indicates a legislative intent to limit the applicability of La. R.S. 9:5625 to certain cities, contrary to the appellee's claim of an inadvertent drafting oversight. The court emphasizes its role in interpreting the law, not rewriting it, as established in previous case law. It specifically notes that La. R.S. 9:5625(C) and (D) are applicable only to East Baton Rouge and Jefferson parishes and their instrumentalities. The court refuses to extend the definition of "instrumentality" to include autonomous municipalities. It also finds that the exclusion of the City of Harahan from La. R.S. 9:5625(C) does not lead to an unreasonable outcome that would necessitate a reinterpretation of legislative intent. The court highlights that the original 1993 language of Subsection (C) specified a population threshold of over 325,000, which Harahan never met, thus it was not subject to the three-year prescriptive period established in that subsection. The majority's interpretation, which suggests that all municipalities in a qualifying parish are included, misreads the legislative language and intent. Consequently, the court concludes that Harahan does not qualify under Subsection (C) as amended in 2011, as it does not meet the specified population criteria nor is it an instrumentality of Jefferson Parish.

The prescriptive period for the City of Harahan to enforce use violations is five years from the date it received written notice of the violation, as established by La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3). The City was aware of Wood Companies' composting activities by February 15, 2012, and filed its reconventional demand on July 21, 2016, which was within the five-year limit. Since the City is not an entity of Jefferson Parish, the shorter three-year period in La. R.S. 9:5625(C) does not apply. The Batture area, where the violation occurred, is zoned under the City’s regulations. Amendments to La. R.S. 9:5625 in 1993 did not alter the provisions of subsection (A), and specific exceptions exist for the Parish of Orleans and the City of New Orleans. The City incorrectly interpreted a previous case, Parish of St. Charles ex rel. Dept. of Planning and Zoning v. Bordelon, to generalize the application of the five-year prescriptive period across all parishes, as the ruling specifically pertained to St. Charles Parish. The conclusion is that the City of Harahan's cause of action remains valid, justifying a reversal of the trial court's judgment.

The violation of the use regulation took place in St. Charles Parish, which is not covered by La. R.S. 9:5625(C), applicable only to East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parishes. Consequently, La. R.S. 9:5625(A)(3) governs the suit from St. Charles Parish, rendering the Supreme Court's decision in Bordelon irrelevant to this case. La. R.S. 9:5625(C) stipulates that if no written notice of a violation is received, actions (excluding use violations) must be initiated within five years of the first act constituting the violation. Furthermore, La. Const. art. 6.44(1) defines "Local governmental subdivision" as any parish or municipality, while art. 6.44(2) expands "Political subdivision" to include parishes, municipalities, and other local government entities like school boards and special districts, with examples provided such as the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District and the Red River Waterway District.