Nanette Sanders v. Lull International, Inc.

Citations: 411 F.3d 1266; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10721; 2005 WL 1356456Docket: 04-12151

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; June 9, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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James Sanders, a construction worker, was injured when a Lull forklift he was operating overturned at a job site in St. Simons, Georgia, on February 24, 2001. Sanders filed a tort claim against Lull International, alleging defects in the forklift's design, manufacture, and warning systems. The district court granted summary judgment to Lull, concluding that Sanders misused the forklift, which negated liability. 

The incident occurred while Sanders and a co-worker were elevated approximately thirty feet in the air. The forklift tipped over after the operator performed a leveling maneuver while the boom was extended. Both men were within the forklift's weight limit, and Lull did not claim that their actions contributed to the tipping. The parties agreed that the tipping likely resulted from the failure of the safety system, designed to slow frame tilt when the boom exceeds 40 degrees. It was suggested that an unknown third party may have bypassed the safety switch, a common practice in the industry, although no evidence supported this claim against Sanders or his employer.

An expert witness, Dr. Isaac Avitan, provided an affidavit asserting that the forklift did not function as intended at the time of the accident. He proposed three potential causes for the tipping: intentional bypassing of safety switches by a third party, a foreign object interfering with the electrical circuit, or an intermittent electrical failure. Avitan believed that the most plausible cause was the intentional bypass by a third party. The appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Lull provided a warning on its forklift stating it was not designed to lift personnel and should not be used as a work platform. The owner’s manual reiterated this warning, advising against using the forklift for personnel lifting and referencing compliance with specific safety standards if such use was necessary. Testimony from Lull's company spokesman, who designed the forklift, indicated that using a properly attached work platform could be an acceptable practice. The district court granted summary judgment to Lull, concluding that Sanders and his employer's decision to use the forklift for personnel lifting negated any proximate cause associated with defects in the forklift. The court emphasized that the risks associated with ignoring the warnings were clear to Sanders, and his failure to heed the warning did not undermine the case. The court noted that product misuse serves as an affirmative defense against claims based on warnings, design, or manufacturing, particularly when misuse is obvious. While acknowledging that misuse could be a complete defense in some cases, the court found that Sanders' actions constituted obvious misuse, leading to the summary judgment in favor of Lull.

Upon review, it was determined that a reasonable juror could conclude that Sanders did not misuse the forklift, as he used it with a specially designed work platform. The court's interpretation of product misuse under Georgia law suggests that a manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from unforeseeable or abnormal use of their products. Lull argued that the warnings were clear and that using the forklift for personnel lifting constituted misuse; however, Sanders presented evidence suggesting that the warning was possibly inapplicable when using a specialized work platform.

Lull's owner’s manual permits the use of a specially designed work platform for lifting personnel, stating compliance with ASME/ANSI standards is required. A Lull spokesperson confirmed that using the platform correctly is acceptable. Lull argues that Sanders' failure to read the owner’s manual makes its contents irrelevant. However, Sanders claims that the manual demonstrates his use of the platform was foreseeable and permitted, which does not constitute misuse that would absolve Lull of liability. The court agrees that a reasonable juror could find Sanders' use of the forklift was not misuse that would bar recovery. The adequacy of warnings regarding lifting personnel and safety features are deemed jury questions. The court also disagrees with the district court's conclusion that the risk of lifting personnel was open and obvious, asserting that such issues should be determined by a jury. Lull's reliance on Veliz v. Rental Service Corp. is rejected as inapposite, as that case involved clear misuse of the forklift, unlike Sanders' situation. Questions of proximate cause are also considered jury matters, with Sanders' expert presenting three potential reasons for the machine's tip-over. The absence of evidence of external interference supports the plausibility of Sanders’ explanations. The court reverses the district court’s summary judgment and remands for further proceedings, dismissing Lull’s other proximate cause arguments.