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Frederick A. Hurley and Christine A. Hurley v. Motor Coach Industries, Incorporated

Citations: 222 F.3d 377; 2000 WL 1022329Docket: 98-3888

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 31, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves a products liability lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against a bus manufacturer following a serious injury sustained in a bus accident. Initially filed in Illinois state court, the case was removed to federal court due to diversity of citizenship, though the presence of a forum defendant complicated the removal process. The plaintiffs failed to object to this removal in a timely manner, leading the court to consider whether the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional or procedural. The primary legal issue was whether the plaintiff's design defect claim, which suggested alternative safety features such as three-point seat belts, was preempted by federal standards under FMVSS 208. The district court ruled in favor of the bus manufacturer, finding that the claim was indeed preempted by federal law as it would eliminate manufacturer discretion allowed by FMVSS 208. The court upheld the dismissal, emphasizing the nonjurisdictional nature of the forum defendant rule and highlighting the significance of waiver due to the plaintiff's inaction. The ruling affirmed the importance of adhering to federal standards that offer flexibility in vehicle safety design choices, thereby precluding state-law claims that impose conflicting requirements.

Legal Issues Addressed

Alternative Design in Products Liability Claims

Application: The plaintiff's products liability claim was based on proposing an alternative design to demonstrate the product was unreasonably dangerous.

Reasoning: Hurley relied entirely on the alternative design argument, proposing that bus manufacturers in Illinois must adopt his proposed safety features to avoid liability.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS 208)

Application: The court found that Hurley's proposed mandatory three-point seat belts would contradict the flexibility allowed under FMVSS 208.

Reasoning: Geier supports Motor Coach's argument that state lawsuits imposing requirements contrary to federal standards, specifically FMVSS 208, are preempted.

Federal Preemption of State Law Claims

Application: The court determined that the plaintiff's state-law claim was preempted by federal crashworthiness standards under FMVSS 208.

Reasoning: The district court's summary judgment favored Motor Coach, citing preemption as the sole basis. It determined that Hurley's claim is preempted by FMVSS 208, which outlines federal crashworthiness standards.

Forum Defendant Rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)

Application: The court examined whether the forum defendant rule, which restricts removal if any properly joined defendant is a citizen of the state where the action was brought, was jurisdictional or procedural.

Reasoning: The primary issue to resolve is whether the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, a question that has been unresolved in the circuit for decades.

Jurisdictional Defects in Federal Court

Application: The court highlighted that true jurisdictional defects are nonwaivable and can be raised at any point prior to final judgment.

Reasoning: The distinction between waivable defenses and true jurisdictional flaws is critical, as jurisdictional defects are nonwaivable and can be raised at any time.

Waiver of Objection to Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

Application: The court considered whether the plaintiff waived his right to object to removal due to inaction within the 30-day period permitted for such objections.

Reasoning: After the defendants submitted their removal petition, Hurley failed to act, leading Motor Coach to argue that Hurley waived any objection to the removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which allows plaintiffs only 30 days to object.