Sprint Pcs L.P., Doing Business as Sprint Pcs v. Connecticut Siting Council, Cellco Partnership, Doing Business as Bell Atlantic Mobile, and Springwich Cellular Limited Partnership

Citations: 222 F.3d 113; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18102Docket: 00-7073

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 11, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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An interlocutory appeal was filed by Sprint PCS L.P. against the Connecticut Siting Council and other defendants following a district court decision that dismissed one count of Sprint's complaint for failing to exhaust state administrative remedies. Both parties concurred that the district court misinterpreted Connecticut law regarding the appealability of state administrative agency declaratory rulings. The appellate court agreed with this assessment, leading to a reversal and remand.

Sprint, a nationwide wireless telecommunications provider, sought a declaratory ruling from the Connecticut Siting Council on whether its PCS towers fell under the Siting Council's jurisdiction. The Siting Council ruled on December 10, 1997, that Sprint's PCS towers and equipment were not classified as "facilities" subject to its jurisdiction based on statutory definitions. Specifically, the Siting Council cited that it had consistently interpreted the law to exclude PCS from the definition of cellular systems that require its oversight. Without a ruling in its favor, Sprint would face challenges in obtaining necessary approvals for construction from over 160 municipalities in Connecticut.

On January 8, 1998, Sprint initiated a lawsuit against the Siting Council in the federal district court of Connecticut, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief. In Count I, Sprint argued that the Siting Council's interpretation of "facility" in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50i(a)(6) conflicts with and is preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), which prohibits unreasonable discrimination among providers of similar wireless services. Count II sought a declaration that the Siting Council's interpretation was incorrect under state law. Additionally, Sprint requested two forms of injunctive relief: one to prevent the Siting Council from processing any requests related to telecommunications towers until equal treatment under state law was established, and another to require the Siting Council to process Sprint's requests as it would for traditional cellular companies. Both Sprint and the Siting Council filed motions for summary judgment on Count II, with intervenors supporting Sprint's position. The district court denied both motions without addressing their merits, instead dismissing Count II due to unexhausted administrative remedies under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50q and § 4-183. The court denied motions for reconsideration and later certified its decision for interlocutory appeal, which the Court agreed to hear on January 25, 2000. The appeal involves determining whether Connecticut law requires Sprint to exhaust additional administrative remedies, a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo. Sprint had previously submitted a "Petition for Declaratory Ruling" to the Siting Council regarding its jurisdiction over Sprint’s PCS towers and related equipment, as permitted by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-176(a) and Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-50j-38.

Count II of Sprint's complaint was dismissed by the district court due to Sprint's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50q and § 4-183. However, § 16-50q pertains specifically to applications for certificates of environmental compatibility and public need, not to petitions for declaratory rulings. It allows judicial review of orders related to such certificates but does not prohibit judicial review of declaratory ruling petitions. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183 outlines that a person may appeal to the Superior Court after exhausting all administrative remedies, but it does not mandate that a party seek a certificate before filing for a declaratory ruling under § 4-176(a). The exhaustion doctrine serves to ensure that courts benefit from the agency's findings during judicial review. Declaratory rulings are treated as having the same status as orders in contested cases and are considered final decisions for appeal purposes as per § 4-176(h) and § 4-166(3). The Connecticut Supreme Court has affirmed that declaratory rulings are appealable final decisions under § 4-183(a). Additionally, plaintiffs can seek a declaratory ruling as a remedy, and any adverse agency ruling can be appealed under § 4-183.

Sprint was not required to apply for a certificate from the Siting Council under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50l before seeking judicial review of the Siting Council's declaratory ruling under § 4-176. This conclusion is supported by case law, indicating that a party can pursue a declaratory ruling even if it has not appealed an adverse administrative decision. The court emphasized that requiring parties to seek administrative remedies twice would undermine the efficiency of the declaratory ruling process. Consequently, the district court's ruling that Sprint failed to exhaust its administrative remedies was incorrect. Both Sprint and the Siting Council requested summary judgment on the merits, but the court declined to address these issues, determining they should be initially resolved by the district court. The district court's order is reversed, and the case is remanded for consideration of the remaining summary judgment motions.

The Honorable Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, serving in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, addresses specific statutory provisions regarding the regulation of personal wireless service facilities and the process for declaratory rulings in Connecticut. According to 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), state and local governments cannot unreasonably discriminate among providers of similar services in regulating facility placement and construction. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-176(a) allows individuals to petition for declaratory rulings on the validity of regulations or statutes as they apply to specific circumstances. The procedural rules for such petitions are outlined in Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-50j-38, which equates the council's declaratory ruling to decisions in contested cases. Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-50j-39 reiterates that any interested person can request a declaratory ruling concerning the applicability of statutes. Furthermore, Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-50j-40 details the notice and hearing procedures for these rulings. A certificate of environmental compatibility and public need requires detailed submissions and a fee per Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50l. It is noted that Sprint's "Petition for Declaratory Ruling" lacked the necessary information and fee mandated by this statute. The Siting Council's regulations align with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-176(b), confirming that a ruling on a declaratory petition holds equivalent status to council decisions in contested cases.