Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 5, 2018; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Barbara Davidson, the plaintiff-appellant, is appealing a trial court judgment that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees, Charles Sanders, Sr., Charles Sanders, Jr., Randall Sanders, Richard Sanders, and Russell Sanders (collectively referred to as the Sanders defendants), and also granted CMR Construction Roofing, LLC's (CMR) exception of no cause of action. Davidson, aged 83 at trial, purchased a home from the Sanders defendants on March 22, 2014, for $174,265, which included $50,000 specifically for roof replacement. Despite repairs conducted by CMR and Dixie Roofing, the roof continued to leak, prompting Davidson to file for rescission of the sale on March 30, 2017, seeking a refund due to persistent roof issues that forced her to relocate in June 2016.
The Sanders defendants claimed that Davidson's case was based on redhibition and was therefore subject to a one-year prescriptive period, asserting that her claims had prescribed and that she was aware of the roof issues prior to purchase. They also contended that the actual sale price of the house was $120,000 and did not include the roof cost. CMR argued that Davidson had no privity of contract with them and failed to demonstrate any defects in their workmanship, as well as not adhering to the warranty's notice requirements, which they claimed voided the warranty.
In September 2017, the Sanders defendants moved for a hearing regarding the prescription exception and for summary judgment. Davidson countered by asserting her claims were based on breach of contract and amended her petition to include allegations of breach of contract, lack of contract, and unjust enrichment against all defendants. Following a December 2017 hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of the Sanders defendants and granted CMR's exception of no cause of action. The court's decision is partially reversed and partially affirmed.
Davidson appeals the trial court's dismissal of her action against Sanders with prejudice, asserting three primary errors. First, she claims the court improperly granted summary judgment on redhibition, arguing that her pleadings raise valid issues regarding the existence of a contract, breach of contract, detrimental reliance, and unjust enrichment. Second, she contends the court erred in not recognizing Sanders’ judicial admission that they received $50,000 for the roof replacement. Third, she argues the court incorrectly granted an Exception of No Cause of Action against CMR, asserting that her pleadings adequately state at least one valid cause of action against them.
The appeal reviews summary judgments de novo, assessing whether genuine issues of material fact exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as outlined in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. The Sanders defendants argued Davidson's claim was solely in redhibition, which they claimed was prescribed, while Davidson maintained her claims were based on breach of contract, asserting she did not receive the agreed-upon house and roof. She highlighted that her payment of $174,265 included $50,000 for the roof replacement, arguing that she detrimentally relied on Sanders' representations regarding the roof. Central to her argument is the assertion that her claim was mischaracterized as redhibition rather than breach of contract. The appellate court previously noted in a related case the issue of a trial court granting summary judgment based on a cause of action not explicitly stated in the plaintiff's petition, and remanded that case for further consideration.
The appellate court determined that the trial court mistakenly addressed breach of contract without considering redhibition in the context of Daferner's appeal. It emphasized that Daferner bore the burden of proving a redhibitory defect, specifically forgery, during the summary judgment phase. Consequently, the appellate court ruled the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff erroneous due to genuine factual disputes. While the plaintiff might have had a breach of contract claim, the court noted that the allegations did not adequately support such a claim, rendering Daferner's motion for summary judgment improper.
Furthermore, the appellate court criticized the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for lacking sufficient evidence aligned with the claims made in its own petition. The court reiterated that a motion for summary judgment cannot redefine the nature of a plaintiff's allegations. Citing Balthazar v. Hensley R. Lee Contracting, Inc., the court emphasized that summary judgment must be based on the claims asserted in the pleadings, and cannot introduce new claims not previously stated.
The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on redhibition, a notion first introduced by the defendants. It pointed out that both parties were aware of the roof defects, which undermined the applicability of redhibition statutes, as these statutes pertain to latent defects unknown to the buyer. Louisiana Civil Code article 2521 specifies that sellers are not liable for defects known to the buyer at the time of sale, reiterating that apparent defects do not constitute redhibitory vices.
Davidson's petition adequately alleges a breach of contract claim against the Sanders defendants, asserting that she paid $50,000 for a roof replacement which turned out to be defective. Consequently, the trial court's summary judgment favoring the Sanders defendants based on redhibition was deemed incorrect, and the Sanders defendants' prescription exception is now irrelevant.
In reviewing the exception of no cause of action, the appellate court employs a de novo standard, focusing on the legal sufficiency of Davidson's petition. The burden lies with the exceptor to demonstrate that a cause of action is absent. The court presumes all well-pleaded facts as true, favoring the plaintiff in drawing reasonable inferences. An exception of no cause of action is typically granted only when the petition clearly indicates an insurmountable bar to relief or reveals an affirmative defense.
During the hearing, CMR argued that Davidson's warranty attachment indicated it was void due to another party performing repairs without notice to them. CMR also claimed that Davidson could not assert detrimental reliance because no representations were made by CMR, nor could she claim undue enrichment as she did not pay CMR directly. The trial court upheld CMR's exception, concluding Davidson's only claim against CMR was a limited warranty claim. Davidson conceded that CMR's liability rests with the Sanders defendants.
The appellate court found no error in affirming CMR's exception of no cause of action but noted CMR's attempt to void the limited warranty issued to Davidson, a third-party beneficiary who followed the Sanders' instructions in contacting another roofing company.
The trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Sanders defendants is reversed, while the grant of CMR's exception of no cause of action is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assigned to the Sanders defendants.
