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John Sansing v. Charles Ryan
Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-99001
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 29, 2022; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an order regarding John Edward Sansing's appeal, which arose from the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Sansing, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona in 1999, claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial during the penalty phase of his sentencing. The Arizona Supreme Court, upon remand after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Ring v. Arizona (2002) that such a sentencing scheme was unconstitutional, deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel noted that to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show "actual prejudice" as defined in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993). It highlighted that satisfying Brecht is necessary but not sufficient for relief under AEDPA. The court examined whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the Chapman standard (which assesses harmless error) was objectively unreasonable. The panel rejected Sansing's arguments, concluding that reasonable jurists could agree that the lack of a jury trial did not influence the state court's findings regarding the egregiousness of the murder or the absence of mitigating circumstances. Consequently, Sansing's failure to meet AEDPA standards rendered further analysis of actual prejudice unnecessary. Additionally, Sansing raised a second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase, which remains under consideration. Sansing's post-conviction review (PCR) claims were largely denied, with the court determining he did not meet the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically failing to show deficient performance or prejudice. In Claim 8, Sansing argued that his waiver of self-incrimination was not knowing and voluntary because he did not realize his admission during the plea colloquy could be used to establish cruelty under Arizona law. The panel affirmed the denial of this claim, noting the Supreme Court has not mandated that trial courts discuss the implications of a defendant's admissions during plea colloquies. Claim 4, which also alleged ineffective assistance based on the same facts as Claim 8, was dismissed, with the panel stating that even if ineffective assistance were established, there was no reasonable probability of a different sentence. In Claim 7, Sansing contended that the Arizona courts violated the Eighth Amendment by improperly applying a 'causal nexus' test in evaluating non-statutory mitigating circumstances. The panel found that the sentencing court did not completely disregard the mitigating evidence by using this test. Although the Arizona Supreme Court may have applied a rule inconsistent with Eddings v. Oklahoma, any potential error did not result in actual prejudice under Brecht. Dissenting, Judge Berzon would grant relief on Claim 1 regarding Ring error prejudice and argued that both the AEDPA/Chapman test and the Brecht standard should be applied. She asserted that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard was contrary to federal law as established by Neder v. United States, leading to no deference to its harmlessness determination. Berzon would assess whether the jury's right to determine the sentence had a 'substantial and injurious effect' on Sansing’s outcome, concluding it did due to evidence of his impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. She agreed with the majority on Claims 4 and 8 concerning the factual basis for the guilty plea. The opinion dated May 17, 2021, was amended, along with Judge Berzon's dissent. The panel unanimously denies the petition for panel rehearing, with Judges Callahan and Watford voting against rehearing en banc, while Judge Berzon recommends denial. The full court was informed of the en banc petition, but no judge requested a vote on it. The petition, filed on June 27, 2022, is thus denied, and no further petitions for rehearing will be considered. In the case of John Sansing, sentenced to death in 1999 for the murder of Trudy Calabrese, the excerpt outlines the procedural background of his federal habeas corpus appeal under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The district court granted a certificate of appealability on five claims, with a sixth later added. Sansing has not demonstrated entitlement to relief on any of these claims. Factually, the events leading to Calabrese's murder occurred on February 24, 1998, amid Sansing's heavy crack cocaine use. He planned to rob a food delivery from a local church while his children were present. When the delivery person, Calabrese, arrived, Sansing and his wife Kara restrained her after a brief conversation. Despite her pleas for help and attempts to call the police, Sansing assaulted her, rendering her unconscious with a wooden club, and subsequently raped and stabbed her. The medical examiner noted the severity of her injuries, which ultimately led to her death. Sansing further took jewelry from Calabrese to exchange for drugs. A church pastor contacted the Sansing home seeking Ms. Calabrese, but Sansing provided a false address and claimed her delivery never arrived. Subsequently, he concealed Ms. Calabrese’s body in his backyard under carpeting after committing the murder with a club. He cleaned the weapon and hid other evidence. The next day, a search party found Ms. Calabrese’s truck containing a note with the correct Sansing address. Police discovered her body, which was blindfolded and suffocated with a plastic bag and ligatures. Sansing was at work during the discovery but later confessed to his sister, who informed their father, leading to Sansing’s surrender to the police. The State of Arizona charged Sansing with first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and sexual assault, indicating its intent to seek the death penalty. He was represented by two deputy public defenders and, wishing to avoid a trial for both families, pleaded guilty in September 1998. The case moved directly to the penalty phase, where the judge evaluated aggravating and mitigating factors before sentencing Sansing to death in a detailed verdict. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld this sentence on direct appeal. Sansing’s post-conviction review (PCR) claims were largely dismissed, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after a hearing. The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review the remaining claims. In 2011, Sansing filed a federal habeas corpus petition with 29 claims, which the district court denied while granting an appeal certificate for five claims. Following a timely appeal, the district court's handling of Claim 1, alleging a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial during sentencing, was examined. At the time of his trial, Arizona law allowed the judge to impose the death penalty post-conviction, a scheme later deemed unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona. After vacating the initial judgment and remanding for reconsideration, the Arizona Supreme Court deemed the lack of a jury trial harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Sansing contended that this determination was contrary to federal law. Background information relevant to this claim noted that Arizona law mandated the sentencing court to decide between death or life imprisonment after Sansing’s guilty plea. The sentencing court conducted a three-step analysis to determine Sansing's eligibility for the death penalty. First, it established that the State proved two statutory aggravating factors: that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner (13-703(F)(6)), and that it was committed for pecuniary gain (13-703(F)(5)). Second, the court assessed whether Sansing demonstrated any statutory mitigating circumstances, concluding that he did not prove his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was significantly impaired due to crack cocaine use (13-703(G)(1)). However, the court acknowledged his drug impairment as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, along with his acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and difficult upbringing, but gave minimal weight to his lack of education and family support. Third, the court weighed the aggravating factors against the mitigating circumstances, finding the latter insufficient to warrant leniency. Consequently, it sentenced Sansing to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed this sentence after a thorough review, upholding the heinous nature of the murder as sufficient for the (F)(6) factor while striking the (F)(5) factor due to insufficient evidence of a pecuniary motive linked to the killing. Sansing's failure to establish the (G)(1) mitigating circumstance was also confirmed. The Supreme Court independently concluded a death sentence was warranted based on the remaining aggravating factor's strength and the limited value of the mitigating evidence. Following this, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed Arizona's judge-based capital-sentencing scheme unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, necessitating jury findings for aggravating factors. The Arizona Supreme Court consolidated pending capital case appeals, including Sansing's, to address the implications of the Ring decision. A Ring error is classified as non-structural and can undergo harmless-error review, as established by the court. A Ring error is deemed harmless if two criteria are met: (1) overwhelming evidence supports an aggravating factor, such that no reasonable jury would fail to find it beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) no reasonable jury could find that the mitigation evidence is substantial enough to warrant leniency. In the case of Sansing II, the Arizona Supreme Court applied this standard to Sansing’s death sentence, concluding that the (F)(6) aggravating factor—murder committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner—was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on Sansing's admissions and the overwhelming evidence of gratuitous violence inflicted on the victim, Ms. Calabrese. The court determined that any reasonable jury would have found the murder especially heinous and that Sansing failed to establish the statutory mitigating circumstances of age and significant impairment due to drug use. Although some weight was attributed to his family support and acceptance of responsibility, the court found this mitigation insufficient given the brutality of the murder. Consequently, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Sansing's death sentence. The parties involved in Claim 1 agree that Sansing was denied the jury-trial right established in Ring, with the central issue being whether this error was harmless. There is contention regarding the scope of the Ring rule, with Sansing arguing for a comprehensive review of aggravating and mitigating factors, while the State asserts that only the presence of aggravating factors is necessary for a valid sentence. The district court sided with the State, indicating that the Arizona Supreme Court's inclusion of mitigation in its analysis was a matter of state law rather than a requirement of the Ring decision. The court focused on the evidence related to aggravating factors, concluding that the evidence of cruelty, heinousness, and depravity supporting the (F)(6) aggravating factor was compelling enough to negate any prejudice from the Ring error. It found that the Arizona Supreme Court's review of the mitigating evidence, while not mandated by Ring, was thorough and not objectively unreasonable. In Murdaugh v. Ryan, a broader interpretation of Ring was adopted, asserting that harmless-error review must consider both aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances. A federal habeas petitioner must show that a constitutional error led to "actual prejudice," as defined by the Brecht standard. However, following Brown v. Davenport, it was clarified that meeting the Brecht standard is necessary but not sufficient for relief; petitioners must also satisfy the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). If a state court determines an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a petitioner must prove that the state court applied this standard in an objectively unreasonable way. The analysis begins with whether fairminded jurists would agree with the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion that the Ring error was harmless. The court found that fairminded jurists could reasonably conclude that the absence of a jury trial did not impact the finding of the (F)(6) aggravating factor or the assessment of mitigating evidence. The Arizona Supreme Court reasonably determined that any reasonable jury would have found the murder committed in an "especially cruel" or "especially heinous" manner, with cruelty established on three grounds, according to Arizona law. Ms. Calabrese experienced significant mental anguish before Sansing attacked her, as evidenced by her defensive wounds and pleas for help. The court recognized three main grounds for her suffering: (1) the mental distress prior to the assault; (2) the mental and physical trauma during the rape while she was bound; and (3) the severe physical pain from the substantial head injuries and stab wounds, which were confirmed by medical testimony to cause pain without immediate death. The Arizona Supreme Court found overwhelming evidence supporting these grounds. Sansing argued that a rational jury could conclude Ms. Calabrese did not regain consciousness after the head trauma, which would affect the assessment of cruelty related to the rape and stabbing. However, the court found this argument unconvincing, noting that both Sansing and a witness testified she was conscious during the attack, contradicting his claim. Additionally, the court stated that Arizona law does not require the victim to be conscious at the time of death for a finding of cruelty, as established in prior cases. The court also addressed the heinous nature of the murder, highlighting factors such as the defendant's enjoyment of the act, gratuitous violence, and the victim's helplessness, affirming that the combination of these elements supported the conclusion of the murder being especially heinous. The helplessness factor in a murder case occurs when the victim is physically unable to resist, as seen in State v. Gulbrandson. In this instance, the Arizona Supreme Court found overwhelming evidence that Sansing inflicted gratuitous violence on Ms. Calabrese, a helpless victim bound with electrical cords. The violence included acts such as rape, facial injuries, and the use of ligatures and a knife, which exceeded what was necessary to kill her. Regarding mitigating circumstances, the court reasonably concluded that no rational jury could find any statutory mitigating factors or that Sansing's non-statutory mitigating factors warranted leniency. Sansing claimed that his consumption of crack cocaine impaired his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, which could qualify as a mitigating circumstance under Arizona law. However, he failed to provide expert testimony to demonstrate a causal link between his drug use and the crime, which was essential per legal precedent (Murdaugh case). The court noted that Sansing's actions, including planning the robbery and evading detection after the murder, contradicted his claims of impairment. Ultimately, the evidence pointed to Sansing's ability to control his conduct, undermining his argument for mitigation based on drug use. Sansing engaged in actions to conceal his crime, such as washing blood from the weapon used in the attack and attempting to hide the victim's body, which led the Arizona Supreme Court to conclude that a reasonable jury would not find that his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was significantly impaired. The court determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no rational jury would recognize the (G)(1) mitigating circumstance. Although there is room for fairminded disagreement, the court's decision must be respected under the deference principle established by Harrington v. Richter. In terms of non-statutory mitigating circumstances, Sansing pointed to his impairment during the crime, familial drug use issues, remorse, acceptance of guilt through a guilty plea, and a report detailing his troubled childhood marked by domestic violence and early drug use. Despite these claims, the court found that the evidence was minimal and did not warrant leniency, asserting that the brutality of the murder distinguished it from typical first-degree cases. The dissenting opinion argues against deferring to the Arizona Supreme Court’s harmless-error determination, claiming it applied the wrong legal standard. However, the majority disagrees, asserting that the court utilized the appropriate standard from Neder, focusing on whether a rational jury could have deemed the mitigating evidence substantial enough for leniency. The Arizona Supreme Court's inquiry was consistent with the principles established in prior cases, confirming that their evaluation aligned with the dissent's interpretation of the required standard. The Arizona Supreme Court's assessment of the (G)(1) mitigating circumstance was framed in terms of what a reasonable jury "would have" found, a language choice that does not affect the substance of the ruling. This phrasing aligns with the standard established in Neder, where reviewing courts are to determine if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached a guilty verdict absent the error. The court concluded that Sansing's evidence was insufficient to establish the (G)(1) mitigating circumstance due to a lack of causal connection and strong evidence refuting his claims of impairment. As a result, it determined that no reasonable jury would have found that Sansing's ability to control his behavior or understand the wrongfulness of his actions was significantly impaired. In Claim 2, Sansing alleges ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his mitigation defense during the penalty phase, with his attorneys dividing responsibilities between disputing aggravating factors and handling mitigation. The PCR court found no deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland v. Washington standard. Sansing argues that this finding was contrary to established federal law and based on an unreasonable factual determination, with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) limiting review to the state court record. The analysis indicates that, for most aspects of Ronan's representation, the PCR court's conclusions on deficient performance were not objectively unreasonable, and for the remaining points, it reasonably determined that Sansing did not demonstrate prejudice, applying a "doubly deferential" standard of review as mandated by AEDPA. Sansing asserts that Ronan's performance as his legal counsel did not meet the Sixth Amendment's standard for effective representation. He argues that Ronan did not provide necessary materials to experts for an accurate evaluation of his mental health. Although Ronan could not recall if he supplied these materials, he indicated it was his standard practice to do so. The PCR court upheld a presumption that Ronan adequately assisted Sansing, finding no reason to doubt that he provided the records. Sansing's strongest evidence against Ronan is a discrepancy in Dr. Kathryn Menendez's report regarding his academic performance, which raises questions about whether Ronan provided the necessary school records. However, conflicting interpretations of this evidence prevent a conclusion that the PCR court made an unreasonable factual determination. Additionally, Sansing claims Ronan failed to introduce Dr. Menendez's diagnosis of an anti-social personality disorder, but the PCR court determined that Ronan made a strategic decision not to call her as a witness. Ronan testified that he saw no reason to present this diagnosis, which the court found to be a reasonable professional judgment. Introducing such evidence could have undermined Sansing’s expressions of remorse, despite its potential mitigating value under Arizona law. Finally, Sansing argues that Ronan's investigation into his family background was insufficient. The PCR court found that the defense team’s mitigation specialist adequately evaluated and reported on Sansing's difficult childhood, indicating that Ronan's actions were within Strickland’s deferential standard for effective counsel. Davis conducted extensive investigations into Sansing's background, visiting him frequently and interviewing various family members across multiple states, including Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and Alabama. She gathered information on his upbringing, drug use, and criminal history. During the post-conviction relief (PCR) evidentiary hearing, Sansing presented expert testimony from Dr. Paul Miller, a developmental psychologist, who identified several adverse childhood experiences that he termed "risk factors" contributing to a potentially disruptive adulthood. However, Dr. Miller did not link these factors directly to Sansing's crime. The PCR court found that Ronan, Sansing’s attorney, made a strategic decision not to present expert testimony connecting Sansing’s family background to the murder. Ronan believed that the sentencing judge would understand the implications of the information provided in Davis's report, which he felt was within the realm of competent legal assistance, as much of the background evidence was not complex. Sansing criticized Ronan for not utilizing live family testimony in addition to the written report, referencing the 1989 American Bar Association Death Penalty Guidelines. However, it was noted that the standards described in such guidelines are relevant only to the time of representation, and a reasonable jurist could accept that Davis’s report was a standard practice in Arizona in 1999. Furthermore, Sansing raised concerns about Ronan's presentation of family background evidence during the penalty phase, claiming that new evidence uncovered post-conviction should have been presented earlier. This included testimony from siblings regarding severe neglect and abuse by their mother, Glenda, and instances of violence involving her partners, which painted a troubling picture of Sansing's childhood. New evidence presented largely duplicated the mitigation evidence already considered at trial. The sentencing court learned about Glenda's ineffective parenting, the unacceptable home conditions, Sansing's exposure to domestic abuse due to alcohol abuse by his mother and stepfather, and numerous police calls regarding domestic violence. Additionally, it was noted that Sansing experienced the loss of his maternal grandfather, struggled with a lack of positive male role models, began drug abuse at a young age, and completed only one year of high school. Ronan successfully demonstrated to the court that Sansing had a difficult upbringing and a dysfunctional family, but even if the new evidence had been introduced during the penalty phase, it would not have significantly changed the defense's mitigation argument. Sansing failed to prove a reasonable probability that his counsel's errors would have altered the outcome of the proceedings. Further, Ronan's failure to investigate the potential causal link between Sansing’s drug use and the murder was scrutinized. Despite being aware that Sansing’s intoxication would be a key issue, Ronan did not consult experts in substance abuse. During post-conviction relief (PCR) hearings, Sansing provided expert testimony he argued should have been presented at trial. This testimony included insights from Dr. Richard Lanyon, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who discussed the effects of heavy cocaine use leading to psychosis, suggesting Sansing may have entered an abnormal mental state during the incident. However, Dr. Lanyon's conclusions were primarily based on Sansing's retrospective account, which included feelings of panic and darkness during the altercation. The PCR court found Sansing's expert testimony had weaknesses that could undermine its credibility, ultimately concluding that Sansing did not demonstrate sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. Dr. Lanyon identified Sansing’s belief that Ms. Calabrese intended to contact the police as a significant cognitive distortion, potentially stemming from a paranoid personality disorder or cocaine-induced psychosis, leading to atypical behavior. Dr. Edward French, a pharmacology expert, supported this view, attributing Sansing's diminished control over his actions to chronic methamphetamine and crack cocaine use, independent of the quantity consumed. Conversely, Dr. Michael Bayless, a forensic psychologist for the State, argued that Sansing was aware of his actions and their wrongfulness, having taken measures to evade prosecution after the assault, thus indicating no psychosis. The PCR court determined that Sansing failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the testimonies from Dr. Lanyon and Dr. French would establish the mitigating factor under Arizona law, as they did not adequately address Sansing's capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform to legal standards. Both experts acknowledged Sansing's awareness of his actions, which undermined claims of substantial impairment. The PCR court found the expert opinions speculative and unlikely to impact the sentencing court’s perception of Sansing's mitigating circumstances, which already acknowledged his intoxication at the time of the crime. Ronan presented sufficient evidence to establish Sansing’s impairment as a non-statutory mitigating factor, making the testimonies of Dr. Lanyon and Dr. French redundant. The post-conviction relief (PCR) court determined that the chance of a different sentencing outcome was merely conceivable, not reasonably probable. Sansing claimed that even without showing a reasonable probability of a different penalty phase outcome, Ronan’s ineffective assistance impacted his direct appeal. He argued that expert testimony on crack cocaine abuse could have influenced the Arizona Supreme Court's view on a prior Ring error. However, the court noted concerns about Dr. Bayless’s testimony, which suggested Sansing’s motivation for committing rape but did not affect the overall outcome of the sentencing or the PCR court’s analysis of prejudice. The court declined to evaluate the influence of Dr. French and Dr. Lanyon's potential testimonies on the direct appeal outcome. It emphasized that the PCR court correctly limited its prejudice assessment to the trial phase under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Sansing also raised Claims 4 and 8 regarding his guilty plea, asserting he did not knowingly waive his self-incrimination privilege (Claim 8) and that Ronan provided ineffective assistance during the plea process (Claim 4). Claim 8 was framed as a due process challenge related to the factual basis he acknowledged in his plea, specifically admitting that the victim was conscious and alive during the assault, which he confirmed in writing and orally at the plea hearing. Sansing claims he was unaware that his admission regarding Ms. Calabrese's consciousness during the rape could be used to establish cruelty as an aggravating factor, arguing that this lack of knowledge rendered his waiver of self-incrimination unknowing and unintelligent. The PCR court denied this claim summarily, and relief can only be granted if no reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent from 2008 could support the denial. Sansing cites Boykin v. Alabama, asserting that the trial court failed to inform him that the State could use his factual admissions in the penalty phase; however, Boykin does not mandate such a disclosure. The trial court had adequately advised him of his constitutional rights during the plea hearing. The Supreme Court has not ruled that trial courts must discuss the potential implications of a defendant's factual admissions during plea colloquies. Under Section 2254(d)(1), state courts are not required to extend Supreme Court precedent, and federal courts cannot treat the absence of such an extension as error. In Claim 4, Sansing raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument linked to the same factual basis as Claim 8, which the court granted a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This claim focuses on the admission of Ms. Calabrese's consciousness and includes a stipulation regarding hearsay statements from his children about his intent to rob and the attack’s circumstances. Additionally, he stipulated that journalist Victoria Harker would testify about his intention to kill Ms. Calabrese after the assault and that she had regained consciousness. Sansing contends that his attorney, Ronan, failed to inform him about the State's potential use of factual admissions during sentencing, allowed damaging admissions, and did not interview the children or Harker before stipulating to their statements. The PCR court denied this claim without reasoning, and therefore, relief can only be granted if no reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent could support the denial. To satisfy the prejudice requirement under Strickland, Sansing must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have received a different sentence if he had not made the admission or agreed to the stipulation. Ronan’s alleged ineffective assistance did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different sentence for Sansing. The State could have presented witnesses to corroborate the facts outlined in the sentencing stipulation, negating claims of prejudice. Sansing had already admitted that the victim was conscious and that he killed her to alleviate her suffering. Ronan’s use of a sentencing stipulation was not prejudicial, as Sansing failed to show that his children or Harker would have provided different testimony if the stipulation had not been used. The statements from Sansing’s children aligned with Kara’s testimony during the penalty phase. In Claim 7, Sansing argued that Arizona courts violated the Eighth Amendment by employing a “causal nexus” test to assess non-statutory mitigating circumstances, which was deemed impermissible following the Supreme Court's rejection of such tests in 2004. Although the Arizona courts had historically applied this test, the sentencing court did not exclude mitigating evidence as irrelevant per Eddings. It considered Sansing’s intoxication as a non-statutory mitigating factor, and while it evaluated the evidence for a causal link in terms of statutory mitigation, this did not contravene Eddings. The court's decision to assign less weight to certain mitigating factors due to the lack of causal nexus was not prohibited by Eddings, allowing such considerations within its discretion. Sansing demonstrated a challenging childhood, but the court found no causal link to the crime, resulting in only minimal mitigating weight attributed to this factor. Likewise, the court assigned minimal weight to evidence of family support, as it did not prevent the crime. This assessment supports the conclusion that the court did not apply an unconstitutional causal-nexus test in weighing mitigating circumstances. Sansing's claim regarding a causal-nexus test in the Arizona Supreme Court's review was rejected, as the lack of a causal link can influence the weight of mitigating evidence. Additionally, Sansing's argument regarding the Eighth Amendment violation due to the exclusion of a letter from the victim's daughter was upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court, which deemed the letter irrelevant to his character or the crime. State law also prohibits considering victim recommendations concerning sentencing. Sansing argues that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling constituted an unreasonable application of Eighth Amendment precedent, but this claim is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has established that while the Eighth Amendment forbids the introduction of victim family recommendations for the death penalty (Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)), it has not recognized a right for defendants to present victim family recommendations for leniency. Various courts have rejected this interpretation, indicating a divergence of opinion that suggests fair-minded disagreement. Consequently, Sansing is not entitled to relief on the claims under review, leading to the affirmation of the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. In dissent, Circuit Judge Berzon would grant relief regarding Claim 1, related to Ring error prejudice, without addressing other challenges. Berzon concurs with the majority on Claims 4 and 8, which concern the factual basis for Sansing's guilty plea. The dissent highlights that Arizona courts violated Sansing's constitutional right to have a jury decide the facts warranting a death sentence, citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Arizona Supreme Court deemed this error harmless, claiming any reasonable juror would conclude Sansing committed a particularly heinous murder and that mitigating evidence did not warrant leniency. Berzon argues that the court applied the incorrect legal standard, as established in Neder v. United States, asserting that the assessment should focus on what a reasonable jury could have found based on the record, rather than what the court believed a jury would have found. The dissent emphasizes that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider evidence favorably for Sansing, improperly weighed witness testimony, and thus did not apply the correct sufficiency-of-evidence standard. Consequently, the dissent concludes that no deference is owed to the Arizona court's harmlessness determination and suggests a review under Brecht v. Abrahamson. The legal analysis focuses on whether the lack of a jury's determination significantly impacted Sansing's death sentence. It references the standard set by Kotteakos v. United States, assessing whether a rational jury could have found mitigating factors in Sansing's case. Viewing the evidence favorably for Sansing, it suggests he provided enough proof that his crack cocaine use substantially impaired his ability to understand his wrongdoing or conform to the law, which is a relevant mitigating factor under Arizona law. In light of the absence of a jury decision, the possibility that a jury could have recognized these mitigating factors is sufficient to establish prejudice under Brecht. If a jury had acknowledged these factors, it could have influenced the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, potentially preventing a death sentence. The excerpt further discusses the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, which deemed the judge-based capital-sentencing scheme unconstitutional, emphasizing that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination for any fact affecting their maximum punishment. The Arizona statute mandates that judges consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances when imposing a death sentence. Murdaugh v. Ryan is cited to clarify that under Ring, a jury must determine the presence of aggravating factors and the existence of mitigating circumstances, as both are essential for assessing a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. However, Murdaugh does not assert that the jury must weigh these factors, only that they must determine their existence. The Supreme Court determined that a jury is not constitutionally required to evaluate aggravating and mitigating circumstances or make the final sentencing decision within a relevant range, as established in McKinney v. Arizona. However, this does not alter the precedent that a jury must ascertain the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances, as stated in Murdaugh v. Ryan. The Arizona courts' failure to allow a jury to decide on mitigating factors necessitates a review to determine if this deprivation was harmless. The majority concluded that the Arizona Supreme Court's application of the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard from Chapman v. California was appropriate under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), thereby denying habeas relief without needing to apply the “substantial and injurious effect” test from Brecht. A dissenting opinion argues that the right to have a jury find facts necessary for imposing the death penalty is fundamental and any deprivation of that right cannot be deemed harmless, referencing Sullivan v. Louisiana. The opinion further criticizes the majority's reliance on speculative determinations regarding a hypothetical jury's actions in a penalty phase and emphasizes the need to defer to the Arizona Supreme Court's harmless error review as permitted by the Supreme Court's precedent. The dissent asserts that the state court's application of Chapman was contrary to federal law established in Neder v. United States, which delineates strict parameters for assessing harmless error when an essential element of a crime is not presented to a jury. A reviewing court cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have reached the same verdict if a trial error had not occurred, particularly when the defendant disputed an omitted element and presented sufficient evidence for a contrary conclusion. In cases where no jury was present, the sufficiency-of-evidence analysis differs from the typical Chapman inquiry because the standard focuses on the specific impact of the constitutional error on the case at hand rather than a general assessment of how a reasonable jury might behave. The court must consider whether there is sufficient evidence to support the defendant's claims, rather than whether strong evidence supports the trial judge's findings. The emphasis is on whether the record includes evidence that "could" lead to a favorable finding for the defense, without making predictions about a non-existent jury's decisions. The inquiry must be conducted in a manner that favors the defense, avoiding credibility assessments or weight evaluations, which are functions reserved for the jury. This principle parallels the evaluation of a defendant's entitlement to jury instructions on a defense, where the court only assesses if sufficient evidence exists to warrant the instruction, leaving the resolution of conflicting testimony to the jury. The sentencing judge found it “likely” that Sansing was impaired by crack cocaine during the murder but concluded he did not sufficiently prove impairment under the (G)(1) mitigating factor, which requires evidence showing that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform to the law was significantly impaired, though not to the extent of a complete defense. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Sansing failed to demonstrate a causal link between his drug use and impairment, citing the absence of expert testimony. However, expert testimony is not a strict requirement to establish significant impairment; it is typically presented but not mandatory. Sansing had other evidence regarding his drug use and its effects that could have been considered by a jury. The court's emphasis on the lack of expert testimony is questioned, particularly since Sansing's case was presented to a judge rather than a jury, leading to a different strategic approach by his counsel. The trial counsel suggested that he did not present expert testimony because he believed the judge understood the relationship between substance abuse and criminal behavior. The implications of procedural errors, such as those involving Apprendi and Neder, highlight the importance of what evidence might have emerged had the case gone to trial. Evidence presented in Sansing’s case indicates that he struggled with drug addiction, with specific references to his use of marijuana starting in fifth grade and a significant cocaine binge just before the murder of Ms. Calabrese. The Arizona Supreme Court found the deprivation of Sansing's right to present his mitigation case to a jury to be harmless, asserting that the absence of expert testimony in a bench trial did not undermine his defense strategy. However, this conclusion failed to recognize the different dynamics between jury and bench trials, particularly in death penalty cases. The court overlooked critical evidence from a mitigation specialist, Pamela Davis, and Sansing's family members, including details of his drug use and its psychological effects. Despite Kara Sansing's testimony regarding her husband's behavior and demeanor before and during the incident, the Arizona Supreme Court deemed her testimony insufficient, primarily citing a lack of quantification of drug use. Notably, evidence indicated that Sansing and Kara had spent $750 on crack cocaine over a four-day period, contradicting the court's dismissal of the impact of his substance use on his behavior at the time of the crime. The Arizona Supreme Court failed to appropriately consider evidence regarding Sansing’s impairment. The court claimed that Kara’s assertion that Sansing was not himself did not provide sufficient proof of significant impairment, citing prior case law that emphasized the need for precise testimony regarding a defendant's intoxication level and its impact on behavior. However, the court should have evaluated whether a jury could reasonably conclude Sansing's capacity was significantly impaired, rather than simply deciding that it would not. Kara's testimony included details about Sansing's appearance and behavior after the incident, suggesting he was heavily affected by drugs, which should have been included in the sufficiency-of-evidence review. Moreover, the court dismissed Sansing’s claim of impairment by highlighting his "deliberate actions" to evade detection, implying that such actions negated his impairment defense. This approach overlooked the necessity to consider evidence in the light most favorable to Sansing, as established in prior rulings. Although evidence indicated he planned a robbery, it did not preclude a jury from finding significant impairment contributing to the transition from robbery to murder. Additionally, his actions to avoid detection were minor and ineffective, suggesting a lack of sober awareness. Comparisons were made to other cases where similar ineffectual attempts to cover up crimes were not deemed indicative of sober intent. A reasonable jury could conclude that Sansing's efforts to evade detection did not negate his claim of being "significantly, but only partially, impaired" during the offense. Specifically, evidence such as his ability to drive a truck short distances and his confession to Hooper, which the Arizona Supreme Court overlooked, may support the idea that his capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions or to conform to legal standards did not fully return until after he had regained some sobriety. The Arizona Supreme Court's failure to conduct a proper sufficiency review under the Neder standard rendered its harmlessness determination contrary to established federal law. Additionally, under the Brecht standard, habeas relief is warranted if the error, specifically the lack of a jury, had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. The inquiry focuses on whether a rational jury could have found that Sansing met the (G)(1) mitigating factor. Without an actual jury verdict to compare against, the evaluation of potential variance due to the trial error necessitates the same analysis the Arizona Supreme Court should have performed during its harmlessness review, specifically determining if the record contained evidence that could rationally lead to a different finding on the omitted element. Evidence in the record supports a rational jury's potential finding that Sansing's ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions was "significantly, but only partially, impaired." Testimony from Kara, Sansing's wife, indicated that he was under the influence of crack cocaine during the assault on Ms. Calabrese and exhibited unusual anxiety and a distinct change in demeanor. This, combined with Sansing's long history of drug abuse and substantial crack cocaine use prior to the incident, suggests significant impairment. The court noted that Sansing was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial, which hampers the determination of how a jury might have evaluated the mitigating factors, specifically the (G)(1) factor concerning impairment due to substance abuse. If a jury had recognized this mitigating factor, it could have influenced a sentencing judge's consideration of the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, potentially leading to a different sentence. The court referenced legal precedents emphasizing the importance of jury findings in sentencing decisions and concluded that the lack of a jury's assessment had a "substantial and injurious effect" on Sansing's sentence. Consequently, the court determined that Sansing met the criteria for prejudicial error and recommended granting his petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding Claim 1.