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Richmond Medical Center for Women William G. Fitzhugh, M.D. Hillcrest Clinic Herbert C. Jones, Jr., M.D. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, Dc, Incorporated Virginia League for Planned Parenthood Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. James Gilmore, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Virginia David M. Hicks, in His Official Capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Richmond Donald S. Caldwell, in His Official Capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the County of Roanoke Howard Gwynn, in His Official Capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Newport News Charles D. Griffith, Jr., in His Official Capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Norfolk Robert F. Horan, Jr., in His Official Capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the County of Fairfax James L. Camblos, Iii, in His Official Capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the County of Albemarle

Citations: 219 F.3d 376; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18196Docket: 98-1930

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; July 28, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a motion concerning a Virginia statute regulating abortion, specifically focusing on its provision related to partial-birth abortion. Plaintiffs, including medical and reproductive health organizations, challenged the statute, arguing it infringed on constitutional rights established in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Initially, a stay was placed on the district court’s order, influenced by an expectation that the Supreme Court might find the statute not unduly burdensome. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, which required clear differentiation between certain abortion procedures and mandated health exceptions, the Fourth Circuit vacated the stay and affirmed the district court's judgment, finding the Virginia statute unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the statute failed to make necessary distinctions and lacked a health exception, aligning its decision with the Supreme Court's precedent. The court also addressed standing issues, noting the plaintiffs did not intend to perform the banned procedure. The decision emphasized the judiciary’s duty to adhere to Supreme Court rulings, and the court declined to recuse itself, underscoring the impartiality expected of judicial decisions.

Legal Issues Addressed

Article III Standing

Application: The court addressed the issue of standing, noting that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the statute as none intended to perform the banned procedure.

Reasoning: The author expresses the belief that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge the Commonwealth's partial-birth abortion statute since none intended to perform the banned procedure.

Constitutional Right to Abortion

Application: The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on established Supreme Court precedents, emphasizing that the essential holding of Roe v. Wade, which protects women's constitutional rights to terminate pregnancies, should remain intact.

Reasoning: Circuit Judge Luttig emphasized the Supreme Court's established precedent in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, reaffirming women's constitutional rights to terminate pregnancies.

Distinction Between Abortion Procedures

Application: The Fourth Circuit ruled that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional because it failed to clearly distinguish between D&X and D&E procedures and did not include an exception for maternal health, as required by the Supreme Court.

Reasoning: The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that similar statutes must clearly differentiate between the D&X and D&E procedures and require an exception for maternal health to be constitutional. The Commonwealth's statute fails on both counts.

Judicial Obligation to Supreme Court Precedent

Application: The court emphasized the judiciary's duty to adhere to Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution, asserting that legal decisions should not be influenced by individual judges' preferences.

Reasoning: Emphasizing the judiciary's obligation to adhere to the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution, the author also denies the plaintiffs' request for their recusal, asserting that law is independent of individual judges' preferences and should not be politicized.