Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; April 16, 1993; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Bryde Sledge was convicted of two counts of unlawfully breaking and entering a vehicle, violating Alabama Code 13A-8-11(b), and received a three-year concurrent sentence for each count. The evidence presented showed that on November 29, 1991, while at Madison Square Mall, Wells Johnston witnessed Sledge leaving a maroon car with a broken window and entering a yellow compact car, which he later identified. Johnston reported the incident to mall security and later spotted the same vehicle at a nearby pawn shop, where Sledge attempted to pawn a stolen Cobra radar detector. The owner of the radar detector, Judy Pearson, confirmed its theft from her car at the mall. Additionally, Jolie Michelle Landess testified that her vehicle was also broken into, and a Kraco radar detector valued at $50 was stolen. Sledge argued that the indictment, which charged felony theft, did not match the trial evidence that only supported misdemeanor theft claims. The indictment specified unlawful entry into vehicles belonging to Pearson and Landess with intent to commit theft, qualifying as Class C felonies under Alabama law.
The appellant claims that the trial evidence only supported a conviction for third-degree theft, a class A misdemeanor, since the radar detectors had values of $50 and $100. However, unlawful breaking and entering a vehicle, under 13A-8-11 of the Code of Alabama 1975, is a distinct offense from theft. To convict for breaking and entering, it suffices to show the intent to commit any felony or theft; no specific degree of theft or a minimum value of items taken is required. The indictment must clearly inform the accused of the charges to prepare a defense, as established in Copeland v. State and Griffin v. State. In this case, the indictment accurately charged the appellant with breaking and entering two vehicles, and the trial evidence confirmed these actions, showing no discrepancy between the indictment and the evidence. Additionally, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence. The court correctly found that the state's case was not solely based on circumstantial evidence, justifying the refusal of such a jury charge. Therefore, no reversible error occurred, and the judgment was affirmed with all judges concurring.
