Willie Ervin Fisher v. R. C. Lee, Warden, Central Prison North Carolina Attorney General
Docket: 99-25
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; June 19, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Willie Ervin Fisher appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition challenging his capital murder conviction for the death of Angela Johnson. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision authored by Judge Traxler and joined by Judges Widener and Goodwin, affirms the lower court's ruling. Fisher's conviction stems from events on April 2, 1992, when he violently attacked Angela in her home, inflicting severe injuries that led to her death shortly after. The court outlines the timeline of the incident, noting that Fisher arrived at the Johnson residence earlier that evening, where tensions escalated into a physical confrontation between him and Angela. After being assaulted, Angela attempted to escape, ultimately seeking help at her mother's workplace. Officer T.C. Smoot responded to the scene following a call about the assault and observed visible signs of Angela's injuries. The appellate court concludes that Fisher did not demonstrate a substantial denial of constitutional rights and denies his application for a certificate of appealability, resulting in the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition.
Angela and her mother obtained a warrant for assault against Fisher, leading to a police search for him. After returning home late at night, Angela answered a call from Fisher, who denied any wrongdoing. Approximately ten minutes later, Fisher forcibly entered their home, armed with a knife, and confronted Angela. She attempted to escape but was chased by Fisher, who ultimately cornered her and began stabbing her in the chest and stomach. Shemika and Angela's mother intervened; Shemika was also injured, and Fisher struck Angela's mother. Fisher continued his assault outside, dragging Angela into the street and inflicting further injuries. Neighbor Lucius Simmons intervened, prompting Fisher to flee after Simmons discharged a firearm into the air.
When police arrived, they found Angela bleeding in the driveway and unresponsive to medical care, later pronounced dead. Shemika sustained significant injuries but survived. After hiding in nearby woods, Fisher contacted the police for his arrest and was treated for his injuries at the hospital, where he provided a voluntary statement and was later questioned after waiving his Miranda rights.
Fisher admitted to breaking into Angela's home and stabbing her but claimed a "voluntary intoxication" defense, arguing that his alcohol and crack cocaine use prior to the murder impaired his ability to form the specific intent required for a first-degree murder conviction in North Carolina. He testified about his substance use leading up to the crime and presented a friend's corroborating testimony, along with expert testimony from Dr. J. Gary Hoover, a clinical psychologist, who stated that Fisher was likely in a blackout state during the murder. The jury rejected this defense and convicted Fisher of first-degree murder based on malice, premeditation, deliberation, and the felony murder rule.
During the capital sentencing phase, the State relied on previously presented evidence, while Fisher's counsel introduced additional testimony highlighting Fisher's good behavior in jail, his mother's alcohol issues, and his lack of prior convictions. The jury was presented with two aggravating circumstances: the murder occurred during a burglary and was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Both aggravating circumstances were found to be present.
Regarding mitigating circumstances, the jury acknowledged two statutory factors: Fisher's lack of significant prior criminal history and that the crime was committed under mental or emotional disturbance. They also found six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including Fisher's voluntary surrender, admission of guilt, good behavior in custody, participation in Narcotics Anonymous, expression of remorse, and a passive personality shaped by his upbringing. However, the jury did not find that Fisher's capacity to understand the criminality of his actions or to conform to the law was impaired at the time of the murder, nor did they identify any other unspecified mitigating circumstances.
The jury recommended a death sentence for Fisher, which the trial court imposed alongside fifteen years for burglary and three years for assault. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Fisher's certiorari petition. Fisher then filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in Forsyth County, where certain claims were procedurally barred, and remaining claims were denied after an evidentiary hearing. The North Carolina Supreme Court also denied certiorari for the MAR. Subsequently, Fisher filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was dismissed by the district court, denying a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Fisher raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial phases and challenges the constitutionality of the trial court's aggravating circumstance instruction.
Before addressing these claims, the court must determine whether they were "adjudicated on the merits" by the state court, thus invoking the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d). If the state court adjudicated the claims, federal habeas relief is limited to cases where the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on unreasonable fact determinations. If not adjudicated on the merits, the court reviews the claims de novo. Fisher argues that the state court failed to consider his submission properly due to factual errors in an order signed by the State, which he claims indicates a lack of independent judicial consideration. The court finds this argument unmeritorious.
Fisher's assertion that the state court inadequately considered his Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) is contradicted by the record. He filed his MAR in September 1995, and a hearing occurred in September 1996, leading to a November 1996 order that allowed discovery, authorized the hiring of an investigator and expert, and dismissed some claims due to procedural bars. An amended MAR was accepted, and an evidentiary hearing on remaining claims took place over three days starting December 17, 1996, during which multiple witnesses testified. After the hearing, Fisher was permitted to amend his MAR further, and closing arguments were held on January 3, 1997.
The state court ultimately denied the MAR, concluding that Fisher did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel nor any resulting prejudice. Following this, both parties were asked to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 8, 1997, the state court issued a 36-page order denying all versions of Fisher's MAR, adopting the State's proposed order, which aligned with the court’s earlier ruling. This adoption does not imply a lack of independent judgment as Fisher’s own proposal would have contradicted the court's ruling.
Moreover, Fisher's claims of erroneous factual findings in the order were rejected. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual determinations are presumed correct, and the burden lies with the applicant to provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. The district court found no evidence that the state court's findings were unreasonable or unsupported, noting that Fisher was given ample opportunity to present his claims. Lastly, the court stated that even if the order was somewhat summary, it does not diminish the necessity to defer to the state court's application of established law in reviewing the facts.
Fisher's claim that the state court neglected his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments during sentencing is rejected. He argues that these claims were presented in his Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) and discussed at an evidentiary hearing, but contends they were not adequately "adjudicated" because they were only briefly mentioned in the court's written order. The court clarifies that a summary ruling does not imply a failure to adjudicate under § 2254(d). Thus, Fisher's claims are reviewed under the standards of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).
The court establishes that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, as defined by the Sixth Amendment and Strickland v. Washington, Fisher must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficiency resulted in a different outcome probability in his case. The court emphasizes the need for a strong presumption in favor of counsel's performance, noting that it is easy for a defendant to criticize counsel after an unfavorable verdict. Furthermore, merely showing that errors could have influenced the outcome is insufficient; Fisher must show a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would have been different, undermining confidence in the result. For a conviction challenge, this means establishing a reasonable doubt about guilt; for a death sentence challenge, it involves showing that the balance of circumstances would not have warranted a death sentence without the errors.
The governing law from the Supreme Court requires deference to state court adjudications as per 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). Review of state court decisions is limited to determining if they are "contrary to" or involve an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law. A decision is "contrary" if it reaches a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court on a legal question or differs on materially indistinguishable facts. An "unreasonable application" occurs when the state court identifies the correct legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the specific facts of the case. Importantly, a federal habeas court cannot issue a writ solely based on a perceived erroneous application; it must also be unreasonable.
The focus then shifts to Fisher's claim of ineffective counsel regarding the failure to present better evidence for his voluntary intoxication defense and additional claims at sentencing. Fisher alleges his attorney should have interviewed more lay witnesses who could testify to his alcohol consumption before the crime, provided stronger expert testimony, and introduced a police statement from the victim after an earlier attack. Fisher confessed to the murder, relying on a voluntary intoxication defense, which requires proof that intoxication rendered him incapable of forming intent to kill. His attorney did present testimony from Fisher, a companion, and a clinical psychologist to support this defense.
Fisher testified about his substance use, including regular consumption of alcohol, marijuana, and crack cocaine. On April 1, 1992, after work, he engaged in several activities, including visiting a grocery store with his nephew to cash a check, where they purchased beer and malt liquor. He consumed at least four quarts of malt liquor and additional beer before returning to Angela's house around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. After an argument with Angela, who struck him, Fisher left for Cliff Foster's house.
At Foster's, they drank and smoked crack cocaine, which Fisher purchased from a drug dealer. Fisher attempted to contact Angela but was prevented by her mother. Around 4:00 a.m., he returned to Angela's house carrying a knife to intimidate her. Upon entering, a confrontation occurred, leading to a "scuffle" during which Fisher blacked out. He has no recollection of stabbing Angela or her daughter, Shemika, nor of dragging Angela outside. Fisher only regained awareness when he heard a gunshot from a neighbor, prompting him to flee and hide from police until later that day.
Cliff Foster corroborated Fisher's account of their drug and alcohol use leading up to the incident, confirming they smoked four rocks of crack cocaine together early that morning.
Dr. Hoover, a court-appointed clinical psychologist, provided comprehensive testimony for the defense regarding Fisher's psychological evaluation post-murder. His assessment included the administration of various personality tests and resulted in a diagnosis of chronic, persistent dysthymia, substance abuse issues, and below-average intelligence. Dr. Hoover opined that Fisher was in an alcohol and drug-induced blackout during the murder, which impaired his ability to plan and execute the act. He emphasized that Fisher's mental state, combined with his personality traits and intellectual capacity, made it difficult for him to formulate a coherent plan.
Fisher contended that his trial counsel was deficient for not presenting lay witnesses who could corroborate his alcohol consumption prior to the murder, as well as for failing to provide more robust expert testimony on the effects of alcohol and crack cocaine on his behavior. Fisher argued that this omission could have influenced the jury's verdict and sentencing. However, the state court found that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that there was no resulting prejudice to Fisher. The court's decision was upheld as reasonable.
Fisher did not prove that his counsel was deficient regarding the voluntary intoxication defense. The state court noted that his trial counsel provided adequate evidence for a jury instruction on this defense during the guilt phase and for statutory mitigating circumstances during sentencing. Fisher and another witness detailed his alcohol and crack cocaine use in the hours leading up to the murder, but additional witnesses could only vaguely confirm his drinking hours prior, without asserting he was highly intoxicated or impaired. The state court reasonably concluded that these witnesses did not accurately observe Fisher's alcohol intake. Furthermore, after arriving at a friend's house at 9:00 p.m., Fisher did not testify to consuming any substances until after the murder, and his counsel had sufficiently explored the relevant evidence. Therefore, the state court's finding that Fisher's counsel was not constitutionally deficient for not presenting more lay witnesses to support the intoxication claim was justified.
Fisher's trial counsel's failure to present witness testimony was deemed insufficient to alter the trial's outcome, as overwhelming evidence indicated Fisher violently assaulted Angela before her murder. The assault, characterized by a torn shirt and multiple bruises on Angela, ended when she escaped into a taxi with Fisher in pursuit. Fisher admitted to recollecting events from 9:00 p.m. onward, including returning to Angela's home with a knife after confirming she was there. Despite his alcohol and crack cocaine use, he demonstrated clear intent by telephoning Angela, retrieving the knife, and forcibly entering her home to continue the attack. The jury reasonably dismissed Fisher's claims of incapacity to form intent due to intoxication, as well as his assertion of impaired judgment at sentencing. The possibility that the testimony of witnesses who saw Fisher prior to 9:00 p.m. could have influenced the jury was deemed negligible. Furthermore, even if the jury had found mitigating circumstances, it was unlikely they would have deemed them sufficient to outweigh aggravating factors. As a result, North Carolina's rejection of Fisher's claims was consistent with the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, and he is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). Additionally, Fisher's argument regarding ineffective assistance related to expert testimony on voluntary intoxication was rejected, particularly concerning the late evaluation by his court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Hoover.
Fisher claims his trial counsel failed to seek the testimony of a psychiatrist to address the effects of alcohol and cocaine on his behavior and to assert that he was in a blackout during the murder, which would have impaired his ability to form a murderous intent. He argues that this oversight affected the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances related to his mental capacity during sentencing. Fisher contends that had such testimony been presented, there was a reasonable probability it would have influenced the jury's findings regarding the mitigating factors, potentially resulting in a non-death sentence.
However, the court found Fisher’s claims unconvincing. Prior to trial, Fisher had secured a clinical psychologist, Dr. Hoover, to evaluate him. Despite some delays in the evaluation process, Dr. Hoover met with Fisher multiple times and provided comprehensive testimony regarding Fisher’s mental state at the time of the murder, which was deemed competent. The jury accepted Dr. Hoover's testimony and found one mitigating circumstance based on it. The court determined that additional psychiatric testimony would largely be redundant and not crucial enough to alter the jury's decision.
Ultimately, the jury rejected the voluntary intoxication defense, concluding that Fisher had the capacity to deliberate and premeditate the murder, as well as to understand the criminality of his actions. The evidence supporting this conclusion was overwhelming, leading the court to affirm that the trial counsel's actions were not deficient and that the absence of additional testimony would not have likely changed the jury's verdict or sentencing outcome.
Fisher asserts two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: first, that his attorney failed to secure an expert opinion from Dr. Hoover regarding his ability to adjust to incarceration, and second, that counsel neglected to introduce Angela's statement indicating Fisher's violent behavior was out of character. The State argues that these claims were neither timely nor specifically raised in state court, suggesting Fisher has waived or defaulted on them. However, the court finds it unnecessary to address procedural issues since Fisher has not demonstrated ineffective assistance based on these claims. During sentencing, Fisher's counsel presented evidence of his good behavior while incarcerated, lack of prior criminal history, and positive personal relationships. The jury recognized Fisher's absence of significant prior criminal activity and his good conduct in jail as mitigating circumstances but ultimately found them insufficient against the aggravating factors. The court concludes that the failure to introduce the additional evidence, while potentially a misstep, did not constitute a deficiency that would have changed the jury's decision on sentencing. Counsel's overall presentation, including lay and expert testimony supporting Fisher's defense, was deemed adequate, as it effectively highlighted multiple mitigating factors, even though the jury did not find them sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Fisher's counsel's failure to present additional testimony and evidence for mitigation did not result in actual prejudice, as determined by the state court. Fisher committed a brutal murder of his girlfriend, stabbing her thirty-two times in front of her children and mother. His actions included dragging her naked and bleeding into the yard, where he continued the assault until interrupted by a gunshot. The jury found that Fisher committed the murder during a burglary and classified it as "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Despite eight mitigating circumstances presented, the jury concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed them. The court found no reasonable probability that additional mitigating evidence would have changed the jury's decision on the death penalty, thus denying Fisher habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Fisher's request for an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance was also denied. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2), a district court cannot hold such a hearing if the applicant failed to develop the factual basis for a claim during state proceedings unless a statutory exception applies. Fisher argued that he did not fail to develop his claims and that he met the criteria for an evidentiary hearing as outlined in Townsend v. Sain, claiming to establish four of the required factors.
1) The merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing, and the state factual determination lacks support from the overall record. 2) The fact-finding procedure used by the state court was deemed inadequate for a full and fair hearing. 3) The state trier of fact did not provide a complete and fair fact-finding opportunity. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.
However, it is noted that Fisher did not fail to develop the factual basis for his claims in state court, as he had opportunities to do so, including a three-day evidentiary hearing where he presented live witnesses and evidence regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Following this, he amended his motion for appropriate relief (MAR) to align with the evidence presented. Fisher argued that the facts he developed were sufficient to demonstrate ineffective counsel.
The court also clarified that while 2254(e)(2) did not prevent the district court from conducting an evidentiary hearing, it did not imply entitlement to one. Fisher's claim for such a hearing relied on the assertion that the state court did not resolve his sentencing claims and made vague allegations about the hearing's fairness. The court found no evidence that Fisher was denied a full and fair hearing and noted he did not challenge the presumption of correctness of the state court's findings. Fisher failed to present additional facts or evidence he would wish to introduce, leading to the conclusion that the district court did not err in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, Fisher claimed his death sentence should be reversed due to the unconstitutionality of the trial court's instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, since he did not raise this constitutional challenge in his direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the state MAR court deemed the claim procedurally defaulted according to N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1419(a)(3)(1999).
Federal courts are barred from reviewing the merits of claims that are procedurally defaulted under state procedural rules unless the applicant demonstrates either cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law, or that not considering the claims would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A state procedural rule is deemed "adequate" if consistently applied and "independent" if it does not rely on federal constitutional rulings. In this case, Fisher argues that the North Carolina state court did not base its rejection of his jury instruction challenge on an "independent and adequate" state law ground and that he has shown cause and prejudice for his procedural default. The court finds that N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1419(a)(3) constitutes an independent and adequate ground for procedural default, which Fisher does not seriously contest. Fisher's assertion that the North Carolina Supreme Court was required to conduct an automatic review that would have included his claim is dismissed. The court references similar precedents, emphasizing that mandatory reviews do not necessitate the examination of constitutional errors not specifically raised on appeal.
South Carolina's previous in favorem vitae review did not preserve defaulted claims, as highlighted in Bennett v. Angelone. Similar to Virginia's mandatory review, North Carolina's statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-2000(d)) does not require courts to investigate unraised errors on direct appeal. Consequently, North Carolina's dismissal of Fisher's jury instruction challenge is based on an adequate and independent procedural rule (N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1419(a)(3)). Fisher contends that despite his procedural default, federal habeas review of his claim is warranted due to ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" jury instruction. However, the court disagrees, affirming that the Sixth Amendment guarantees effective counsel on direct appeals, as established in Evitts v. Lucey. Fisher must meet the Strickland v. Washington criteria, showing that counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient and that this deficiency likely affected the outcome. Appellate counsel is presumed to prioritize issues that offer the best chance for relief, and failing to raise every non-frivolous argument does not indicate incompetence. Furthermore, capital sentencing must avoid arbitrary application of the death penalty, requiring states to clearly define death-eligible crimes to prevent standardless discretion. Statutory aggravating circumstances must provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing cases that warrant the death penalty from those that do not, in compliance with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Claims of vagueness in this context are particularly concerning.
The challenged provision is criticized for failing to clearly inform juries on the necessary findings to impose the death penalty, resulting in open-ended discretion deemed invalid by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. In Maynard v. Cartwright, the Court found Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, a stance supported by Godfrey v. Georgia, which invalidated similar language in Georgia law. The Supreme Court emphasizes that limiting the sentencer's discretion is a constitutional requirement to minimize arbitrary and capricious actions. A vague statutory circumstance may be supplemented by a limiting instruction that provides sufficient guidance; however, the instruction must not itself be vague. In Walton v. Arizona, the Court highlighted the need to assess both the statutory language and any subsequent definitions provided by state courts for constitutional adequacy.
In Fisher's trial under North Carolina law, the aggravating circumstance was defined as the capital felony being "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The jury received a limiting instruction defining these terms, stating that to qualify, the murder must exceed normal brutality or be a conscienceless, torturous crime. This instruction had previously faced vagueness challenges in State v. Syriani, showing ongoing scrutiny of such definitions in capital cases.
The court upheld the jury instructions, determining they offered constitutionally adequate guidance by incorporating definitions sanctioned by both the court and the United States Supreme Court. Fisher, in his federal habeas application, contended that North Carolina's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague and that the jury's discretion was not sufficiently limited. He also claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to address this issue on appeal. While the court acknowledged that the term "especially heinous" could be interpreted broadly, referencing Maynard v. Cartwright, it emphasized that prior Supreme Court rulings have established acceptable limiting constructions. These include defining the circumstance to encompass crimes involving "torture or serious physical abuse" or requiring that the murder be a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which was unnecessarily torturous to the victim." The court asserted that the jury received a limiting instruction that differentiated the murder in question from others by requiring findings of excessive brutality or specific torturous conditions, thus ensuring the imposition of the death penalty was not arbitrary or capricious.
The court concludes that Fisher's appellate counsel did not act unconstitutionally by not challenging the jury instruction on direct appeal, as North Carolina precedent already dismissed such claims. The court emphasizes that the horrific details of Angela's murder mitigate any possibility that a different outcome would have occurred had the claim been presented. Consequently, Fisher has not shown adequate cause for his procedural default regarding the heinousness claim and is thus ineligible for habeas relief. The court denies Fisher's request for a certificate of appealability, dismissing his appeal on the grounds that he has not demonstrated a substantial denial of a constitutional right. Additionally, the court rejects Fisher's argument that the 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) review standard violates due process, noting that this claim is barred by existing precedent. The Supreme Court's recent decisions on § 2254 do not alter the court's stance, and no further briefing is necessary. Fisher's claims do not meet the criteria for an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2), and he has not argued that failing to consider his heinousness claim would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
