Terry Belk Dwayne Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and the Class They Represent, William Capacchione, Individually and on Behalf of Christina Capacchione, a Minor Michael P. Grant Richard Easterling Lawrence Gauvreau Karen Bentley Charles Thompson Scott C. Willard v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Eric Smith, Superintendent, in His Official Capacity Arthur Griffin, Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, in His Official Capacity, United States of America, Amicus Curiae. William Capacchione, Individually and on Behalf of Christina Capacchione, a Minor Michael P. Grant Richard Easterling Lawrence Gauvreau Karen Bentley Charles Thompson Scott C. Willard, and Terry Belk Dwayne Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and the Class They Represent v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Eric Smith, Superintendent, in His Official Capacity Arthur Griffin, Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, in His Official Capacity, United States of America, Amicus Curiae
Docket: 99-2389
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; May 8, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition for an initial en banc hearing regarding a case involving plaintiffs Terry Belk, Dwayne Collins, and others against the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education and its officials. A majority of active judges voted against the en banc hearing, with Chief Judge Wilkinson and several judges concurring in the denial, while Judges Wilkins, Luttig, and Williams dissented. Chief Judge Wilkinson emphasized the importance of following customary procedures by referring the case to a three-judge panel, which is the standard practice for reviewing appeals. He noted that this approach promotes focus and refinement of issues, often rendering en banc hearings unnecessary. Additionally, he highlighted that en banc proceedings do not guarantee a clearer resolution and can lead to fragmented decisions, particularly without prior panel consideration. This order reflects the court's commitment to procedural norms and the efficient handling of appeals.
En banc review is uncertain at this stage. A dissenting opinion suggests bypassing the three-judge panel due to its earlier ruling on a stay motion, arguing that the appellants and the public deserve the assumption of eventual success before the panel. The dissenting judge believes the panel will likely invalidate the district court's decisions regarding the desegregation decree and injunction, implying that the case's outcome is predetermined. However, the author of the excerpt disagrees, asserting that the stay order referenced the merits only briefly and focused primarily on the balance of hardships. The panel determined that the appellants demonstrated serious questions for litigation without fully addressing the merits.
The author emphasizes the importance of allowing the panel to conduct a thorough deliberation process, which includes briefing and oral arguments that enhance judicial decision-making. They argue against prejudging the panel's outcome and highlight the need for judges to avoid a fixed view of how cases are resolved. While acknowledging the urgency of resolving litigation, particularly in school desegregation cases, the author warns against sacrificing proper judicial procedures for expediency, which could lead to uncertain consequences. The dissenting colleague's hypothetical scenarios about future events are seen as speculative and overly reliant on assumptions, reinforcing the view that standard procedures may ultimately be more efficient.
Since 1975, all school desegregation and pupil assignment appeals in this circuit have been decided by a three-judge panel, a practice that replaced earlier en banc resolutions. Historical cases supporting this practice include Wheeler v. Durham County Bd. of Educ. and several subsequent decisions. The author argues against changing this established procedure, emphasizing that judicial orders must be respected when reached in a careful manner, which is essential for upholding the rule of law.
Judge Luttig, dissenting from the denial of an en banc hearing, expresses concern over the potential delay in resolving this significant case. He notes that the unusual stay issued by the panel and the expected lengthy timeline for full court consideration could leave the district court's decision unimplemented for multiple academic years. Luttig highlights the implications of continued busing and racial assignment of students, asserting the court's obligation to expedite its decision regarding the district court's injunction, which declared the school system unitary and fully integrated after decades of federal oversight.
The decision to hear the case en banc is prompted by several key considerations. The district court's injunction against the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education allows for compliance starting in the 2000-2001 academic year, giving the Board approximately one year to implement the order. Testimony from the school superintendent confirmed that compliance is feasible. While the plaintiffs sought a complete stay of the injunction, the Board requested only a partial stay, agreeing to eliminate race-based assignments to magnet schools but seeking additional time until the 2001-2002 year for broader compliance. The Board's rationale for this request includes minimizing disruption by aligning the implementation with the opening of four new schools.
The court panel granted a complete stay, diverging from the Board's request, and cited three significant reasons for this decision: the timeframe for implementation was deemed inadequate, the argument was not scheduled until June (six months post-stay), and the panel indicated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the case. The appeal regarding the injunction will not be argued until June, and the timeline for a decision is uncertain, with potential delays due to the complexity of the case and the summer schedule affecting deliberations. The lengthy litigation history, spanning thirty-five years, underscores the importance of the legal issues at stake. A dissent could further extend the timeline for rendering a final opinion.
A final panel decision in this case is anticipated around March or April 2001, at which point the losing parties may petition for rehearing en banc. The panel has paused the district court's injunction, indicating that both the Board and plaintiffs appellants are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge. This stay does not resolve the underlying dispute but suggests a presumption that the movant will ultimately prevail, potentially leading to the invalidation of the district court's dissolution of a longstanding injunction against race-based student assignments.
If the panel supports the continuation of the injunction allowing race-based assignments, plaintiffs may request en banc consideration, particularly if they argue it contradicts recent court decisions. The criteria for en banc review would be met regardless of the panel’s final decision. The timeline for seeking en banc review is fourteen days for the losing party, with the prevailing party given ten days to respond, although the federal government may have an extended period for its response.
If the court agrees to en banc review after the panel decision, a further delay of two to three months before oral argument is expected. Thus, if the panel decision is issued in March or April 2001, en banc arguments could occur as early as June or as late as September 2001.
Upon granting a motion to rehear a case en banc, the court could potentially act on the panel's existing stay of the district court's injunction. If the stay remains, the court might lift it during the en banc consideration; however, the author expresses reluctance to support such a motion, emphasizing that maintaining the status quo is preferable until further review. The panel's carefully considered decision holds a presumption of correctness, and no compelling circumstances suggest lifting the stay. With the academic year approaching, particularly if it has already begun, lifting the stay could be detrimental, especially since the panel determined nine months is insufficient for the Board to prepare for compliance with the district court's decision.
The author argues that, despite a typical expectation that the Board would develop compliance plans while awaiting the court's decision, the panel's indication that the Board and plaintiffs are likely to succeed undermines this assumption. Expenditures on contingency planning could draw criticism, given the court's view that the Board is likely to prevail in its current student assignment strategy.
Once the case is argued en banc, there is an expectation that the en banc opinions will take at least as long, if not longer, than the panel's opinions to prepare. Consequently, a final opinion may not be issued until March or June of 2002, by which time the current academic year will be well underway. Even if the court affirms the district court's decisions later, implementation would likely not commence until the 2002-2003 academic year is underway, and could be further delayed until the 2003-2004 academic year, especially if the losing party seeks Supreme Court certiorari.
The court has denied the plaintiffs' request for an initial en banc hearing, which typically delays the implementation of the district court's injunction until at least the 2002-2003 academic year, likely extending to the 2003-2004 academic year. This timeline is significant—almost four years since the stay of the district court's judgment—and reflects concerns about the adequacy of nine months for proper implementation. The complexity of reorganizing a school system, which involves extensive community participation and budget allocation, further complicates the timeline. Unlike private entities, school systems require additional time due to the constraints of the academic calendar, highlighting the need for careful consideration of significant changes to avoid disruptions. The speaker emphasizes the urgency of resolving the important issues raised in the case, despite not taking a position on the merits of the plaintiffs' challenge. Additionally, the speaker critiques Judge Wilkinson's emphasis on procedural regularity, noting that previous cases in this jurisdiction have been addressed en banc, suggesting that the current situation warrants similar treatment. The speaker argues that adherence to established practices supports the call for an en banc review rather than departing from them without adequate justification.
A judge rebuts the insinuations made by Judge Wilkinson regarding the implications of voting for an en banc hearing, asserting that such a vote does not inherently indicate a belief about how colleagues will rule on the case. The judge emphasizes that both supporting and opposing the en banc hearing do not reveal personal views on the merits of the case. He argues that Judge Wilkinson's suggestion misrepresents the judicial process, as the court has already concluded that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed based on careful deliberation, which should be respected by the public and the parties involved. The judge highlights that the panel's written opinion provides a legitimate basis for presuming that they will invalidate the district court's order, countering Wilkinson's insinuation that this presumption stems from bias.
The judge voices respect for his colleagues' procedural decisions but advocates for an en banc hearing given the specific circumstances, including the panel's broad stay order and the insufficient time for compliance if the district court's order is upheld. He believes that an en banc hearing would allow for a timely resolution before the academic year begins, which is crucial for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board and the community. The judge notes the panel's brief discussion on the merits, emphasizing that it acknowledges the likelihood of the plaintiffs prevailing.
The panel concluded that CMS and the Swann plaintiffs demonstrated the necessary elements for their case after reviewing the parties' submissions and applicable case law. It stated that the balance of hardships, likelihood of success on appeal, and public interest favored staying the injunction. The panel indicated that a party seeking a stay needs only to present serious questions regarding the litigation. Even if the panel's wording implied a distinct question from likelihood of success on the merits, it reasonably requires plaintiffs to show a significant question about the district court's injunction being erroneous. Therefore, the panel's conclusion that the plaintiffs likely would succeed on the merits is implied, despite Judge Wilkinson's assertions to the contrary. Wilkinson suggests that the panel's brief reference to its conclusion lacks legal significance, but he fails to provide a compelling argument against the panel's stated conclusion. Ultimately, no member of the panel or the court has supported Wilkinson's interpretation, which appears to undermine the clarity of the panel's decision.
