Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; February 26, 2018; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
Deputy Terry Smith of the Panola County Sheriff's Department was involved in a fatal two-vehicle accident with Lynda and William Irwin on Highway 6, resulting in their deaths. Their daughter, Beverly Irwin-Giles, filed a lawsuit against Panola County under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The county sought summary judgment, citing the "police protection" exemption from the MTCA's sovereign immunity waiver, arguing that Smith did not act with reckless disregard for the Irwins’ safety. The circuit court agreed, finding insufficient evidence of recklessness.
However, the appellate court determined that Irwin-Giles presented enough evidence to challenge the summary judgment. The accident occurred on July 21, 2015, when the Irwins were traveling west at 75 mph, exceeding the speed limit. Smith, returning from an unsuccessful suspect search, failed to activate lights or sirens and crossed into the Irwins' path without yielding at a stop sign, leading to the collision.
An accident reconstruction expert, Tim Corbitt, analyzed data indicating that Smith's vehicle increased speed before the crash and opined that he did not stop at the stop sign or prior to entering the westbound lanes. Following the accident, both vehicles ended off the road, with Smith sustaining injuries and the Irwins suffering fatal injuries. Irwin-Giles provided pre-suit notice under the MTCA before filing the lawsuit, which the county defended by claiming immunity due to Smith's actions and Lynda's alleged speeding. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment, allowing the case to proceed.
The circuit court determined that there was no causal link between Lynda's speeding and her injuries, ruling that her speeding would not be attributed to William. It granted the county's motion for summary judgment, stating that Irwin-Giles did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding Smith's alleged reckless disregard. The court highlighted that Smith was not driving at excessive speeds, was not in pursuit of another vehicle, and did not act recklessly by entering a dangerous intersection. Although Smith might have been negligent for running a stop sign, his actions did not meet the threshold for reckless disregard.
On appeal, the court employs a de novo standard of review for summary judgment and interpretations of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Summary judgment is warranted when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence is viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. The MTCA grants immunity to governmental entities for claims arising from employees' actions related to police or fire protection unless those employees acted with reckless disregard. The statute outlines two immunity paths: if the injured party was engaged in criminal activity, the governmental entity is immune, or if the employee did not act with reckless disregard.
The county contends that both paths to immunity apply, leading to summary judgment. The court first examines whether there is a genuine issue of fact regarding Smith's actions and whether he acted with reckless disregard. It defines "reckless disregard" as a standard exceeding simple negligence but lower than intentional misconduct, involving a conscious indifference to consequences and a willful disregard of risks. Prior cases have clarified that reckless disregard involves a complete failure to exercise any care, distinguishing it from negligence, which involves a lack of due care.
In Maye, the Supreme Court determined that a Pearl River County deputy sheriff exhibited "reckless disregard" by backing his vehicle into traffic without a clear view, despite checking his rearview mirrors and ignoring the sound of another vehicle's horn. This was classified as a failure to exercise care, distinguishing it from simple negligence. Conversely, in Vo, a Hancock County deputy who backed out at low speed without checking behind him was found to have acted with at most simple negligence, as he could not see traffic but did not knowingly disregard safety. In Maldonado v. Kelly, the Court ruled in favor of a deputy who stopped at a stop sign before proceeding through a dangerous intersection, concluding that while he may have been negligent, he did not act with reckless disregard.
In the case at hand, the court must evaluate evidence favorably for Irwin-Giles. Smith, a deputy, claimed he stopped at a stop sign and looked for traffic; however, data indicated he may not have stopped or slowed before entering a highway, suggesting he failed to exercise care. This could lead a fact-finder to conclude that Smith acted with reckless disregard, as defined in Maye.
The prior decision in Vo is distinguished from the current case due to the deputy's cautious behavior while backing up slowly in a parking lot, resulting in a low-impact collision. In contrast, the current case involves a deputy allegedly driving across a major highway without stopping or yielding, presenting significantly greater risks to public safety. Additionally, in Maldonado, the deputy looked both ways before entering an intersection, whereas in the present case, evidence suggests that Smith failed to check for oncoming traffic before colliding with the Irwins' vehicle. This discrepancy allows Irwin-Giles to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding reckless disregard, thus surviving summary judgment.
The document also addresses governmental immunity from liability for police actions when the injured party is engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury. The circuit court found insufficient evidence to prove that Lynda could have avoided the accident despite speeding, ruling that her speeding could not be attributed to William, who was not involved in any criminal activity at the time of his injury. This aligns with prior rulings that differentiated between the actions of a driver and their passengers regarding claims arising from incidents involving criminal conduct.
Irwin-Giles's claims related to Lynda’s injuries and death require further consideration, as misdemeanor traffic offenses, like speeding, are classified as criminal activities under the statute. Therefore, Lynda's speeding is deemed criminal activity per Mississippi law, which impacts the analysis of her claims.
A literal interpretation of section 11-46-9(1)(c) suggests that individuals engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury cannot make claims. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that this statute does not protect grossly negligent or intentional tortfeasors from liability if the victim's criminal activity is unrelated to the incident causing injury. The Court provided an example where a negligent officer could not evade liability merely because the injured pedestrian possessed illegal whisky at the time. A claim may only be barred if there is a causal link between the injured party's criminal conduct and the injuries sustained.
There is a dispute over the nature of the required "causal nexus." The county asserts that any link between the injured party's criminal activity and the injuries suffices to bar the claim, while Irwin-Giles argues that the nexus must connect the injured party's actions to the tortfeasor's police duties. This disagreement is pivotal, as evidence showed no connection between Deputy Smith's actions—returning from an unrelated search—and Lynda's speeding incident, with Smith unaware of the Buick until post-collision.
Past cases suggest support for both positions, but the county's interpretation aligns better with precedent. In the case of Williams, where an intoxicated driver collided with a fire truck, the Supreme Court determined that the driver's criminal behavior barred a wrongful death claim against the city due to a clear connection between his actions and his injuries, despite the fire truck’s unrelated emergency response. The essential nexus in Williams’s case was solely between his DUI and his death, not with the firefighters' actions.
In McElroy v. City of Brandon, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the city, ruling that the intoxicated driver's actions barred a wrongful death claim after a crash with a police car responding to an unrelated emergency. The court established that there was no causal connection between the decedent's intoxicated driving and the police's emergency response, focusing instead on the link between the decedent's criminal activity and his death, as supported by the Mississippi Supreme Court's precedent in Williams.
In contrast, the court found that the county was not entitled to summary judgment in a subsequent case, Durn, where a plaintiff made an unsafe left turn while being approached by a pursuing state trooper. Although the plaintiff committed a misdemeanor traffic offense, the court differentiated this case from Williams, noting that the trooper was pursuing another vehicle and the plaintiff's left turn was coincidental. The court emphasized that holding the plaintiff's action as criminal activity justifying immunity would contradict common sense, especially since the trooper failed to use his siren while traveling at high speed.
An appellate court determined that the county was not entitled to summary judgment in a case involving a traffic collision, as the evidence presented closely mirrored the precedent set in the case of Durn. The court emphasized that Lynda's speeding did not bar recovery, as it was considered a "merely fortuitous" circumstance that could not be imputed to William, thus aligning with the reasoning in Durn. The court also identified a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Deputy Smith acted with reckless disregard for others' safety. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the county and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court noted that the officer was engaged in police protection activities while driving, which is relevant to the immunity considerations under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The court acknowledged the possibility of apportioning fault to Lynda but maintained that this would not prevent the county from facing liability.
