Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 31, 2018; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Plaintiff Bob Haber appealed a trial court's summary judgment favoring Ocean Canyon Properties, Inc., which had terminated his employment shortly after hiring him. Haber claimed he was owed approximately $2,000 in wages upon his termination on September 1, 2014, and subsequently demanded unpaid wages and penalty wages through his attorney. Ocean Canyon responded with partial payment of past due wages and a settlement for penalty wages. Haber filed a petition for damages on July 22, 2016, asserting that his demand for his final paycheck, coupled with his attorney's demand in November 2014, entitled him to ninety days of penalty wages and attorney fees.
Ocean Canyon countered with a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Haber only demanded past due wages in November 2014 and had received payment for those wages, limiting his entitlement to four days of penalty wages. Haber also filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming his initial notification constituted a valid demand under Louisiana law. The trial court ultimately awarded Haber $538.48 in penalty wages, denied attorney fees, and dismissed Haber's claims. On appeal, Haber contends the trial court erred in limiting his penalty wage award, denying attorney fees, and dismissing his suit.
The court noted that summary judgment is a procedural tool to avoid trial when no material facts are at issue, requiring clear evidence that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Only specific documents may be submitted in support of or opposition to such motions.
The court is limited to considering only documents related to a motion for summary judgment that are filed in support or opposition, as stated in La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2). Appellate courts review evidence de novo, using the same criteria as the trial court for summary judgment appropriateness (M/V Resources LLC, 16-0758). The burden of proof lies with the mover on a summary judgment motion. However, if the mover does not bear the burden at trial, they only need to demonstrate the absence of factual support for the adverse party’s claim, while the adverse party must provide sufficient factual support to show a genuine issue of material fact (La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1)). In this case, Haber appeals the trial court's summary judgment favoring Ocean Canyon and the denial of his own motion for summary judgment. While the denial is not appealable, Haber's motion is reviewed due to overlapping legal issues for judicial economy (MP31 Investments, LLC v. Harvest Operating, LLC).
Regarding wage claims, the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (La. R.S. 23:631 et seq.) mandates prompt payment of earned wages upon termination. The Act aims to protect employees from delayed wage payments. Specifically, La. R.S. 23:631(A)(1)(a) requires employers to pay owed wages by the next payday or within fifteen days post-discharge. Employers failing to comply may owe penalty wages, as outlined in La. R.S. 23:632(A). To qualify for penalty wages, an employee must show: 1) due wages, 2) a demand for payment at the usual payment location, and 3) the employer's failure to pay (Kern v. River City Ford, Inc.). La. R.S. 23:632 is penal and must be strictly interpreted (Pokey v. Five L Investments, Inc.). It is established that Ocean Canyon owed Haber wages for work performed before his termination on September 1, 2014, and that he made a demand for payment on the termination date.
Haber's deposition indicated that he was informed of his termination by Daley, who also discussed payment logistics. Haber specified that his paycheck should be mailed to his resume address. He later confirmed his termination and payment details with Wofford, reiterating the same mailing instructions. After not receiving his paycheck, Haber enlisted an attorney, who sent a demand letter to Ocean Canyon on November 6, 2014. Ocean Canyon argued that the conversations on the termination date did not constitute a demand for payment and claimed that wages were not due immediately, as they had a grace period until the next payday. However, the law allows for oral demands for payment, which do not need to be in writing, and a single demand suffices. Haber's requests were deemed precise and constituted a valid demand for payment. Moreover, the fact that Ocean Canyon had a grace period did not invalidate his demand made at termination. The court referenced prior cases establishing that demands made on or immediately after termination are sufficient. It concluded that Ocean Canyon failed to pay Hajer in accordance with the law, acknowledging a delay until November 13, 2014, which was attributed to oversight. However, mere negligence in payment is not defensible. Thus, the court determined that Haber was entitled to penalty wages.
Haber is entitled to penalty wages amounting to $9,961.88 for the period from his demand for payment on September 1, 2014, until Ocean Canyon paid him on November 13, 2014, totaling seventy-four days. Under La. R.S. 23:632(C), reasonable attorney fees are mandated for well-founded suits for unpaid wages, irrespective of employer defenses. A suit is deemed well-founded when the employee successfully recovers unpaid wages. Since Haber established his entitlement to penalty wages, he is also entitled to attorney fees. The court determined a fee of $5,000, despite Haber not providing evidence for attorney costs. The court applied factors from Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct to assess this fee. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, granting Haber summary judgment, ordering Ocean Canyon to pay both penalty wages and attorney fees, with all appeal costs borne by Ocean Canyon. Judge Crain concurred, expressing disagreement with previous cases that interpret the penalty provision as applicable to demands made before the statutory deadline for wage payment, arguing that this interpretation penalizes employers for legally withheld payments.
