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In Re: Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996
Citations: 209 F.3d 200; 2000 A.M.C. 1217; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5637; 2000 WL 329022Docket: 1999
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; March 28, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed an appeal concerning the crash of TWA Flight 800 that occurred on July 17, 1996, approximately eight nautical miles from the coast of Long Island, New York. The defendants, including Trans World Airlines, The Boeing Company, and Hydro-Aire, appealed a decision from the Southern District of New York that denied their motion to dismiss claims for nonpecuniary damages based on the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). The court found that DOHSA does not apply to accidents occurring in U.S. territorial waters, affirming the district court's ruling. The appeal involved 145 consolidated wrongful death cases filed by the relatives and estate representatives of the 213 individuals who perished in the crash. Judge Sotomayor dissented from the majority opinion. In July 1997, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for nonpecuniary damages, asserting that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) limited recovery to pecuniary damages. By June 1998, Judge Sweet denied this motion, determining that DOHSA applies only when death occurs on the high seas, defined as waters beyond a marine league from shore, which did not encompass the crash site in this case. The judge interpreted "high seas" as referring to international waters beyond the dominion of any nation, thus concluding that DOHSA was not applicable. He did not address remaining choice of law issues and certified the order for immediate appeal. The appeal hinges on the interpretation of DOHSA's provisions, specifically regarding the definition of "high seas." While both parties agree the crash occurred eight nautical miles off Long Island, plaintiffs argue this is within U.S. territorial waters (12 miles), thus excluding DOHSA's application. Defendants contend "high seas" encompasses all waters beyond the low-water mark, asserting DOHSA applies since the crash site is beyond both the low-water mark and a marine league from shore. A dissenting opinion proposes that "high seas" refers to waters beyond a marine league. The significance of DOHSA's applicability lies in its limitation of recovery to pecuniary losses. If DOHSA is inapplicable, plaintiffs argue they are entitled to nonpecuniary damages, including pre-death suffering and survivor grief. The district court's order is subject to de novo review due to its nature of resolving a motion to dismiss and the necessity of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of ambiguous terms like "high seas" requires a broader inquiry, considering the statute’s language, legislative history, congressional intent, and the need for uniformity in admiralty law, as illustrated by Supreme Court precedents. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) was established to provide a legal remedy for wrongful death at sea, addressing a prior lack of clear recourse. Initially, federal courts recognized a right of action based on humanitarian concerns, as noted in *The Sea Gull*. However, the Supreme Court's decision in *The Harrisburg* restricted this by ruling that without a common-law remedy for wrongful death on land, none existed at sea, denying relief in the absence of statutory provisions. This ruling was eventually overruled in *Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.*, which recognized a wrongful death remedy under general maritime law. Subsequent judicial attempts to address the harshness of *The Harrisburg* led to more complexity in jurisdiction and choice of law, as seen in *The Hamilton* and *La Bourgogne*, complicating recovery for wrongful death cases. In response to these issues, the Maritime Law Association began drafting DOHSA, which Congress aimed to refine into a uniform remedy without displacing existing state remedies. The interpretation of "high seas" in the legislative history indicates a focus on achieving the intended purposes of DOHSA. The initial objective was to create a statute for wrongful death recovery on the high seas, addressing criticisms of the existing legal framework established by The Harrisburg, which was deemed inadequate and rejected by Western European nations. The Maritime Law Association (MLA) aimed to draft legislation that would standardize maritime remedies and resolve complex choice of law issues stemming from varying state statutes. From 1909 to 1915, proposals included remedies for incidents on the high seas, Great Lakes, or other navigable U.S. waters. During the 1914 congressional debates, particularly in light of the Titanic disaster, concerns emerged that the proposed bill would eliminate state jurisdiction over wrongful death claims, replacing it with an insufficient federal remedy. In response to such opposition, the MLA revised its approach in 1916, introducing a bill that would not disrupt existing laws but would extend coverage to waters not currently addressed. The 1916 version of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) maintained state remedies by limiting its scope. Key changes included redefining navigable waters to exclude those within state jurisdiction, adding provisions to protect state wrongful death remedies for deaths in state territorial waters, and specifying coverage only for deaths on the high seas beyond a marine league from state shores. Further adjustments were made at the request of the Secretary of War to exclude the Panama Canal Zone from DOHSA's application. Ultimately, the statute enacted in 1920 established a remedy for wrongful death occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from any state, the District of Columbia, or U.S. territories, thus confirming that DOHSA does not apply to state territorial waters, defined as within three nautical miles from shore. The crash occurred more than three miles from Long Island, and the parties dispute the definition of 'high seas.' Plaintiffs argue it refers to international waters beyond U.S. territorial waters, while defendants contend it includes all waters outside the low-water mark, suggesting that 'beyond a marine league' excludes certain waters from the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) coverage. Both interpretations have supporting authority, but the plaintiffs' view aligns with the Supreme Court's historical definition of 'high seas' as non-sovereign waters, a definition upheld in subsequent rulings. The boundary of U.S. territorial seas was informally set at three miles since 1793 based on a cannonball's range, although it was left open for future assessment. By the time DOHSA was enacted in 1920, the Supreme Court defined 'high seas' as international waters in key cases, characterizing them as areas without exclusive state jurisdiction. These interpretations influenced the legislative debate surrounding DOHSA, with proponents consistently referencing these prior cases. The reliance on these definitions implies Congress intended 'high seas' to denote international waters, and the dissent's failure to address this historical context leads to a misinterpretation of the statute. Defendants reference Congressman Bryan's 1914 statement asserting that 'high seas' includes Puget Sound to support their interpretation. However, it is established that speeches from opponents of legislation carry little weight in interpreting statutory meaning, as noted in Holtzman v. Schlesinger. Moreover, DOHSA's sponsors disavowed Bryan's interpretation, clarifying that 'high seas' refers to areas outside the three-mile territorial limit, where states lack jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has consistently defined 'high seas' as 'international waters' following DOHSA, exemplified in Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, which held that Prohibition laws applied only within U.S. territorial limits, rejecting the notion that these laws extended to ships in international waters due to the absence of sovereign authority there. While the definition of 'high seas' has varied historically, Justice Story's characterization of it as the open ocean beyond the low-water mark has not been the authoritative definition. Other justices have defined 'high seas' as non-sovereign waters. The current interpretation of 'high seas' as being beyond the low-water mark is neither the prevailing understanding, nor is it aligned with Supreme Court rulings that informed the discussions surrounding DOHSA, nor is it consistent with contemporary decisions on the matter. Hence, defendants' definition is rejected. The analysis of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) emphasizes that both 'high seas' and 'beyond a marine league' should be interpreted as having distinct meanings, avoiding redundancy in statutory language. Defendants' interpretation renders 'high seas' superfluous and fails to provide examples where the low-water mark is not within three nautical miles of the coast. The plaintiffs argue that 'beyond a marine league' represents a geographical boundary, while 'high seas' denotes a political boundary, which could change over time. Historical context indicates that when DOHSA was enacted in 1920, the minimum territorial jurisdiction was a marine league, highlighting the absence of remedies for wrongful death on the high seas prior to this legislation. The legislative history reveals that 'high seas' was consistently included in the statute, while 'beyond a marine league' was added later to protect state remedies. Congress's decision to retain 'high seas' suggests it refers to international waters beyond state and federal territorial limits. Additionally, the inclusion of provisions in earlier drafts that reference 'high seas' implies that these waters fall outside U.S. jurisdiction, reinforcing the interpretation that 'high seas' refers to international waters. Plaintiffs' interpretation of 'high seas' as nonterritorial waters aligns with Section 7 of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), which specifies that state statutes regarding death claims are unaffected by DOHSA and that the Act does not apply to the Great Lakes, state territorial waters, or navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone. Defendants contend that Section 7 would be meaningless if 'high seas' were defined as nonterritorial, arguing that all waters listed in Section 7 are territorial. This view overlooks the necessity for Congress to clarify that state remedies for wrongful death remain intact, as demonstrated by legislative discussions suggesting Section 7 was added for caution. Applying DOHSA to federal territorial waters would contradict its purpose of providing remedies where none existed, as state and federal remedies are already available for deaths in those waters. Legislative history indicates Congress aimed to preserve existing state remedies, which might offer more generous recovery than DOHSA. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of maintaining broader recovery options in admiralty law. Ultimately, the interpretation proposed by defendants would eliminate preexisting remedies for deaths in territorial waters, conflicting with DOHSA's objectives, leading to a rejection of their argument. The concept of 'high seas' has evolved from 1920 to 1988, with the high seas effectively beginning at three nautical miles (one marine league) from the shore, prior to Proclamation 5928, which extended U.S. territorial waters to 12 miles. There is limited support for the view that the high seas still commence at one marine league despite this extension. Following the enactment of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) in 1920, the prevailing interpretation remained that the high seas are beyond U.S. territorial waters. The Supreme Court, particularly in United States v. Louisiana, outlined a three-zone model of maritime jurisdiction: internal waters (under complete sovereignty), territorial sea (where a nation has control but must allow innocent passage), and high seas (international waters open to all nations). The Court referenced the United States Convention on the High Seas, defining 'high seas' as areas not included in territorial or internal waters. DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for wrongful deaths occurring on the high seas, whereas state wrongful death statutes apply to deaths in territorial waters. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings established that while a Moragne-type remedy exists under general maritime law, DOHSA remains the sole legal recourse for high seas incidents, disallowing damages for mental anguish or pre-death suffering in such cases. However, for deaths occurring in territorial waters, state remedies remain applicable. The Supreme Court unanimously determined that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) does not override state law in territorial waters, as established in Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 628. The Court rejected the notion that DOHSA applies to deaths occurring in Puerto Rico's waters, emphasizing the preservation of state statutes in such contexts. Prior cases did not address DOHSA's application to federal territorial waters nor define its scope. The court has interpreted "high seas" as international waters, where no state law has exclusive authority, and has historically set the boundary for DOHSA's application as beyond U.S. territorial limits. Cases cited by defendants regarding the high seas beginning where state waters end are outdated due to changes in federal territorial waters. Defendants also referenced a case implying that DOHSA applied to deaths over three miles from shore, but this was inapplicable as the death occurred in a Connecticut river. Furthermore, while some cases have applied DOHSA in foreign territorial waters, such as in India and off the Shetland Islands, this has led to unconventional applications, including to a river in Peru and a lake in Venezuela. Overall, the court maintains that DOHSA's application is limited to areas outside U.S. territorial waters. A wrongful death claim is not considered in the context of an accident occurring in the territorial waters of a foreign nation. The court refrains from determining how DOHSA should be applied in such foreign contexts, where plaintiffs may have limited remedies. Previous cases applying DOHSA to foreign waters aim to provide federal court remedies for survivors of maritime accident victims but do not extend this application to U.S. territorial waters, where state or federal remedies are available. Key cases like Jennings and Bombay do not support the defendants' argument that "high seas" refers to areas beyond the low-water mark; rather, the Ninth Circuit in Howard supports the plaintiffs’ view that DOHSA covers wrongful deaths occurring outside U.S. territorial boundaries. The discussion shifts to Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, which extends U.S. territorial waters from three to 12 nautical miles, affecting the applicability of DOHSA. The Proclamation, issued in 1988, aligns with international law, as a majority of nations claim a twelve-mile territorial sea. Judge Sweet indicates that the Proclamation effectively shifts the boundary for DOHSA from three to 12 miles offshore. As the incident in question occurred eight miles off Long Island, it falls within U.S. territorial waters, leading the district court to conclude that DOHSA does not apply. Defendants reference a specific provision within the Proclamation, but the implications of the territorial extension are the primary focus. The Proclamation does not modify or expand existing Federal or State laws, rights, or obligations. Defendants claim the district court misinterpreted the Proclamation's intended effects. The Office of Legal Counsel states that the key issue is whether Congress intended existing statutes to encompass an expanded territorial sea, necessitating a statute-by-statute analysis for the Proclamation's impact. In *United States v. One Big Six Wheel*, the court determined that the expansion of territorial waters under the Antiterrorism Act did not extend federal criminal jurisdiction under the Gambling Ship Act. However, this case does not address whether Congress intended to exclude the expanded territorial sea from the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Analyzing Congress's intent, the legislative history indicates a clear intention to exclude state and federal territorial waters from DOHSA's scope. The Proclamation effectively shifts the application of DOHSA from three to twelve miles offshore, without altering its fundamental provisions. The Proclamation's interpretation does not redefine "high seas" but merely designates additional waters where DOHSA is inapplicable. If the Proclamation were interpreted to create federal territorial waters subject to DOHSA, it would contradict its disclaimer and modify the statute's scope, which Congress intended to exclude all federal territorial waters. Despite the defendants' claims of overwhelming judicial authority supporting their position, only two district court cases have addressed the Proclamation's impact on DOHSA, both in the Fifth Circuit, with one case lacking substantive analysis. The court indicated that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) may apply beyond Texas state territorial waters and into federal waters, but determined that the crash location was a factual issue unsuitable for resolution by summary judgment. It noted that Proclamation 5928 effectively diminished the relevance of the traditional three-mile limit for federal waters. Defendants asserted that previous case law consistently supports that DOHSA coverage starts three miles offshore, citing several cases; however, these decisions did not address the implications of Proclamation 5928 and primarily involved incidents within state waters. The dissent’s reliance on Proclamation 5928 to interpret DOHSA was critiqued, with the argument favoring an analysis grounded in Congress’s original intent when DOHSA was enacted. The dissent was said to improperly isolate DOHSA from its historical and legal context, neglecting the Supreme Court's consistent interpretation of "high seas" as synonymous with international waters, a point not addressed by the dissent. Once the United States or any of its states or territories asserts sovereignty over specific waters, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) does not apply to the remedies available in those waters. The district court's decision regarding federal territorial waters between three and twelve miles from the shore did not create a "no-man's land" but acknowledged a broader federal territorial waters zone governed by traditional federal remedies. Defendants argued that exempting these waters from DOHSA undermines consistency, but it would be more inconsistent to apply different remedial schemes within federal territorial waters. DOHSA's primary purpose is to provide a remedy where none existed, rather than to replace existing remedies like those from Moragne or state law. The remedies applicable in the federal territorial waters of the crash may better suit the case than DOHSA’s requirements. The Supreme Court's precedent allows the district court to resolve conflicts regarding available remedies. The court concludes that DOHSA does not apply to federal territorial waters relevant to this case and affirms the district court's decision, remanding for further proceedings. The Moragne Court identified a misconception in The Harrisburg's assumption that U.S. law followed British common law, which did not permit wrongful death actions due to the death penalty for homicides, leaving no civil claims. The Court determined that the abolishment of this prohibition in both England and the U.S. warranted overruling The Harrisburg. The excerpt also discusses the territorial waters of Texas and Florida, which extend three leagues (approximately 10 miles) seaward, based on historical boundaries. It references that congressional committee reports are not legally binding but can indicate legislative intent. Additionally, it highlights the definition of "fauces terrae," describing narrow land formations enclosing sea areas. The excerpt critiques the defendants' reliance on Ross v. McIntyre, pointing out that while it mentions "high seas," it does not support the defendants' definition. The dissent argues that DOHSA was intended to fill a legal gap for wrongful death claims beyond state territorial waters, which ignores previous cases where courts provided remedies despite The Harrisburg. Some cases, like Kernan v. American Dredging Co., do not mention "high seas" or U.S. territories in their descriptions of DOHSA, which offers remedies for wrongful death occurring beyond a marine league from state shores. Defendants' definitions of "high seas" appear inconsistent, and Yamaha's footnote defines DOHSA's applicability as extending beyond three nautical miles from state shores, without referring to "high seas." The Court did not consider the implications of Proclamation 5928, issued eight years prior, as it was not referenced in any briefs or during oral arguments related to the cases at hand. This omission indicates that the issue was not presented before the Court. Various courts have applied the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) to territorial waters of foreign nations, reaffirming the definition that "the high seas" refers to waters beyond the territorial sea. The dissenting opinion highlights that the majority's ruling disregards the limitations imposed by Proclamation 5982 and misinterprets DOHSA's legislative intent and historical application, asserting that DOHSA encompasses all deaths occurring beyond three nautical miles from any state's shore. The dissent argues that the majority incorrectly applies the Proclamation's territorial definitions to DOHSA, despite the fact that the meaning of "high seas" is a matter of domestic law. Furthermore, the dissent notes that a bill aimed at amending DOHSA to exclude commercial aviation crashes was passed by Congress but had not been addressed by the parties in relation to its potential impact on the case. Consequently, the Court refrains from taking a position on the bill's effects, concluding that the crash in question is not governed by DOHSA based on the existing record and arguments. The majority opinion concludes that the Proclamation extending the U.S. territorial sea boundary from three to twelve nautical miles excludes the application of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) within this nine-mile zone. It critiques the majority's reliance on Congress' interpretation of "high seas" in 1920, arguing that the DOHSA was intended to define the boundary at three nautical miles, aligning with the states' territorial seas, to preserve state remedies in state waters and provide a separate DOHSA remedy for federal jurisdiction waters beyond one marine league. The dissent emphasizes that Congress was focused on domestic boundaries rather than international definitions of "high seas," and asserts that the majority's interpretation contradicts the established judicial consensus in various circuits that have applied DOHSA to incidents in foreign territorial waters. The dissent firmly believes that the Proclamation did not replace DOHSA with federal maritime law within the disputed nine-mile zone. It clarifies that DOHSA offers remedies for wrongful deaths occurring beyond three nautical miles, and while the Proclamation altered the definition of U.S. territorial waters for international purposes, it did not change DOHSA's application under domestic law, as explicitly stated in the Proclamation itself. The Proclamation extending the U.S. territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles is effective only for foreign policy purposes and does not alter existing rights, legal interests, or obligations under federal law. Therefore, the domestic definition of "territorial waters" remains at three nautical miles unless Congress explicitly links it to the international legal definition. In the case of Wheel, the Second Circuit concluded that the term "beyond the territorial waters of the United States" in the Gambling Ship Act referred to waters extending only three nautical miles from the coast, as Congress had not indicated otherwise. This distinction between domestic and international definitions of U.S. territorial sea is recognized by federal agencies, including the FAA, which stated that the Proclamation did not change geographical boundaries for domestic law purposes. Similar interpretations have been adopted by the Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency. Proclamation 5928 extended the U.S. territorial sea to twelve nautical miles for international law purposes but did not alter domestic law, specifically the application of 46 U.S.C. § 4102, which mandates certain emergency equipment for uninspected vessels on the high seas. Courts, except for a district court and the majority in this case, have consistently ruled that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) remains applicable in the newly defined territorial sea. For instance, the court in Francis v. Hornbeck Offshore determined that the Proclamation's limiting language did not change DOHSA's applicability beyond one marine league from shore. Similarly, in Blome v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., the court found DOHSA applicable for incidents occurring more than nine nautical miles from the Texas coast, reinforcing that the Proclamation did not alter DOHSA's reach. Numerous other courts have also indicated in obiter dicta that DOHSA applies in the disputed zone post-Proclamation. The Supreme Court in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun noted that DOHSA provides a federal claim for wrongful death beyond three nautical miles from shore. Overall, the prevailing legal opinion is that the Proclamation's changes to the territorial sea apply only for international law, not domestic statutes like DOHSA. When interpreting such statutes, it is crucial to adhere to congressional intent without importing international law concepts unless explicitly stated. The Office of Legal Counsel supports this interpretation, emphasizing the need to assess congressional intent regarding the Proclamation's impact on specific statutes. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) emphasizes that the interpretation of statutes should begin with the plain language. If the language is ambiguous, the legislative history and purpose of the statute should be analyzed. This approach aligns with traditional statutory construction principles. For instance, in Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the plain language was determinative, while in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, legislative history was critical due to ambiguous language. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) defines its application zone as "on the high seas beyond a marine league" from U.S. shores. The OLC posits that if a statute specifies a boundary or uses the term "territorial sea" without invoking its broader international concept, it does not engage with the territorial sea but indicates an area that aligns with it. Consequently, such statutes are deemed unaffected by the Proclamation extending the U.S. territorial sea, requiring no further analysis. The primary point of ambiguity in DOHSA's interpretation is whether "high seas" incorporates the international definition or simply denotes waters beyond a marine league from the coast. The debate hinges on whether "high seas" referred to waters beyond the three-mile limit or the low-water mark. Evidence suggests Congress likely intended "high seas" to mean waters outside state territorial seas. However, this understanding does not resolve the identified ambiguity. The majority argues that if "high seas" refers to waters beyond state territories, the Proclamation's extension of the U.S. territorial sea to twelve nautical miles would exclude DOHSA's application in the disputed zone. If this were conclusive, it would imply that the Proclamation impacts numerous domestic statutes that reference "U.S. territorial sea." The term "high seas" has historically been understood to encompass all waters under U.S. jurisdiction, extending twelve nautical miles from the coast. However, courts and administrative agencies have not interpreted the Proclamation to have such an expansive reach. The majority's incorrect approach stems from a failure to analyze whether Congress intended to incorporate the concept of non-sovereign waters into "high seas" for the purposes of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), or if it simply aimed to establish a boundary delineating the start of the high seas. Numerous courts applying DOHSA to foreign territorial waters have interpreted Congress's intent as the latter. For instance, in *Howard v. Crystal Cruises, Inc.*, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a death occurring within the territorial waters of Mexico is considered to take place on the "high seas" under DOHSA. Other cases, including *Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling*, *Sanchez v. Loffland Bros.*, and *Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd.*, similarly support the applicability of DOHSA to incidents in foreign waters more than a marine league from U.S. shores. This interpretation is affirmed by admiralty treatises, establishing that DOHSA applies even in foreign territorial waters. The legislative history indicates that DOHSA was created to address the gap left by *The Harrisburg*, which denied federal common law remedies for wrongful deaths at sea. Early reports on the bill emphasized its purpose to provide a federal right of action for deaths on the high seas while preserving state remedies for deaths within state territorial waters. The drafters of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) debated whether the statute should apply to all navigable waters, potentially overriding state laws, or be supplementary, only applying to areas not governed by state statutes, specifically the high seas. They ultimately chose the latter approach, limiting DOHSA's application to waters a marine league from the shore or areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Maritime Law Association committee concluded that the simplest approach would recognize state statutes for territorial waters, applying DOHSA only where no state statute existed, specifically beyond three nautical miles from shore. Congress did not extend DOHSA's reach to territorial waters, believing state laws were sufficient there. Legislative history indicates that Congress aimed to avoid preempting state remedies by confining DOHSA to the high seas, which were defined as areas beyond the three-mile limit. The drafters' focus was on preserving state remedies, and there is no evidence that they considered altering the three-nautical-mile boundary. Additionally, the potential for changes in U.S. territorial sea limits post-1920 would not have influenced the original intent of DOHSA's drafters. The term "high seas" in DOHSA was thus intended to establish a clear geographical boundary beyond a marine league from the U.S. coast. Congress intended for the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) to clarify the geographical boundary of the "high seas," defined as "beyond a marine league" from the coast, preserving state remedies in state waters. The language was not intended to import an international legal concept of U.S. federal sovereignty that could change over time, nor could Congress have anticipated the later overruling of The Harrisburg by Moragne. The statute lacks an independent definitional section, prompting the majority to argue for a reading that distinguishes between "on the high seas" and "beyond a marine league." However, this interpretation is flawed, as the drafters viewed these terms as functionally equivalent, reflecting the outer limits of state territorial seas. The majority's interpretation risks rendering the language superfluous, as sovereignty was established within a marine league. Including both terms was likely a precautionary measure to avoid confusion regarding DOHSA's application, as Congress recognized the necessity of explicit language to maintain clarity. At the time of DOHSA's passage, there was a significant legal gap concerning wrongful death remedies beyond state waters, which the statute was expressly designed to address. Congress likely did not intend for future changes to the U.S. territorial sea to create a gap in remedies between state and federal boundaries. The majority's interpretation that "beyond a marine league" denotes a shifting geographical boundary lacks legislative support and is speculative. Legislative history indicates that the terms "high seas" and "beyond a marine league" were meant to clearly establish the boundary for the application of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), thereby preserving state remedies in state waters. DOHSA's clear purpose is to provide a remedy for deaths in the disputed zone, but the majority's assertion that it should be replaced by more generous federal maritime law misrepresents congressional intent. The majority cites case law advocating for recovery but fails to establish the necessity for the most generous outcomes. Historical cases demonstrate that while admiralty law prefers remedies, it does not guarantee the most generous ones. Congress intentionally limited the DOHSA remedy to pecuniary damages, indicating no intent for a broader application. The majority's approach undermines the principle of uniformity in admiralty law as outlined by the Supreme Court in *Tallentire*. Their proposed framework introduces four distinct maritime zones with varying laws, whereas the current system operates under two zones: state and federal law within three nautical miles, and DOHSA beyond that. This fragmentation is counterproductive to the goal of uniformity. Furthermore, the viability of remedies for deaths in the disputed zone under general federal maritime law is questionable, especially since state law does not apply there. The majority has not adequately addressed how the law would operate in the TWA litigation while denying DOHSA's applicability. The excerpt critiques the majority ruling that replaces the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) with general federal maritime law in a disputed zone, highlighting the legal complexities and uncertainties this decision introduces. It notes that the majority declines to address potential remedies for appellees, such as recovery for loss of society, survivor's grief, and punitive damages, indicating that significant conflict of law issues arise from this ruling. The application of DOHSA is rendered uncertain due to the majority's interpretation that Congress defined "high seas" flexibly, which could result in fluctuating boundaries influenced by international law, unilateral actions by states, and new treaties. The dissent argues for maintaining the three nautical mile boundary established by DOHSA to preserve state jurisdiction and suggests that legislative amendment is necessary for any broader remedial scheme. The dissent emphasizes that the appropriate approach to deaths occurring off the U.S. coast should be a matter of legislative policy rather than judicial interpretation. The dissent concludes with a call to reverse the district court's decision, noting that the majority ruling could significantly impact related cases, including those from the Alaska Airlines crash. The majority's argument incorrectly assumes that the purpose of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) is related to the international definition of the U.S. territorial sea and overlooks relevant Supreme Court precedents. The author asserts that it is irrelevant whether Congress aligned with the international understanding of "high seas" as "non-sovereign waters," emphasizing that Congress's intent in referencing "high seas beyond a marine league" was solely to delineate a boundary that protected state remedies within state territorial waters, reflecting a domestic focus. The language and legislative history of DOHSA do not suggest that its boundary is subject to international legal changes. The author references the Gambling Ship Act, which defines "beyond the territorial waters of the United States" in a specific manner, and contrasts this with the majority's reliance on the Triton Container case, which did not pertain to deaths at sea. The author critiques the majority for downplaying the relevance of Yamaha v. Caldera, arguing that the Supreme Court's considerations, even in dicta, are significant, and clarifies that Yamaha did not raise the issue of DOHSA's applicability in Puerto Rico. Instead, Yamaha dealt with the application of state law versus federal common law in Puerto Rican territorial waters, where DOHSA does not apply. The ruling affirmed that state remedies were not superseded by federal maritime wrongful-death laws. Finally, the author notes the involvement of Hughes in drafting DOHSA and the role of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. Differences in language between the 1909-1915 and 1916 versions of a bill reflect a desire to preserve state remedies in wrongful death cases. The earlier versions specified applicability to deaths on the high seas and navigable waters of the U.S., while the 1916 version restricted this to deaths occurring "beyond a marine league" from state shores, including navigable waters of the Panama Canal Zone and U.S. territories. The 1919 version further removed the Panama Canal reference, establishing that the final draft carved out a three nautical mile belt seaward of District of Columbia and U.S. territories, exempting these navigable waters from the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). DOHSA also upholds local remedies in U.S. territories, which had their own wrongful death laws at the time of the bill's passage, as evidenced by case law such as *The Schooner Robert v. Kekauoha*. The Supreme Court has consistently treated state territorial waters and those of U.S. territories similarly under DOHSA. Additionally, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea outlines methods for measuring territorial sea breadth, while the Submerged Lands Act fixes state coastal borders at three nautical miles. A current bill pending presidential signature seeks to amend DOHSA by allowing compensation for nonpecuniary damages in commercial aviation accident deaths and declaring DOHSA inapplicable to such deaths occurring in disputed zones, with an effective date set for July 16, 1996, prior to a notable aviation disaster.