Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; September 29, 2017; Alabama; State Supreme Court
The Court addressed three appeals concerning Indian tribal immunity and subject-matter jurisdiction regarding claims against the Poarch Band of Creek Indians and its business entities. Amada Harrison appealed the dismissal of her complaint by the Escambia Circuit Court, which cited tribal immunity as the basis for its decision. Harrison's complaint alleged negligence in serving alcohol to Roil Hadley, the driver involved in an accident that injured her son, Benjamin, who later died from those injuries. The complaint included claims under Alabama's Dram Shop Act. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing tribal sovereign immunity and lack of jurisdiction, which the circuit court upheld for the tribal defendants while denying it for two individual co-defendants. The court's dismissal was certified as final, and Harrison subsequently substituted herself as the administrator of her son's estate following his death. The standard of review for such dismissals requires the court to accept the complaint's allegations as true without presuming correctness, focusing on the possibility of the pleader prevailing rather than the likelihood of ultimate success.
Two key issues arise from the three appeals involving the Tribe and related entities: (i) the subject-matter jurisdiction of tribal and state courts over the dispute, and (ii) the sovereign immunity of the tribal defendants. Both issues are rooted in principles of sovereignty and the limits of adjudicative authority and immunity. The circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint was explicitly based on sovereign immunity, unlike the trial court's reasoning in a related case.
Tribal sovereign immunity has been meaningfully addressed by the United States Supreme Court for only the last 20 to 30 years, beginning with the 1991 case of *Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma* and the 1998 case of *Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.* Earlier cases, including *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, did not establish sovereign immunity, as they determined tribes were not equivalent to foreign nations. *Turner v. United States* is often mistakenly cited as the foundational case for tribal immunity, but it clarified that the tribe was not liable due to its dissolution and lack of a cause of action. The 1940 case *United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.* merely assumed sovereign immunity without substantive discussion.
In *Oklahoma Tax Commission*, the Court indicated that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was originally articulated in *Turner* but did not provide a thorough rationale for this doctrine. Instead, it maintained that the absence of congressional action to alter the doctrine supported its persistence.
Oklahoma requested the Court to either narrow or abandon the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, arguing that contemporary tribal business activities, such as cigarette sales, are disconnected from traditional tribal interests. Oklahoma contended that the doctrine should be restricted to tribal courts and internal tribal governance, asserting that tribal business ventures should not be shielded from state law enforcement. The Court rejected this request, relying on the principle of "Congressional inaction." In the 1998 case Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal immunity, while expressing self-doubt about the foundations of its previous rulings. The majority opinion acknowledged that the precedents supporting the immunity lacked thorough reasoning and that the doctrine had developed almost by accident. The Court highlighted that the immunity referenced in earlier cases, like Turner v. United States, was not a well-founded legal principle, as it primarily dealt with the absence of substantive rights to recover damages. Despite recognizing these deficiencies, the Kiowa majority opted to maintain the doctrine, choosing not to reevaluate existing case law and deferring to Congress's inaction in this area. The opinion also pointed out that since the doctrine is judicially created, the rationale for "legislation by silence" is particularly weak.
The excerpt outlines the complexities surrounding the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, highlighting several key judicial opinions. The Supreme Court has consistently warned against interpreting congressional silence as an endorsement of legal principles, emphasizing that inaction is often not significant. In particular, the Kiowa Court raised concerns about the relevance and fairness of tribal immunity today, suggesting a potential need for its abrogation. The doctrine has faced challenges, notably in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, where the petitioner argued for its limitation due to the detachment of tribal businesses from traditional governance. Despite these challenges, the Court maintained the doctrine to support economic development and tribal self-sufficiency, though this rationale is questioned given the expansive nature of contemporary tribal enterprises. Justice Stevens criticized the doctrine as outdated, arguing it may not apply to off-reservation commercial activities. The excerpt also points out that the broad application of tribal immunity can adversely affect individuals unaware of their dealings with tribes. Although the respondent does not seek to completely abolish tribal immunity, they advocate for its restriction to reservations or noncommercial activities. However, the Court declines to make such distinctions and defers to Congress regarding this matter, affirming that tribes retain immunity from lawsuits related to contracts, irrespective of the nature of the activities or their location. Congress has not abrogated this immunity, nor has it been waived by the petitioner, thus it remains applicable in this case.
Tribal sovereign immunity, as highlighted in the referenced cases, particularly disadvantages those without negotiation power, such as tort victims and others unable to seek waivers through contracts. The Supreme Court's ruling in Kiowa was limited to contract-related lawsuits, but Justice Stevens noted the broader unfairness of tribal immunity, emphasizing its inapplicability to modern tribal contexts and the resulting injustices for victims. Since the Kiowa decision, tribal commercial activities have significantly expanded, especially in the gaming industry, where revenues have increased dramatically. Tribes now engage in various business ventures beyond gaming, encompassing sectors like manufacturing, retail, and telecommunications. Despite this growth, tribal immunity shields these enterprises from litigation, creating conflicts and inequities that impair state enforcement of laws against tribal businesses. The example of Bay Mills operating a casino outside its reservation illustrates these challenges, as Michigan's attempts to enforce state law face substantial barriers due to tribal immunity.
Tribal immunity frequently obstructs legal remedies when tribes fail to comply with state laws, such as paying taxes, causing harm to tort victims, or breaching contracts. Significant cases illustrate this issue: tribes can purchase land, refuse to pay taxes, and evade consequences due to immunity from lawsuits, as seen in Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County. Other cases, such as Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and Native American Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., demonstrate immunity protecting tribes from tort claims, contract disputes, and allegations of unfair competition. Tribal immunity has also been exploited in regulated areas like payday lending, where lenders partner with tribes to evade state laws, raising concerns about consumer protection. Additionally, tribes assert immunity as a defense against state campaign finance law violations. The ongoing disparity between tribal immunity and the realities of commerce has led to negative outcomes, including deregulation and tensions with states and individuals. Justices dissenting in cases like Kiowa and Bay Mills criticized the Court's inaction on these issues, noting the need for reform. Despite dissent, the Supreme Court upheld tribal immunity, reaffirming tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations" and deferring to congressional inaction.
The Court acknowledged a potential unfairness in applying the doctrine of tribal immunity against parties with no alternative judicial relief, but determined that the plaintiff in Bay Mills did not fit this scenario. The majority opinion emphasized stare decisis, referring to the Kiowa case, which denied exceptions for tribes' commercial activities. The Court argued that prior rulings influence contract negotiations with tribes, reinforcing the significance of stare decisis. It noted that congressional inaction suggested an intent to maintain tribal immunity in certain cases, particularly where other remedies were available to states like Michigan. The Court had not encountered cases involving tort victims without alternatives for relief, suggesting that such cases could warrant a different approach. Justice Thomas's dissent criticized the expansion of tribal immunity since Kiowa, arguing it lacked justification and undermined state sovereignty. He highlighted the increasing inequities from tribal immunity as tribal commerce grew and expressed disappointment that the Court did not rectify its earlier mistake. The dissent underscored the importance of sovereign attributes and concerns raised since Kiowa. In light of these considerations, the Court in Wilkes declined to extend tribal immunity to tort actions where plaintiffs cannot negotiate waivers or find alternative relief. Consequently, the judgment granting tribal defendants immunity in a case involving alleged negligent serving of alcohol, which resulted in a death, was reversed.
The case is remanded to the circuit court to address the issue of the circuit court's asserted lack of adjudicative subject-matter jurisdiction, which was previously unexamined. The tribal defendants argue that the claim arose on Indian land. However, the complaint states that the injuries occurred on Jack Springs Rd., a county road in Escambia County, which may influence whether jurisdiction lies with tribal or state courts, referencing Strate v. A-1 Contractors. Additionally, the circuit court must evaluate if subject-matter jurisdiction is impacted by the tribal defendants' alleged violation of Alabama's alcohol sale regulations, as Congress has determined the Tribe is subject to these laws (18 U.S.C. § 1611). Relevant Alabama statutes and regulations require compliance by alcohol licensees, allow for hearings on violations, and provide for civil actions against unlawful sales. The opinion also cites cases illustrating that tribal powers are subject to congressional enactments and that jurisdiction may hinge on whether the activities on Indian land can be regulated by the Tribe. The circuit court's dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Justices Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Wise, Bryan, and Sellers concurred, while Chief Justice Stuart and Justice Main concurred in the result, and Justice Shaw recused himself.
The Supreme Court recognized tribal sovereign immunity in two cases, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, without offering substantial rationale, merely presuming its existence. Justice Stevens, in a dissent, criticized the doctrine as based on an outdated fiction and argued that tribal immunity disrupts fundamental principles of sovereignty and federalism. He noted the complex nature of tribal immunity, which involves the interplay of tribal, state, and federal laws. Stevens highlighted that the doctrine developed almost accidentally and pointed out the absence of explicit congressional legislation affirming tribal sovereign immunity. The excerpt also mentions a recent case in Alabama where the state court declined to apply tribal sovereign immunity in a dram-shop action involving the Poarch Band of Creek Indians. It calls for the circuit court to reconsider the jurisdictional issue of tribal sovereign immunity in light of Alabama’s regulatory framework for alcohol sales, although the necessity for this remand is rendered moot by the court's decision in Wilkes.
