State v. Kitts

Citation: 250 So. 3d 939Docket: 2017 KA 0777

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 10, 2018; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Monique O. Kitts was charged with second degree murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder, to which she pleaded not guilty. After a jury trial, she was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension. Kitts filed a combined motion for arrest of judgment, post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and a new trial, all of which were denied by the trial court. She appealed, raising issues regarding the sufficiency of evidence, prosecutor-judge relationships, jury voir dire procedures, Batson challenges, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial statements, and alleged misconduct. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence for count one but noted that no sentence was imposed for count two, rendering the appeal concerning that count improper under Louisiana law. The court indicated that Kitts could pursue a new appeal after sentencing on count two.

On June 9, 2010, Officer Thomas Southon responded to a burglary report at the Kitts residence, arriving shortly after the dispatch but finding no one there. Kitts arrived later, claiming her husband had lost $4,000. She refused to let the officer investigate the home, citing concerns for her daughter. A month later, officers returned to the Kitts residence for another burglary report, observing no signs of forced entry and inconsistencies suggesting the situation was not a typical burglary.

The presence of the defendant and her children, Dorey Kitts and Corey Kitts, Jr., was noted in the master bedroom where shell casings were found on the floor and the deceased victim was lying in bed. Investigators concluded the shooter was standing during the shooting based on the shell casing location. Cell phone records analyzed by Detective Kevin Cyrus indicated frequent communication among the defendant, codefendant Howard, Corey Knox, and David Johnson, who delivered milk for Kleinpeter Farms Dairy and was acquainted with the defendant through work. The defendant and Johnson developed a flirtatious and ultimately sexual relationship, during which she expressed dissatisfaction with her husband and joked about wanting him dead. She later seriously asked Johnson to find someone to kill the victim.

Johnson accepted payments from the defendant over several months, although he claimed he never intended to have the victim killed. In 2008, the defendant inquired if Howard would be willing to kill the victim, but Johnson kept the $1,000 she provided and did not discuss it with Howard, assuming the defendant would approach him directly. Knox, a friend of Howard, testified that he was approached by Howard about killing someone for money, which he declined. Knox observed Howard walking into the victim's yard shortly before the murder and later picked him up on the day of the murder after Howard claimed to have car trouble. Knox parked outside the Kitts residence, where Howard exited, then returned shortly after with around $200 in cash. The autopsy confirmed the victim died from multiple gunshot wounds to the neck, face, and head.

The defendant claims that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, citing the absence of eyewitnesses, a murder weapon, and forensic evidence linking her to the crime. She emphasizes the lack of corroboration for witness testimonies and questions the reliability of expert witness statements. The defendant also points out that unidentified DNA on the victim could belong to one of several women who had relationships with him, suggesting alternative hypotheses of innocence. Citing constitutional protections against due process violations, she argues that a conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand. The legal standard for sufficiency of evidence requires that, when viewed favorably to the prosecution, it must support a rational conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in Jackson v. Virginia. Louisiana law necessitates that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Specific intent, required for a second-degree murder conviction, may be inferred from the circumstances and does not need to be proven directly. The burden remains on the State to prove both the elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator.

The State must eliminate any reasonable probability of misidentification when the defendant's identity is the key issue in a case. A single witness's positive identification can be sufficient for a conviction. All individuals involved in a crime, whether present or absent, can be considered principals, but mere presence at the crime scene does not qualify one as a principal unless they knowingly participated in the crime's planning or execution. Each defendant can only be convicted as a principal for crimes reflecting their individual mental state; one defendant's mental state cannot be imputed to another.

In this case, Officer Southon expressed uncertainty about a burglary based on the defendant's nervous behavior. Trooper Savoy, at the crime scene, observed the defendant emotionally distressed and heard her make a statement indicating remorse. He reported this to the police but acknowledged he might not have quoted her verbatim. DNA evidence from the victim's body indicated contributors but did not conclusively identify the defendant. The defendant discussed with a man named Johnson the potential benefits of the victim's death, including a $1 million insurance payout. She provided Johnson with $2,000 to hire someone to kill the victim, although Johnson claimed he had no intention of carrying out the murder. The defendant also gave another individual, Darnell Sylve, $1,000 and the victim's work schedule, but Johnson denied any actual arrangements were made to assist in the murder.

The defendant paid Johnson an additional $1,000, claiming to have knowledge that her husband would be killed, which was a false pretense to extract more money. In 2010, after Johnson's separation, the defendant leased an apartment for him, funded by Howard. On June 9, just before the victim's murder, Howard met with Johnson, revealing an unsuccessful attempt to kill the victim and stating the defendant intended to pay him for the murder. Johnson declined to assist Howard due to concerns about police involvement because of his affair with the victim. Later, the defendant called Johnson, recounting Howard's failed attempt and the victim's call to the police, during which she provided a false vehicle description.

After the murder, the defendant confessed to Johnson that she orchestrated the killing but did not disclose the murderer's identity. Johnson later spoke with Howard, who admitted to the murder, detailing how he entered the victim's home and shot her. Howard disposed of the gun parts during his travel back to Atlanta. He mentioned that a cousin helped him with the murder as the driver and that the defendant provided the funds and a debit or credit card for the payment. Howard claimed the defendant owed him $100,000 based on their agreement, and when she did not pay, he started making threats.

Johnson expressed confusion regarding his own potential indictment, insisting he was uninvolved in the murder. He testified that he did not disclose his affair with the defendant to police due to her instructions to protect him from suspicion. He also indicated he would assist law enforcement in recording conversations with the defendant and Howard, noting that Howard used the 'Tango' app to avoid detection in phone records. Throughout their discussions, Howard denied any involvement in the murder and assured Johnson that he, the defendant, and Knox would not implicate him in their statements to the police.

Johnson did not confront Howard about his denial of involvement in a murder to avoid revealing he was being recorded. During a recorded call with the defendant, he mentioned the police becoming aware of their affair, but she made no incriminating remarks regarding the murder. Johnson admitted to lying to the police about his sexual relationship with the defendant and her possible involvement in her husband's murder, as well as falsely claiming she was depressed after the incident. He acknowledged that they continued their sexual relationship post-murder. Darnell Sylve testified that Johnson sought to exploit the defendant for money and offered him $500 to support his claims about looking for someone to help her. Sylve discarded a map and work schedule Johnson provided, and he did not take the idea of the defendant killing her husband seriously due to the insignificant financial incentive. He initially failed to mention any intent to hire a hitman during his police interview.

On the morning of the murder, neighbor Sean Douglas saw a silver vehicle, identified as a Durango, parked behind the victim's truck but could not confirm if anyone was inside. Knox admitted involvement in the murder, indicating he knew Howard had a gun and that Howard intended to kill someone, though he did not believe Howard had the resolve to do so. Knox could not recall the exact date but placed it in June or July 2010. He denied any direct request from Johnson or the defendant to commit murder and was uncertain about the photographs of the victim's house shown to him.

Bryan Casebonne, a human resources supervisor, provided details about the victim's financial plans, noting the defendant was the primary beneficiary of his accidental death and dismemberment policy, while their children were contingent beneficiaries. The victim had substantial life insurance totaling $805,000. Two weeks after his death, the defendant inquired about disbursements related to the victim's paycheck, benefits, and insurance plans.

Defendant made multiple calls with similar inquiries over several months. Lorace Watson, who has two children with codefendant Howard's brother, testified that both Howard and his mother, Diane Howard, instructed her to falsely claim Howard was with her all day on July 9, 2010. Initially, Watson told police Howard could have been with her that day, but later acknowledged discrepancies in her statements, confirming he called her at 12:43 p.m., dropped his mother off at her house, and she first saw him between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. at her daughter’s birthday party. Detective Cyrus analyzed cell phone records, noting over 700 communications between the defendant and Howard from January 27 to July 9, 2010. On April 2, 2010, Howard communicated with the defendant and traveled to the Addis area, using a cell tower near the Kitts residence between 8:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. He was again in the Addis area on April 3, 2010, with numerous transmissions between him and the defendant. On June 8, 2010, the defendant withdrew funds at Campus Federal Bank and traveled to the area of Forest Wood Apartments, where Howard frequently stayed. The following day, Howard's and Johnson's phones were in proximity, aligning with Johnson's claim of meeting Howard, where Johnson declined to drive for a planned attack on the victim. Later that evening, the defendant received a call from Shintech Louisiana, followed by a call to Howard and a simultaneous call to 911 from the victim. Records indicated both phones were in a common area the day after. On the morning of the murder, Watson's and Howard's phones were tracked at different towers, indicating they were not together. Howard's phone was located in the Brownsfield area between 8:15 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. before losing transmission between 8:45 a.m. and 9:45 a.m., suggesting it was off the grid during that period.

Detective Cyrus presented evidence indicating that Johnson's cell phone was active in East Baton Rouge Parish during the time of the murder and did not connect with towers in West Baton Rouge, where the Kitts' residence is located. Records showed no communication between the defendant and Howard from July 9 to July 23, 2010. After this period, there were 7,899 communications between them, including those from a new phone number. Expert Jeffery Aucoin analyzed financial records and found that the defendant's withdrawals often coincided with Howard's absences from work, highlighting specific instances where significant withdrawals occurred on days Howard was not working. The defendant's total withdrawals in 2009 were $52,770, while in 2010, prior to the murder, they reached $105,000.

The defendant testified that she married the victim in 1993 but denied involvement in his murder or hiring anyone for that purpose. She admitted to an affair with Johnson starting in July 2006 but claimed her intention was to remain with her husband. The defendant denied sharing the victim's work schedule or providing keys to anyone prior to the murder. She explained the discovery of $4,000 reported missing by the victim, stating it was found by their daughter in the washing machine. After the murder, she took two trips to Atlanta, claiming to visit a friend, though she acknowledged seeing Howard, who lived there at the time. She denied any sexual relationship with Howard, despite admitting he flirted with her and others. The defendant had heard rumors of the victim's infidelity and later learned he had affairs with multiple women, including Jenneasha Williams, who confirmed her affair with the victim but stated their relationship was primarily platonic by his death.

Rochelle Brady testified to a long-term acquaintance with the defendant and the Kitts family, noting no instances of violence and characterizing the defendant as truthful. On the day of the murder, she witnessed the defendant's distress. April Myles, a former daycare teacher, corroborated the defendant's normal demeanor that day and also attested to her truthfulness. Multiple individuals, including the defendant's pastors and friends, reinforced her reputation for honesty.

Howard, a key witness, denied ownership of a red Mazda and asserted he had a red Grand Am Pontiac. He described his relationship with the defendant as close and refuted claims that he was involved in any murder conspiracy or that he had discussed such plans with Johnson or Knox. Howard maintained he was occupied with errands on the day of the murder, while witnesses Frazier and Guillory testified to his trustworthiness.

The court noted that the fact finder has discretion to accept or reject witness testimony, emphasizing that one credible witness can support a factual conclusion unless contradicted by physical evidence. Despite the defendant's claims, Johnson and Knox provided consistent accounts of a murder plot, corroborated by phone and bank records. The jury was aware of the favorable plea deal given to Knox, yet chose to credit both Johnson and Knox's testimonies. The evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was involved in planning her husband's murder, affirming the jury's determination as rational given the circumstances.

An appellate court must respect the fact finder's role and cannot overturn a verdict based on an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence that the jury rationally rejected. In this case, a rational fact finder could conclude that the State proved all elements of second-degree murder and the defendant's identity as a principal beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In the second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial judge, Judge J. Robin Free, and assistant district attorney Tony Clayton should have disclosed their relationship, which was subject to an ongoing Judiciary Commission proceeding during the trial. The defendant claims this lack of disclosure violated her Due Process rights, preventing her from deciding whether to move for recusal. She cites a prior case where Judge Free was sanctioned for violations of judicial conduct, arguing that the undisclosed relationship compromised her trial's fairness. 

The defendant's claims regarding recusal do not pertain to the evidence presented at trial and do not align with the grounds for an arrest of judgment under Louisiana law, thus limiting her argument to the denial of a motion for a new trial. The court must evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying this motion while considering the appropriate legal standards.

The trial court has broad discretion in decisions regarding new trials, which should only be overturned in cases of clear abuse. A motion for a new trial must demonstrate that an injustice occurred to the defendant; without such proof, the motion will be denied regardless of its basis. Judges are presumed impartial, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to demonstrate bias. A notable case involved Judge Free, who faced scrutiny for accepting a trip from attorneys associated with a case he was overseeing, which the Louisiana Supreme Court found undermined judicial integrity but did not preclude him from presiding over future cases involving those attorneys.

According to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 674, motions for a judge's recusal must be filed before trial or judgment, though a defendant may assert unawareness of grounds for recusal in a new trial motion. Art. 671 outlines specific reasons for recusal, including bias, familial relationships, prior employment in the case, or any circumstance preventing a fair trial. Additionally, judges may recuse themselves voluntarily or at the request of a party. Art. 680 details similar recusal grounds for district attorneys, emphasizing the necessity of impartiality in justice administration.

A district attorney may be recused from a case if they have a personal interest that could affect their impartiality, particularly if related to the accused, the injured party, or involved in a grand jury investigation. The burden of proof for recusal rests with the defendant, who must demonstrate conflict by a preponderance of the evidence. A written motion detailing the grounds for recusal must be filed and heard in a contradictory hearing; if sufficient grounds are established, the judge is required to recuse the district attorney per La. Code Crim. P. art. 681.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Maduell established that recusal cannot be based on vague allegations; substantial bias or interest must be demonstrated. In Maduell, the court found no evidence of bias by the trial judge. Similarly, in State v. LaCaze, the defendant failed to prove any bias or impropriety. The U.S. Supreme Court in Rippo v. Baker clarified that actual bias is not necessary for recusal; instead, the focus is on whether the likelihood of bias is constitutionally unacceptable. This standard was applied in LaCaze's case, leading to the vacating of the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision and remanding for further review under the new standard.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in its opinion on March 13, 2018, regarding State v. LaCaze II, clarified the standards for judicial disqualification under the Due Process Clause as established in Rippo. The Court outlined two essential elements a defendant must prove: (1) an objective "probability of actual bias" and (2) that this probability is "too high to be constitutionally tolerable." The Court identified specific scenarios indicative of unconstitutional bias, including direct financial interests, significant campaign contributions from parties involved, past prosecutorial relationships with the defendant, presiding over contempt hearings linked to prior cases, prior approval of severe penalties while serving as prosecutor, and other conflicts of interest.

In LaCaze II, the Supreme Court determined that none of these bias indicators were present in the case at hand. After reviewing the relevant facts, the Court concluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate an objective probability of actual bias from the trial judge, nor could the defendant establish that any alleged bias claims were constitutionally intolerable. Consequently, the Court upheld its previous ruling in LaCaze I, asserting that the defendant was not entitled to recusal under the Due Process Clause, nor did the relationship grounds in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 671(A)(2) or 680(2) apply.

No allegations exist that the judge or district attorney acted improperly in relation to the case, including being employed as attorneys, serving as witnesses, or performing judicial acts. There are no indications of Judge Free's inability to ensure a fair trial. Consequently, Articles 671 and 680 concerning grounds for recusation were not violated, and the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for arrest of judgment, postverdict judgment of acquittal, and new trial is affirmed as free from error or abuse of discretion.

Regarding the automatic excusal of teachers and students from the jury pool, the defendant contends this violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as it was done without individualized assessments of hardship. The exclusion involved fifteen females and three males, and the defendant claims it prejudiced her case. Louisiana law allows for excusal based on undue hardship but prohibits automatic exclusions without individualized findings. A general jury venire can only be set aside under specific conditions, and defendants must prove grounds for such actions. The trial court has broad discretion in excusing jurors, and its decisions are upheld unless fraud or collusion is demonstrated. The defendant's failure to object at the time of the excusal limits her ability to challenge the decision on appeal, as contemporaneous objections are necessary to preserve issues for review.

Irregularities or errors in a trial cannot be raised on appeal if no objections were made at the time they occurred, as established in *State v. Walker*. The defendant's failure to object to the trial court's excusal of teachers and students from the courtroom means this issue is not preserved for appellate review. The trial lasted about a month, during which the court excused a student who was in full-time school, acknowledging the potential impact of extended absences on her education. There was no evidence of fraud or collusion affecting the defendant's rights, and the trial court acted within its discretion when dismissing jurors due to undue hardship, rendering this assignment of error meritless.

In assignment of error number four, the defendant challenges the trial court's rejection of her Batson objections regarding the State's peremptory strikes against four African-American females. The defendant argues that the trial court failed to adequately assess the credibility of the State's purportedly racially neutral reasons for these strikes, especially since a white male who also knew the Kitts family was not struck. The defendant asserts that her conviction should be vacated due to a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection, citing the State's pattern of strikes against black jurors. While systematic exclusion of a specific group from jury venires is unlawful, defendants are not entitled to a jury that reflects the community's demographics precisely. A violation of equal protection occurs if peremptory challenges are used based on race. Under *Batson*, a defendant must show they belong to a racial group and that peremptory challenges were used against members of that group. If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden shifts to the State to provide racially neutral justifications for its strikes.

A neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge must go beyond mere assumptions about a juror's partiality based on race; it should be clear, specific, legitimate, and relevant to the case. Once the prosecutor provides such explanations, the trial court must assess their credibility to determine if purposeful discrimination occurred. The burden of persuasion lies with the defendant. In this case, the State offered race-neutral reasons for excluding jurors Nelson, Jarvis, Butler, and Griffin, which the trial court accepted. Nelson expressed she couldn't vote guilty in a life sentence case, Jarvis had a personal connection to the victim's family, Butler similarly noted her inability to vote guilty, and Griffin wavered on her position. Although Hood, a white male juror, had ties to the Kitts family, he asserted his ability to remain impartial. The defendant's second Batson challenge was ruled in favor of the State without further evaluation, but the record indicated that the State adequately justified its strikes without needing the defendant to demonstrate a clear pattern of discrimination. The reliance on statistics for a prima facie case of discrimination was deemed insufficient, as a pattern of strikes is only one of many factors considered. The voir dire also provided valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenges. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was no purposeful discrimination. The defendant's claims related to evidentiary rulings regarding witnesses Watson and Johnson were also addressed.

The defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly allowed the State to lead Watson on direct examination, claiming she was affiliated with the State rather than the defense. Watson, the unwed mother of Howard's half-brother's children, had no relationship with Howard since 2007 and testified that her intention was to tell the truth, not to assist Howard. The defendant emphasizes that Watson refused to meet with Howard's attorney but cooperated with police, which further indicated her alignment with the State. The defendant asserts that the trial court limited cross-examination of Watson and restricted the introduction of her police statements, claiming these limitations were prejudicial since Watson's testimony was pivotal to the trial's direction.

Regarding Johnson, the defendant contends that the trial court unfairly permitted the State to question him about Facebook live chats, including those he did not participate in, violating evidentiary rules. The defendant also claims the State misled the jury regarding the nature of certain Facebook communications and incorrectly characterized a homeowner's insurance check as a life insurance check. Despite some defense objections being sustained, the defendant argues that the State frequently ignored the trial court's rulings. The defendant highlights an erroneous ruling allowing questioning about conspiracy, despite Johnson denying any involvement in one, and claims the trial court did not allow her to present inconsistent police statements during cross-examination. Lastly, the defendant notes that the State was permitted to ask Johnson leading questions on redirect examination, violating the principle that leading questions should generally be avoided during direct examination unless the witness is hostile or affiliated with an adverse party.

Counsel for a party is generally prohibited from using leading questions during the examination of that party or an associated person, even if they are called as witnesses by another party. This rule is subject to the trial court's discretion, and a conviction may only be reversed if there is a clear abuse of that discretion that prejudices the defendant's rights. In the case discussed, the State called Watson as a witness, claiming she identified with the co-defendant Howard due to familial ties through her children. Watson confirmed her connection to Howard but clarified she was not a blood relative, stating she was subpoenaed to testify truthfully. During cross-examination, she expressed a friendly relationship with Howard but insisted she did not intend to harm him. Despite previously speaking with both Howard's attorney and the State, she indicated discomfort with further questioning about the case. The trial court ruled that Watson identified with Howard and allowed the defense some leeway with leading questions, later instructing them to ask only direct questions. The trial court's decision regarding Watson's identification with Howard was upheld. Additionally, Louisiana law permits the admission of relevant evidence, defined as evidence that makes the existence of a consequential fact more or less probable. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice or confusion, with the trial court having significant discretion in these determinations, which will not be overturned on appeal without clear evidence of abuse of discretion.

Witness credibility can be challenged using extrinsic evidence, including prior inconsistent statements, provided there is a proper foundation and it does not create undue prejudice or confusion, as per La. Code Evid. art. 607(D). Evidence related solely to credibility is admissible if its probative value is not substantially outweighed by potential negative impacts. A witness can be impeached if they have had a fair chance to admit conflicting statements but fail to do so (La. Code Evid. art. 613). In this case, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by allowing misleading questioning of witness Johnson and permitting him to read Facebook communications lacking firsthand knowledge. However, Johnson was cross-examined, and jurors were informed of his lack of firsthand knowledge. Furthermore, the parties agreed on key facts regarding the victim’s status and an insurance check.

Johnson admitted to inconsistencies in his pretrial interviews compared to his trial testimony. While not all pretrial statements were admitted, the defense could question Johnson about certain inconsistencies. The court found that the defendant had already impeached Johnson's credibility sufficiently, making the admission of written statements unnecessary. The court also emphasized jurors' common sense and fair-mindedness, concluding that any error related to Johnson’s testimony was harmless and did not affect the verdict, thus finding the defendant's arguments lacking merit.

In addition, the defendant raised three claims of erroneous rulings by the trial court. She argued that Dr. Alfredo Suarez’s testimony was inflammatory and irrelevant since he did not examine the victim. She also contended that the trial court erred in allowing a non-murder weapon to be presented and demonstrated by Howard, despite his denial of ever possessing or firing a gun. It was noted that a coroner or deputy may testify about the victim's death or cause, even without conducting the autopsy or preparing the report, referencing State v. Ducre.

The defendant acknowledged the victim was shot and killed but disputed her involvement in the murder, with the autopsy confirming fatal gunshot wounds. The case primarily revolved around identifying the perpetrators rather than legal defenses. The defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine the medical expert, Dr. Suarez. Regarding the gun introduced as demonstrative evidence, its admissibility required establishing a connection to the case, which can be done through chain of custody or visual identification. The court referenced prior rulings affirming convictions despite errors in admitting irrelevant weapons under the harmless error rule, which deems an error harmless if it did not influence the verdict. The defendant consented to the gun's use during questioning of a firearms expert, and even if the court erred in its later use, the error did not affect the guilty verdict.

Additionally, the defendant claimed prosecutorial misconduct related to the denial of a mistrial motion after the State improperly led a witness, Detective Cyrus, to express opinions on the credibility of other witnesses. The defendant also argued that an improper statement made by the prosecutor during cross-examination of a forensic accountant undermined the presumption of innocence. The trial court's denial of these objections and motions was asserted as a failure to protect the jury from inadmissible evidence and improper conduct. However, the court found no prejudice resulting from the alleged errors, concluding that the assignment of error lacked merit.

An expert was called to testify not to establish guilt or innocence. The defendant claims that the presumption of innocence was undermined during the State's cross-examination when the prosecutor implied the defendant's guilt regarding the death of Howard's husband. The trial court did not rule on objections from the defendants concerning this comment, and the prosecutor's insistence on continuing the questioning led to a motion for mistrial, which was denied. The defendant argues that this denial, along with the refusal to provide a jury instruction on the presumption of innocence, constituted error.

In another assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the record shows continuous prosecutorial misconduct, which the trial court failed to adequately address despite multiple objections and motions for mistrial. Specific misconduct cited includes the State's failure to provide timely notice of any plea deals and attempts to suggest no deal existed. Additionally, the defendant notes the prosecutor's biased language and actions that implied favoritism, such as referring to "my jury" and instructing a witness in a way that suggested authority over oath administration.

The defendant cites Louisiana law, particularly articles 770 and 771 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which outline grounds for mistrial due to prejudicial comments or misconduct by court officials. A mistrial may be granted when such remarks compromise the fairness of the trial, but it is considered a severe remedy that should be employed only when substantial prejudice is demonstrated. The conduct of the prosecutor in this case is likened to precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, wherein similar misconduct warranted a reversal.

The determination of whether to grant a mistrial lies within the trial court's discretion, and appellate courts will not overturn a denial of such a motion absent an abuse of that discretion. Even if a prosecutor's conduct is deemed excessive or improper, jurors are presumed to possess good sense and fairness based on their exposure to the evidence and arguments. The core principle of Due Process in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct focuses on the fairness of the trial for the accused, rather than the prosecutor's culpability. A prosecutor is expected to act vigorously but must refrain from unethical tactics. In assessing prosecutorial misconduct, the court considers the weakness of the evidence against the defendant and the severity of the misconduct. Specific examples of misconduct include misrepresentation of facts and bullying witnesses, which can cumulatively affect the jury. The trial judge has the discretion to control witness examinations, and leading questions are permissible unless they clearly prejudice the defendant's rights. In this case, even if the trial court allowed leading questions, the defendant did not demonstrate sufficient prejudice to warrant a reversal of the conviction.

The prosecutor's statements and conduct were determined not to have reached the level of impropriety seen in the Berger case, nor did they prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial. The overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt negated the necessity for a mistrial. Consequently, the conviction and sentence on count one were affirmed, and the case was remanded for sentencing on count two and correction of an erroneous commitment order. The indictment involved the defendant and codefendants Howard and Knox, with Knox's case severed prior to trial. Howard was found guilty, and his conviction was similarly upheld and remanded. The commitment order erroneously stated the defendant received two life sentences, while the sentencing records indicated only one sentence had been imposed; thus, the written commitment order must be corrected. The defendant's daughter testified about discovering her father after his murder, corroborating that the defendant had provided Howard with a key to the victim’s house. Post-murder actions by the defendant included destroying her cell phone. Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the bias of jurors, specifically those identifying as educators, who were excused before the defendant's objection. The defendant's Facebook communications, some with sexually explicit content, were also noted.

The defendant expressed concern over the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, specifically noting the lack of corroborating evidence as required under La. Code Evid. art. 801(D)(1)(a). In assignment of error number six, the defendant contested the trial court's decision regarding a motion for mistrial related to the State's questioning of Detective Cyrus, which will be further analyzed in the context of prosecutorial misconduct. During the examination, the defense raised multiple objections on grounds of leading and prejudice. One prominent instance involved the State's inquiry about the last communication before the inactivity of Karl Howard's cell phone, which prompted a rephrasing of the question after a warning from the trial court. Another objection was made when the State referenced Corey Knox's testimony regarding cell phone activity, which was allowed by the court despite the defense's concerns. Additionally, counsel for co-defendant Howard sought a mistrial based on the cumulative prejudicial effects of the prosecution's statements, particularly the use of "code red," which the trial court ultimately denied.