Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; December 15, 2016; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Timothy Wade Saunders, an inmate on death row at Holman Correctional Facility, is appealing the Baldwin Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his postconviction relief petition under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., which challenges his capital-murder conviction and death sentence. Saunders was convicted in August 2005 for the murder of 77-year-old Melvin Clemons during a robbery and burglary, and for the attempted murder of Agnes Clemons, receiving a death sentence for the murder and a life sentence for the attempted murder. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, with the certificate of judgment issued on December 1, 2008. In November 2009, Saunders filed a postconviction petition, which the State moved to dismiss. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and Saunders later sought to extend the appeal period, claiming he was not notified of the dismissal; this motion was denied. His subsequent notice of appeal was dismissed on June 28, 2011, due to a failure to pay the filing fee.
While that appeal was pending, Saunders filed three additional postconviction petitions seeking an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of his first petition. The January 2011 petition was denied, and that appeal was also dismissed on April 24, 2013, because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court later consolidated the remaining petitions and granted Saunders an out-of-time appeal. The current appeal stems from the circuit court's February 11, 2010, dismissal of his first postconviction petition. In his confession, Saunders recounted purchasing and using crack cocaine before encountering Mr. Clemons, who confronted him about his presence on the property. In a fit of rage after hearing Mr. Clemons mention calling the police, Saunders attacked him with a crowbar, which he had borrowed earlier that day, and believed to have killed him.
Saunders admitted to Sgt. Fuqua that after hitting Mr. Clemons, he attempted to enter the Clemons household to steal valuables for crack cocaine. He feigned an asthma attack to gain entry, became aggressive when Mrs. Clemons tried to call for help, and admitted to smoking crack cocaine in the house. He also claimed to have used Windex to clean surfaces he touched to eliminate fingerprint evidence. Saunders stated he did not intend to kill or rape Mrs. Clemons and aimed to take her to a back room to escape. After leaving, he heard a gunshot and returned to his mother's mobile home.
In his appeal, Saunders contests the circuit court's summary dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. petition, asserting that the court's ruling was legally flawed as it lacked evidentiary development for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on unpresented evidence. The circuit court, however, found that his counsel's performance met professional standards and that claims of failure to present testimony were meritless, as similar evidence was already presented during the trial phases. The appeals court reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion, emphasizing that a petition must clearly state grounds for relief and that bare allegations are insufficient for further proceedings.
A postconviction petition may be dismissed summarily if it lacks sufficient specificity, is precluded, fails to state a claim, or presents no material issue of fact or law warranting relief, as outlined in Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. The circuit court can dismiss a petition when it is evidently without merit, as established in Bryant v. State, and further supported by Bishop v. State and Hodges v. State. Saunders contends that the dismissal order is inadequate for not addressing each allegation in his petition, referencing Ex parte Grau; however, this case is distinguishable because Grau involved an evidentiary hearing, which necessitated findings of fact. Conversely, findings are not required when a petition is dismissed without such a hearing, as noted in Daniel v. State and Fowler v. State. Saunders argues his petition met the pleading requirements of Rule 32.6(b), which demands a clear statement of relief grounds but does not require proof at the pleading stage. It is emphasized that postconviction petitions must meet more stringent pleading standards than civil actions, necessitating full facts to avoid summary dismissal.
Saunders filed a Rule 32 petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his capital-murder trial. To succeed, a petitioner must detail specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall outside reasonable professional judgment and demonstrate prejudice indicating that, had counsel performed adequately, the trial's outcome might have differed. Saunders contends the circuit court wrongly dismissed his claims, asserting that his counsel's performance was inherently ineffective because counsel conceded his guilt. He argues that this concession warrants a presumed-prejudice standard under Strickland v. Washington. Saunders further claims that his counsel's questioning of him effectively transformed him into a prosecution witness, leading to a de facto guilty plea, which violated his due process rights to contest the charges before a jury.
The court addressed Saunders's mischaracterization of his counsel's actions, clarifying that while counsel acknowledged the act of killing, they argued lack of intent due to Saunders's crack cocaine influence. Even if counsel conceded guilt, the court noted that this alone does not provide grounds for relief. Citing United States v. Cronic, the court recognized that certain circumstances can presume prejudice when counsel's performance is wholly ineffective. However, it referenced Florida v. Nixon, which determined that a failure to obtain a defendant's consent for a guilt concession does not automatically equate to a per se ineffective assistance claim. In Nixon, the court ruled that, given the complexities of capital trials, such concessions may be part of a strategic defense approach rather than a complete failure to represent the client effectively.
Attorneys for capital defendants encounter significant challenges in formulating trial strategies, particularly when evidence of guilt is strong. Prosecutors often pursue the death penalty and resist plea deals in cases involving heinous crimes and overwhelming evidence. In such scenarios, the primary goal may shift to avoiding execution. According to the ABA Guidelines, it is not inherently ineffective assistance for defense counsel to concede a client's guilt when the evidence is substantial. Alabama law supports this view, indicating it is not per se ineffective for attorneys to partially concede guilt.
In cases with compelling evidence, contesting all charges may harm an attorney's credibility regarding charges with viable defenses. While conceding guilt can lead to claims of ineffective assistance, defendants must meet the rigorous Strickland test to prove prejudice. In this instance, Saunders failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by his counsel's concession of guilt, as required by Rule 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The trial record revealed that Saunders provided a detailed confession to the police, which was admitted into evidence despite strong objections from his attorney. Although counsel acknowledged that Saunders committed the act leading to the victim's death, he did not concede intent. The defense argued that Saunders was under the influence of crack cocaine, impairing his ability to form the specific intent to kill, and sufficient evidence existed to support a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. The court found that trial counsel was not ineffective for these strategies and that a tactical decision was made to concede certain facts while arguing against the charge of capital murder. Counsel's opening argument emphasized that Saunders acted impulsively while under the influence and highlighted gaps in the police investigation regarding potential co-defendants.
In the closing argument, the defense contended that while Saunders was responsible for the acts against the Clemonses, the jury needed to assess his intent, arguing that Saunders lacked the specific intent to commit capital murder as the crimes were impulsive reactions following the killing of Mr. Clemons. Under Alabama law, the defense was not considered ineffective for admitting Saunders's guilt in the killing due to overwhelming evidence against him, which meant he suffered no prejudice from the defense's strategy. Consequently, his claim for relief was correctly dismissed under Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.
Saunders also claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating or presenting evidence related to his mental illness and substance abuse, which he argued was crucial for contesting the intent necessary for a capital murder conviction. He asserted that trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate his drug use fell short of professional standards, affecting his defense. However, the record indicated that trial counsel sought funds for a clinical psychologist, Dr. Stanley Brodsky, who found no evidence of Saunders's inability to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the murder. Counsel had also requested Saunders's medical records and presented evidence of his crack cocaine use during the trial, including statements from both Saunders and witnesses.
Furthermore, while Saunders argued that his counsel failed to present expert testimony on the effects of substance abuse, he did not adequately plead how this evidence should have been introduced or identify a suitable expert. The court emphasized the necessity of specifying an expert's identity and expected testimony when claiming ineffective assistance related to expert witnesses. The absence of an expert witness was not automatically deemed ineffective assistance.
In Marshall v. State, the court clarified that there is no obligation for trial attorneys to seek expert testimony, particularly when the subject is within jurors' common knowledge, as seen in Gersten v. Senkowski. The court found no material issue of fact or law warranting relief for Saunders, leading to the correct summary dismissal of his claims per Rule 32.7(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Saunders contended that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase by failing to present evidence of his severe childhood abuse. He detailed various forms of neglect and abuse, including inadequate food, lack of medical care, physical punishment, and a chaotic home environment characterized by violence and instability. Testimony from Saunders's sister corroborated these claims, revealing a tumultuous upbringing filled with frequent relocations, parental neglect, and domestic violence. Saunders's counsel did present some mitigating evidence regarding his childhood and mental health during sentencing, but Saunders argued it was insufficient given the extent of the abuse.
Young testified that she and her husband had allowed Saunders to live with them, during which time her husband taught him carpentry. However, Young noted that Saunders was heavily involved in drug use and alcohol consumption, and he had attempted suicide, including an incident where he tried to shoot himself with a nail gun. Joanne Terrell, a clinical social worker, conducted a psychosocial assessment of Saunders and described his upbringing as disastrous, characterized by neglect, abuse, and exposure to domestic violence. She indicated that Saunders's environment contributed to his anxiety and depression, leading to significant drug and alcohol dependency. Terrell opined that on the night of the crimes, Saunders's intoxication and psychological disorder impaired his capacity to understand his actions.
During cross-examination, Terrell acknowledged discrepancies in Saunders's account of his childhood, including his claim of a good upbringing, and admitted errors in her report regarding his parents' divorce timeline. Stanley Brodsky, a clinical psychologist, evaluated Saunders and found no evidence that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong during the commission of the crimes. Brodsky diagnosed Saunders with major depressive disorder with psychotic features, linked to auditory hallucinations and his past suicide attempts. He also noted Saunders's extensive history of drug and alcohol abuse, leading to a diagnosis of polysubstance dependency. Brodsky concluded that while Saunders had some capacity for self-control, his ability was diminished during the commission of the crimes due to his psychological condition and substance use. Calvin Means, Jr., a classification officer, testified that Saunders was classified as 'high max' at Baldwin County Correctional Facility.
During his 13 to 14 months at the facility, Saunders did not receive any disciplinary citations. In his petition, Saunders listed various pieces of evidence he claimed his counsel failed to present at sentencing, but he did not specify any witnesses who could have testified to this evidence. Much of the evidence he cited was similar to what had already been presented, and presenting additional cumulative evidence does not constitute a constitutional violation. Previous court rulings emphasize that the omission of cumulative testimony does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Even when alternative witnesses could provide more detailed accounts, failing to present such cumulative evidence is not deemed ineffective. The record reveals that relevant aspects of Saunders's abusive and neglectful childhood were already covered by his sister and professionals. Consequently, there were no significant factual or legal issues warranting relief, leading to the summary dismissal of this claim. Additionally, Saunders contended that his counsel was ineffective for not adequately presenting his history of mental illness and substance abuse, particularly the testimony of Dr. Brodsky and Joanne Terrell.
Saunders's petition lacked specific allegations regarding the questions counsel should have posed to experts and what actions counsel failed to take to obtain desired testimony. His failure to provide "full facts" led to the summary dismissal of his claim under Rule 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The document emphasizes that trial strategy, including the presentation of mitigating evidence, is within counsel's discretion and typically not reviewed on appeal. The trial counsel had presented testimony from Dr. Stanley Brodsky, a clinical psychologist, who testified to Saunders's major depressive disorder and substance abuse issues, which were considered mitigating factors. Additionally, while Saunders claimed counsel did not present evidence of his family’s mental illness history, he only referenced irrational conduct without demonstrating how this omission prejudiced his case. The circuit court found no material issues of law or fact to warrant relief, leading to the correct dismissal of this claim. Saunders also argued that his remaining claims should not have been dismissed summarily, despite acknowledging they could have been raised earlier. His brief did not meet the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, as it failed to adequately support his arguments.
Appellant Saunders has waived his argument on appeal due to noncompliance with Rule 28(a)(10), which requires proper citation to authorities and record parts. The court affirmed the circuit court's summary dismissal of Saunders's postconviction petition regarding his death sentence, with Judges Windom and Burke concurring. Judge Joiner concurred in parts II and III of the decision but only concurred in the result for part I. In part I, the court addressed Saunders's claim that the summary dismissal was legally flawed due to the alleged need for evidentiary development in ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on unpresented evidence. The court quoted the circuit court’s findings, emphasizing that counsel's performance met professional standards and that the issues raised were already presented to the jury. The court upheld that a postconviction petition can be dismissed summarily without an evidentiary hearing, but clarified that if the circuit court dismisses based on its personal observations of counsel's conduct, it must provide written reasons for the dismissal. Because the circuit court relied on its observations in dismissing Saunders's claim, it was required to articulate its reasoning, which it failed to do, leading to a potential conflict with established case law.
The circuit court's order allows for the summary dismissal of Saunders's claim based on the court's observations. Under Rule 32.1 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, a convicted defendant may seek relief if they failed to appeal timely without fault on their part. However, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to grant an out-of-time appeal; the proper procedure requires filing a postconviction petition under Rule 32.1(f). The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Nixon, which could negatively affect the precedents cited by Saunders. For instance, in Brown v. Rice, it was determined that conceding guilt without the defendant's consent constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Each claim of ineffective assistance must be distinctly pleaded, as established in Coral v. State, and the circuit court appropriately assessed each claim individually. Judicial notice was taken of Saunders's direct appeal records, which included a document detailing his abusive childhood, presented at sentencing and similar to other omitted evidence. The obligation to investigate mitigation evidence is influenced by the defendant's actions and instructions, as emphasized in Strickland.
