Richard Thorn and Pat Curran v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corporation
Docket: 99-1192
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 20, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Richard Thorn and Pat Curran filed a lawsuit against Sundstrand Aerospace Corporation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after being laid off in a 1993 reduction in force (RIF). The plaintiffs' cases were distinct, involving different job roles, departments, and supervisors. The district court granted summary judgment for Sundstrand, but the plaintiffs argued that the court's findings were inappropriate for summary judgment, citing the inclusion of contested testimony as improper. The appellate review is plenary, meaning the court assesses whether summary judgment would have been granted based on the record presented.
The court addressed the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework for employment discrimination cases in the context of RIFs, confirming that it is indeed applicable. This framework allows a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by showing membership in a protected class (workers aged 40 and older), satisfactory job performance, and replacement by a significantly younger employee. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the layoff, which in RIF cases typically involves the employer's good faith decision to reduce workforce size without discriminatory motives.
The McDonnell Douglas formula remains unchanged, but in reduction-in-force (RIF) scenarios where the plaintiff is not replaced, slight modifications are necessary. The plaintiff must demonstrate either that a significantly younger individual took over their responsibilities or that, if their position no longer exists, a younger employee was reassigned to a different role within the company after job losses in their division. The facts must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
In the case of Thorn, a 61-year-old department manager in aerospace, he lost his position during a departmental merger, with Schneeberger, a younger former supervisor, appointed as head. Despite Thorn's strong performance reviews, Schneeberger indicated he expected Thorn to retire soon and denied his request for training on essential software needed for his new role as a contract administrator.
During the subsequent RIF, Sundstrand's policy favored retaining more senior employees with comparable job performance. Initially, Thorn was rated a 6, while three younger retained employees had ratings of 5. However, Schneeberger subsequently lowered Thorn's rating to 5 and altered his prior positive evaluation to remove commendations, despite the absence of complaints about Thorn’s performance.
Two younger employees retained included Foots, who had numerous performance issues and customer complaints, and Smiley, who was resistant to new challenges and uninterested in professional growth. Thorn was the oldest in his department by 15 years, and all laid-off employees were over 40.
Schneeberger cited low productivity as the reason for including Thorn in the Reduction in Force (RIF), despite Thorn having a higher workload and more complex contracts than retained employees. Thorn sought additional work, which Schneeberger denied, and there were no quality complaints about Thorn's performance. An internal committee reviewed Schneeberger's RIF decisions but conducted a superficial inquiry, focusing only on employees' weaknesses and not comparing them to retained employees. The committee restricted Schneeberger from taking notes during the proceedings, influenced by legal counsel, suggesting the review was primarily a protective measure against litigation. Thorn provided evidence that he met employer expectations, contradicting the claim of low productivity, and demonstrated that younger employees were given his work after the RIF. This evidence raised the burden on Sundstrand to justify Thorn's selection for the RIF as non-discriminatory. Thorn's credible evidence could lead a jury to disbelieve Sundstrand's rationale and infer that age discrimination might be the true motive behind his termination. Consequently, Sundstrand's motion for summary judgment should have been denied, although the ruling does not predict trial outcomes and presents facts favorably for Thorn as required in summary judgment considerations.
Curran's case against Sundstrand is deemed weak. He was primarily engaged in developing a vortex turbine but was reassigned shortly before a Reduction in Force (RIF) at age 50. The RIF necessitated a focus on current products, making Curran a likely candidate for dismissal. He claims that the younger, less experienced Jacobs was retained over him due to age, despite Jacobs lacking an engineering degree. However, Jacobs was working on products that Sundstrand intended to continue marketing. Curran speculates that department head Linton removed him from the vortex turbine project to facilitate his dismissal, but this is considered mere speculation. The vortex turbine was still a year from production, aligning with Sundstrand's strategy to concentrate on immediately profitable products; thus, Curran could have been laid off even if he remained on the project. Consequently, he was not "substantially equivalent" to Jacobs, undermining his breach of contract claim based on the RIF policy.
Curran highlights a statement made by Linton during deposition regarding selection criteria for the RIF, interpreting "longest-term potential" as indicative of age discrimination. Linton later attempted to correct this statement to clarify the criteria used. The court found Linton's original words correctly transcribed and questioned his memory of the specifics. The inconsistency in Linton's statements did not substantiate Curran's claims of age discrimination, as the rationale behind the RIF selections remained focused on product association rather than age.
A party attempted to alter his deposition from what he stated to what he intended to convey, which raises concerns about the legitimacy of such changes. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) allows for alterations in form or substance, the original transcript must be preserved for the trier of fact to evaluate the integrity of the changes. Changes that contradict the original deposition are generally impermissible unless they correct a transcription error.
In the case at hand, the alteration by Linton could undermine his credibility if used against him at trial. Despite the alteration, a reasonable jury could not infer that the employer's decisions were based on age discrimination, as the employer was entitled to consider which employees had the greatest long-term potential. The retention of younger employees does not inherently correlate with the desire for long-term contributions, as younger employees are often more mobile and likely to leave.
Consequently, the court found that without evidence supporting the inference of age bias, summary judgment for Sundstrand was appropriate. The actions of Sundstrand's attorney in permitting the alteration suggested a possible acknowledgment of age bias, but this was insufficient to support a verdict for Curran. Ultimately, the judgment in Curran's case was affirmed, while a related case (Thorn's) was reversed and remanded for trial.
