Arthur Joseph Sheehan v. James Marr, Police Chief, City of Gloucester
Docket: 98-1813
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; March 26, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Arthur Joseph Sheehan, a former police lieutenant for the City of Gloucester, Massachusetts, filed a complaint under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after his involuntary retirement. Following a medical examination in 1993, Dr. Madhu Thakur concluded that Sheehan suffered from hypertension and hypertensive heart disease, recommending his retirement but noting he could perform non-stressful desk duties. Chief of Police James Marr subsequently applied for Sheehan's accidental disability retirement, which was supported by a panel of physicians who unanimously determined his incapacity was permanent.
On June 28, 1994, the Gloucester Contributory Retirement Board found Sheehan totally and permanently incapacitated, leading to his retirement due to the lack of light-duty options. The decision was approved by the Commissioner of the Division of Public Employee Retirement Administration (PERA) on August 10, 1994. Sheehan appealed to the Gloucester District Court, which remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. During this hearing, Sheehan's personal physician testified that without reduced job stress, Sheehan faced health risks. Ultimately, on October 19, 1994, the Board reaffirmed the decision to retire Sheehan. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.
Sheehan appealed the Board's decision regarding his retirement, which the state court upheld on December 6, 1994, citing substantial evidence and declaring the decision final under Massachusetts disability law. Sheehan did not seek further review from the Massachusetts Superior Court. On May 24, 1994, he filed an administrative complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) alleging age and disability discrimination, claiming the defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his hypertension, such as additional breaks or reassignment. He also reported age bias from Chief Marr regarding his potential rehire based on age. The MCAD found no probable cause for discrimination, deeming Sheehan's accommodation requests unreasonable. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) similarly ruled that there was no violation of the ADA or ADEA. Sheehan then pursued a federal lawsuit in May 1996 for discrimination, seeking reinstatement and damages. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they had offered reasonable accommodations. On May 20, 1998, the district court granted the motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review the state court's retirement decision and questioning the presence of discriminatory intent from Marr. Sheehan contended the district court erred by not addressing the merits of his ADA claim due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which the court found was not applicable. The court concluded that the district court should have evaluated the merits of Sheehan's ADA claim.
Recovery on Sheehan's ADA claim remains unaddressed in this appeal, leading to the decision to vacate and remand for further proceedings in the district court. The court clarifies that its ruling does not validate the merits of Sheehan's ADA claim but rather identifies an error in the district court's application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal review of state court judgments. The court notes that Sheehan's ADA claim is not inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decision regarding his involuntary retirement; despite some overlap concerning his medical condition and job functions, critical ADA considerations—including the potential for reasonable accommodation and discrimination—were not evaluated in the state court. The ruling aligns with precedent indicating that a plaintiff can pursue an ADA claim despite a state court's determination regarding employment termination. The court also references past cases affirming that disability determinations in other contexts do not necessarily bar ADA claims. In contrast, preclusion may apply if the state court explicitly addressed the employee's ability to perform essential job duties with reasonable accommodations.
Defendants argued that Sheehan could have raised a disability-based discrimination claim under the ADA in his statutory appeal regarding his retirement decision. However, it was determined that filing a charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was necessary before pursuing any state or federal court action for disability discrimination. Furthermore, if Sheehan intended to pursue his claim in state court after agency proceedings, he had to do so in the superior court, not the district courts. As a result, Sheehan's choice to have the Gloucester District Court review his involuntary retirement and his failure to simultaneously seek ADA and ADEA relief in that court did not preclude him from seeking such relief in federal court.
The court noted that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only prevents federal claims arising from state court judgments, not those concerning injuries that the state court did not address. Thus, the district court erred in ruling that this doctrine barred Sheehan's ADA claim. The case was vacated and remanded for further consideration of the ADA claim, as the district court had not yet addressed its substance. Although the appellate court could affirm a summary judgment against Sheehan if warranted, it chose to remand due to procedural issues, including the lack of thorough briefing on ADA issues by the parties and potential confusion regarding the nature of Sheehan's accommodation requests. The remand should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Sheehan's ADA claim, which appeared problematic based on evidence of his inability to perform essential job functions even with reasonable accommodation. The district court retains discretion to allow the parties to expand the summary judgment record and may ultimately reaffirm summary judgment for the defendants or make other determinations as deemed appropriate.
On remand, the district court must evaluate the relevance of the Supreme Court's decision in *Murphy v. United Parcel Services, Inc.*, which clarified that hypertension does not qualify as a disability under the ADA if it is managed by medication, does not significantly limit major life activities, and does not hinder job performance. Although Sheehan's hypertension appears managed and he can perform a desk job, the record is insufficient to determine whether the defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on this. Therefore, the district court will reassess Sheehan's ADA claim, which is now confined to the Town, following the earlier ruling that Marr is not a proper defendant, a decision Sheehan did not contest.
Regarding Sheehan's age discrimination claim, the court concluded he abandoned this argument on appeal, as he failed to substantiate it during the district court proceedings. A dialogue between the court and Sheehan's counsel confirmed that the focus was on reasonable accommodations rather than age discrimination, and no substantial evidence was presented. The district court dismissed Sheehan's ADEA claim due to a lack of proof of discriminatory intent, a ruling Sheehan did not address on appeal. As such, the court upheld this dismissal, noting that issues raised without adequate argumentation are considered waived. Additionally, a recent Supreme Court ruling established that state employees cannot sue their employers under the ADEA due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, with each party bearing its own costs.
A "member in service," like Sheehan, who is unable to perform essential job duties due to a personal injury sustained while on duty, and whose inability is likely to be permanent before reaching the maximum age for his group, may be retired for accidental disability. This is contingent upon submitting a written application to the relevant board and employer, or through departmental head application after a hearing if requested. Additionally, under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 32, section 94, any health impairment caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in disability or death for uniformed members of paid fire or police departments is presumed to have occurred in the line of duty, provided the member successfully passed a physical examination upon entry or thereafter, unless proven otherwise by competent evidence. The Board is not involved in the current action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, stemming from Supreme Court cases Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, establishes that federal courts cannot review state court judgments, as this would constitute an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs filed lawsuits in the District Court for the District of Columbia, contesting the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decisions as violations of the Fifth Amendment and the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' denials of waiver petitions but could address constitutional challenges to the rule itself. The doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and Rooker-Feldman were noted to be closely related, with Rooker-Feldman being broader as it does not require a final judgment on the merits. The district court did not address these distinctions. Additionally, it was indicated that Sheehan could not have raised disability-based discrimination in a certiorari review of the state court decision, as such reviews are restricted to whether the state district court's retirement decision was supported by substantial evidence.
