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Xu Cheng Liang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Gioacchino Cinquemani v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Carmelo Jose Rodriguez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

Citation: 206 F.3d 308Docket: 99-5327

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; March 8, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case addresses three petitions for review filed against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) concerning deportation orders for aliens with criminal convictions. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was tasked with interpreting the jurisdictional impact of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), particularly the extent to which these statutes affect federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court reviewed previous rulings and statutory amendments to determine if district courts maintain habeas jurisdiction for statutory and constitutional challenges to deportation orders. The court held that AEDPA and IIRIRA did not explicitly repeal habeas jurisdiction and reaffirmed the availability of habeas review for aliens challenging executive detention. The petitions for review were dismissed under INA § 242(a)(2)(C), which limits judicial review for certain criminal aliens. However, pending habeas corpus petitions remained unaffected, preserving the ability to raise substantial constitutional claims. The ruling emphasized that any repeal of habeas jurisdiction must be explicitly stated by Congress, aligning with historical Supreme Court precedent protecting the writ of habeas corpus.

Legal Issues Addressed

Constitutional Protection of Habeas Corpus

Application: The court reinforced that Congress cannot implicitly repeal habeas corpus protections, highlighting the Suspension Clause and the necessity for explicit statutory language to eliminate such jurisdiction.

Reasoning: A repeal of habeas jurisdiction cannot be inferred; it must be explicitly stated by Congress, as established in the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Felker.

Discretionary Waiver under Former INA § 212(c)

Application: The court discussed the discretionary waiver provision of INA § 212(c), repealed by IIRIRA, noting its historical application and subsequent limitations for aliens with aggravated felony convictions.

Reasoning: Under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney General had the discretion to waive deportation for aliens facing extraordinary hardship.

Judicial Review Limitations for Criminal Aliens

Application: The court considered the government's claim that IIRIRA's provisions limit judicial review of removal orders for aliens with criminal convictions, emphasizing the necessity for explicit congressional intent to remove habeas jurisdiction.

Reasoning: Key provisions cited include INA § 242(a)(2)(C), which restricts judicial review of removal orders for certain criminal offenses.

Jurisdiction under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and IIRIRA

Application: The court considered whether AEDPA and IIRIRA divest federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction, and concluded that district courts retain such jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 unless Congress explicitly repeals it.

Reasoning: The court analyzed historical Supreme Court cases, concluding that neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA explicitly intended to repeal district courts' habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Retroactive Application of IIRIRA

Application: Petitioners argued that the BIA improperly applied IIRIRA § 304(b) retroactively to prior conduct, a claim the court evaluated in light of statutory amendments and existing case law.

Reasoning: Petitioners argue that the BIA incorrectly applied IIRIRA § 304(b) retroactively to prior criminal conduct, challenging the BIA's interpretation rather than its discretionary decisions.