Steven Bastien v. At&t Wireless Services, Inc.

Docket: 18-3440

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 6, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Steven Bastien filed a lawsuit against AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. in Illinois, alleging the company misled him regarding his cellular service. The case was removed to federal court by AT&T Wireless, asserting that federal jurisdiction is required for matters concerning telephone service rates and regulations, as mandated by Congress. Bastien contested this jurisdiction, claiming his issues were state law matters. However, the court interpreted Bastien's complaint as primarily challenging AT&T's service rates and market entry conditions set by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), affirming that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Bastien became an AT&T Wireless customer in 1998, amid the company's entry into a market previously dominated by Ameritech and Southwestern Bell. Following FCC approval of AT&T's rates and infrastructure, Bastien experienced significant dissatisfaction with service quality, particularly regarding dropped calls due to network limitations. Despite being provided options for refunds related to dropped calls, such as redialing or contacting customer service, Bastien often encountered issues with the automatic rebate process. His complaints to AT&T and the FCC resulted in confirmation that AT&T Wireless was compliant with FCC regulations, further complicating his grievances.

Bastien initiated a lawsuit in Illinois state court against AT&T Wireless, alleging breach of contract and consumer fraud. He claimed that AT&T Wireless enrolled subscribers without constructing the necessary cellular infrastructure, resulting in a high failure rate for call attempts. Bastien asserted that AT&T's actions violated contractual agreements and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, he accused AT&T of violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act by engaging in unfair practices, such as signing up subscribers without adequate infrastructure, misrepresenting service quality, concealing material facts regarding call capacity, and lacking proper customer crediting for failed calls. 

AT&T Wireless removed the case to federal court, arguing that Congress had preempted state regulation of mobile service rates and market entry under the Federal Communications Act. Bastien attempted to frame his claims within Illinois state law, but AT&T contended that the complaint challenged matters under FCC jurisdiction. Bastien moved to remand the case to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction, while AT&T sought dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court, led by Judge Charles P. Kocoras, denied Bastien's remand motion and granted AT&T's dismissal request, citing complete preemption by federal law. Bastien's appeal focused solely on the remand issue, leading to the waiver of the dismissal argument.

Bastien argues that his complaint presents two claims under Illinois law—breach of contract and consumer fraud—that are separate from rates and market entry issues, which are under federal jurisdiction. He asserts that the federal district court lacks jurisdiction and that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which would typically involve an administrative agency, does not apply. If his claims are deemed to involve regulatory issues preempted by Congress, they would fail legally and his suit would be dismissed.

A plaintiff can avoid federal jurisdiction by asserting only state law claims; however, if the complaint indicates a federal question, the defendant may remove it to federal court. Federal preemption often serves as a defense rather than a basis for removal unless Congress has completely preempted a field, rendering the complaint essentially federal. Congress has explicitly stated that no state or local government may regulate the rates or market entry of commercial mobile services, indicating complete preemption in this area. Thus, if Bastien's complaint challenges rates or market entry, it cannot evade federal jurisdiction despite its state law labels.

The court will examine whether Bastien's complaint, regardless of its designation, actually contests AT&T Wireless's rates or market entry. The denial of a motion under 12(b)(1) challenging the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction will be reviewed de novo.

The case addresses an ambiguity between two statutory provisions: the preemption clause and the savings clause of the Federal Communications Act. The preemption clause restricts state or local governments from regulating the entry or rates of commercial mobile services while allowing states to regulate other terms and conditions. Conversely, the savings clause preserves existing common law or statutory remedies, suggesting a broader scope for state actions. However, interpreting the savings clause too expansively would undermine the federal regulation intended by the Act, which has been supported by case law that establishes distinct spheres of federal and state authority.

The preemption clause assigns federal courts and regulators exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the entry and rates of commercial mobile services. Meanwhile, states retain the authority to regulate other aspects of mobile services, though the term "other terms and conditions" lacks clear definition. Legislative history is deemed unreliable for determining this phrase's meaning, as it represents only one congressional viewpoint.

Practically, most consumer complaints revolve around service rates and quality, often framing issues of inadequate service as attacks on rates, which fall under federal jurisdiction. Additionally, federal regulations govern market entry conditions and infrastructure requirements, further solidifying Congress's intent for these matters to be handled exclusively by federal agencies like the FCC. This delineation of responsibilities has not been contested in the case.

A review of two cases highlights the jurisdictional divide between state and federal courts regarding telecommunications regulation. In **Cahnmann**, the court determined that a breach of contract claim against Sprint Corp. belonged in federal court because the challenge would effectively invalidate a tariff approved by the FCC. The case involved Sprint's initial tariff for "Fridays Free" long-distance service, which was amended after FCC approval. A class action claim alleged Sprint breached the initial contract, but the court ruled that any challenge to an approved tariff must be addressed in federal court, rejecting the notion that the savings clause of the Communications Act could nullify its provisions.

In contrast, the current case involving **Bastien** differs as he does not dispute AT&T Wireless's compliance with FCC rules but seeks to leverage state law to address issues he believes are outside the preemption clause's scope. This situation aligns with the **Long Distance Litigation**, where plaintiffs accused long-distance companies of state law fraud for failing to disclose charges for incomplete calls. The Sixth Circuit held that these claims did not affect federal regulation and thus were not preempted by federal law, emphasizing that the intent of Congress was to maintain nationwide uniformity in telecommunications regulation.

Bastien's complaint directly challenges AT&T Wireless's rates and market entry in Chicago, differing from the Long Distance Litigation. The nature of the claims indicates that granting relief would significantly affect federal regulation regarding tower construction, service quality, and rates. Key allegations include AT&T Wireless signing subscribers without sufficient infrastructure to provide reliable service, as outlined in multiple paragraphs. These claims encroach upon areas controlled by the FCC, which regulates the conditions under which services may begin in the Chicago market, including the number and placement of towers and associated rates. If the state court supports Bastien's claims, it would compel AT&T Wireless to exceed FCC requirements by providing additional towers and improved service, contradicting the statute that protects FCC decisions from state court intervention.

Furthermore, the complaint contains allegations resembling state law claims, such as breach of contract and misrepresentation of service quality. However, these claims are fundamentally based on AT&T Wireless's failure to adequately develop its network, which was in line with FCC regulations. Thus, Bastien's complaint essentially rebrands challenges to the FCC-approved plan as state law claims, but the underlying issues remain linked to the federally sanctioned framework.

Bastien's attempt to recast federal claims as state law fraud and breach of contract is evident in the lack of specific details regarding promises or representations made by AT&T Wireless in his complaint. Although complaints typically face low scrutiny under notice pleading standards, this changes when jurisdiction is challenged. In such cases, courts can look beyond the complaint to assess jurisdiction. The court noted that while Bastien's complaint alleged 'misrepresentation' and 'concealing,' it failed to provide specific examples of AT&T Wireless's words that would qualify as such. Instead, it presented vague facts suggesting insufficient network development and a conclusory claim of misrepresentation and fraud, which did not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule.

Ultimately, Bastien's complaint, framed as state law actions, actually contested the rates and service levels of AT&T Wireless, which fall under federal regulation. The district court appropriately removed the case from state court and denied Bastien's motion to dismiss and remand under Rule 12(b)(1). Since Bastien did not appeal the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court's order is affirmed. Bastien has indicated a desire to maintain his claim as a state law suit, eliminating the need to consider the doctrine of primary jurisdiction regarding whether the case should be directed to the FCC or remain in federal district court.