Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; March 12, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Eugene E. Wigginton, the plaintiff-appellant, claims that his termination as a commissioned officer in the Rhode Island Army National Guard was wrongful. He initiated a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Adjutant General of the Rhode Island Army National Guard and the State of Rhode Island in Rhode Island state court, which was later removed to the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, leading to this appeal.
Wigginton served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1967 to 1970 before receiving a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1979. He achieved the rank of Major by 1989 and was close to completing twenty years of military service by January 1996. He received a memorandum from Brigadier General Reginald A. Centracchio regarding his forthcoming review by a Selective Retention Board, which evaluated officers for retention beyond twenty years of service based on National Guard Regulation (NGR) 635-102. This regulation stipulates that the Board considers officers in the rank of Colonel and below and aims to retain only the most capable officers for higher command roles. The Board convened on May 13, 1996, to review the records of ten officers, including Wigginton, who did not appear before the Board, as individual appearances are not permitted under NGR 635-102.
On May 13, the Board recommended retaining six officers while not retaining four, including Major Wigginton. On May 14, General Centracchio informed Major Wigginton of his non-selection for retention, leading to his separation from the Army National Guard by July 13, 1996. Subsequently, Colonel Zoglio confirmed Wigginton's honorable discharge. In September 1996, Wigginton filed a lawsuit in Rhode Island Superior Court against General Centracchio and the State of Rhode Island under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His first count claimed that his separation violated Rhode Island General Laws § 30-3-13, which granted tenure to commissioned officers until the age of sixty, barring specific reasons for separation. Wigginton argued that his termination without due process infringed upon his vested property rights. The second count alleged a due process violation due to a lack of explanation for his non-retention. He sought injunctive relief for reinstatement, back pay, and promotion consideration, explicitly limiting his claims to the Rhode Island National Guard. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island, where General Centracchio moved to dismiss. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal, asserting that the 1983 action was barred based on the precedent set in Wright v. Park, which prohibits such claims against military superiors in a military context.
The Magistrate Judge determined that actions against military officers for injuries incident to service are not justiciable, recommending dismissal of the complaint. However, the District Court disagreed, asserting that while Wright v. Park bars damage actions, it does not preclude equitable actions such as Major Wigginton's reinstatement suit. The District Court then examined the substance of Wigginton’s claims, which included a due process violation stemming from his termination as a Rhode Island Air National Guard (RIANG) officer, asserting a property right under R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13, which states that commissioned officers hold their positions until age sixty.
The parties disagreed on the statute's applicability; the defense claimed Wigginton was not an officer "of the staff corps and departments," while Wigginton contended he was. The District Court allowed discovery to clarify this statutory phrase. Following discovery, both parties sought summary judgment. The District Court upheld its justiciability ruling but ruled against Wigginton on both counts of his complaint: the due process claim under R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13 and a claim regarding the Selective Retention Board's failure to provide reasons for his non-retention. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment for General Centracchio and denied Wigginton's motion.
Regarding the first count, the District Court noted Wigginton's reliance on an affidavit from Brigadier General Thomas M. Frazer, who criticized the Rhode Island Military Code as outdated but could not clarify the term "staff corps." Wigginton struggled to establish that he was part of the "staff corps and departments," ultimately admitting he was never a staff corps officer. As a result, Wigginton’s substantive due process claim was deemed unsubstantiated and failed.
Major Wigginton contended that his due process rights were violated due to the lack of a written statement explaining his non-retention. The District Court referenced the Rhode Island Supreme Court case, State v. Ouimette, which established that parole applicants have a due process right to receive reasons for parole denial. However, the court determined that the balance of interests did not favor Wigginton's claim for a similar entitlement regarding his non-retention. Wigginton subsequently appealed the District Court's dismissal of his case, which included a question of justiciability—whether the court had the authority to hear his claims.
The appellees argued that claims from subordinates against superior officers are generally non-justiciable, but it appeared they focused this argument solely on Wigginton's second count rather than addressing the entirety of his complaint as had been done in the District Court. The appellate court noted the necessity of addressing the justiciability issue for both counts because it pertains to the court's authority over the case. The District Court had previously upheld that internal military personnel decisions, such as fitness for duty, are not subject to civilian court review. The District Court reinforced this position in its summary judgment, supporting the recommendation to dismiss Wigginton's claims as nonjusticiable.
The court's ruling on March 31, 1998, rejected the recommendation to bar all claims, determining that only claims for damages are strictly prohibited under the doctrine of intramilitary immunity. Injunctive remedies for state guardsmen remain permissible. This decision aligns with the precedent set in Wright v. Park, which reinforced the Supreme Court's findings in Chappell v. Wallace and United States v. Stanley. In Chappell, the Supreme Court established that the military's unique structure and Congressional regulations suggest that enlisted personnel should not receive Bivens-type remedies against superiors. Wright v. Park clarified that Bivens allows victims of constitutional violations by federal actors to seek damages in federal court, but Stanley expanded this principle to cover all activities 'incident to service.' As a result, injuries arising from such activities are not eligible for Bivens remedies, establishing a definitive standard for civil rights claims within the military context, including the National Guard. Therefore, the District Court correctly interpreted that all damage claims related to intramilitary actions are barred, while only claims for damages face this categorical prohibition. This interpretation was supported by the case Charles v. Rice.
The District Court's ruling involved the federal question jurisdiction over a national guardsman's reinstatement claim, referencing Charles v. Rice, which is not binding on this jurisdictional issue. In Charles v. Rice, the justiciability of the reinstatement suit was discussed but not preserved for appeal, leaving this court unable to address it. The District Court correctly determined that Major Wigginton's suit was justiciable, contrary to the Magistrate Judge's view, and concluded that Wright v. Park does not prohibit a guardsman's reinstatement suit against either federal or state actors under Section 1983. This conclusion rests on two key points: first, Wright v. Park focused exclusively on intramilitary damage suits, and second, Supreme Court cases Chappell and Stanley clarify that intramilitary suits alleging constitutional violations, which do not seek damages, are justiciable. Chappell ruled against a Bivens-type damage action by Navy personnel regarding racial discrimination, emphasizing that military personnel retain basic rights despite their service. While the Court has not ruled that military personnel are entirely barred from seeking redress for constitutional violations in civilian courts, it recognizes the military's authority to manage its personnel due to the unique challenges of maintaining discipline. The Stanley case explored the possibility of a Bivens-type action after discharge, focusing on a plaintiff’s unknowing participation in a harmful military experiment.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished its ruling in Stanley from Chappell, referencing Chief Justice Burger's remark that military personnel are not entirely barred from seeking redress in civilian courts for constitutional violations during military service. However, the Supreme Court's reversal in Stanley clarified that this statement does not apply to Bivens actions, which focus on preventing constitutional violations rather than awarding damages. Justice Brennan, while concurring in part and dissenting in part, acknowledged that military plaintiffs can seek equitable relief to address constitutional violations, but expressed concern that such relief might be ineffective for individuals like Stanley, who had already suffered harm. The document notes that injunctions could prevent future violations but do not remedy past injuries, which necessitate monetary damages.
The ruling further indicates that Major Wigginton's suit, claiming federal constitutional violations and seeking reinstatement in the Rhode Island National Guard, is valid in federal court. Wigginton's claims include a due process violation regarding his termination by the Selective Retention Board, which he argues deprived him of his property rights under Rhode Island law, allowing him to retain his position until age sixty. Additionally, he contends that the failure to disclose the reasons for his non-retention represents a significant due process failure. The court draws parallels to Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions that emphasize the necessity of providing reasons when denying rights, echoing the standards set by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding due process in similar contexts.
Appellant argues it is "ironic" that appellees claim a convicted felon deserves more due process from the parole board than a decorated veteran receives from the Rhode Island National Guard (RIANG). However, the court finds appellant's argument lacks depth, failing to differentiate between the interests of someone seeking employment continuity and someone seeking release from confinement. The court emphasizes that procedural due process applies only when a legitimate property or liberty interest exists, referencing Arnett v. Kennedy. Denial of parole affects a fundamental liberty interest, while Major Wigginton, nearing twenty years of military service, seeks retention in the guard—a different kind of interest. His situation hinges on whether R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13 grants him a property right to retain his commission until age sixty. Without an employment contract or similar engagement, he lacks a recognized property interest in continued employment. The viability of his due process claim is contingent on interpreting R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13, which he asserts provided a constitutionally protected property right to his RIANG commission until the age threshold. The existence of this right hinges on whether state law creates a reasonable expectation of continued employment, as established in Bishop v. Wood.
Major Wigginton argues that a statute establishes a property right for commissioned officers of the Rhode Island Army National Guard (RIANG), specifically those in the "staff corps and departments." The statute mandates that these officers must have prior military experience and allows them to hold their positions until age sixty unless retired for specific reasons. The key contention revolves around whether Wigginton, initially a Military Police Officer and later assigned to various roles including Public Affairs and Education Officer, qualifies as an officer in the "staff corps and departments." The District Court granted summary judgment for the appellees, denying Wigginton's claim.
To clarify the term "staff corps and departments," experts were consulted. Brigadier General (Retired) Thomas M. Frazer asserted that the Education Officer position is a staff role, while acknowledging the statute as outdated yet still relevant in current practice. Colonel Rick Baccus, another expert, expressed difficulty in defining the term due to his lack of involvement in its creation, suggesting it refers to specialized staff positions. The differing expert opinions highlight the ambiguity surrounding the statutory language and its application to Wigginton's case.
Colonel Baccus expressed uncertainty regarding the term "staff corps and departments" in R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-1, indicating that he was not involved in drafting the law and that it lacks a modern equivalent. The District Court ruled that Major Wigginton failed to prove his membership in the "staff corps and departments," noting his admission that he was never an officer identified as such. Consequently, the court dismissed Wigginton's substantive due process claim. However, the appellate court disagreed with the District Court's summary judgment ruling, stating that there had been no judicial determination regarding the meaning of "staff corps and departments" or the rights conferred by the statute at the time of the summary judgment decision. Thus, it was premature to conclude whether Wigginton's evidence could substantiate his claims under Rhode Island law, particularly regarding his entitlement to continued service until age sixty. The appellate court emphasized that for Wigginton to prevail on his motion for summary judgment, he needed to demonstrate both his inclusion under the statute and that any entitlement to his position constituted a constitutionally protected expectation, which had not been established prior to the District Court's decisions. The statute generally indicates that commissioned officers in these roles maintain their positions until age sixty unless removed for specific reasons.
Major Wigginton, a commissioned officer of the Rhode Island Army National Guard (RIANG) under the age of sixty and not retired for resignation, disability, or cause, appears to fall under the protections of R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13, provided he qualifies as an officer of the "staff corps and departments." However, the definition of this phrase is ambiguous. The statute implies that "staff corps and departments" includes a broader group beyond chaplains, judge advocate general's corps officers, and medical corps officers, but the extent of this inclusion remains undefined. Major Wigginton, who has held various roles including Military Police, Public Affairs Officer, and Education Officer, may fit this classification, but there is a lack of legislative history or judicial interpretation clarifying the term within Rhode Island law.
Given the absence of relevant case law or statutory guidance, a clear resolution on whether Major Wigginton qualifies as an officer of the "staff corps and departments" is necessary. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has a process to answer questions of law from U.S. Courts of Appeals when there is no controlling precedent. Consequently, this court seeks to certify two questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court: 1) Was Major Wigginton an officer of the "staff corps and departments" at the time of his discharge? 2) [The second question is not provided in the excerpt but is implied to be related to the first.] This approach aims to obtain an authoritative interpretation of the statute to resolve the appeal properly.
Major Wigginton's entitlement to continue as a Rhode Island Army National Guard (RIANG) officer until age sixty, under R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13, is questioned, particularly in the absence of resignation, disability, or dismissal for cause. The legal status surrounding this issue will be certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The United States Army's "selective retention" policy, which reevaluates officers with 20 years of service, is referenced as a framework for ensuring combat readiness and preventing stagnation in senior ranks.
Additionally, a second count alleged that the criteria in National Guard Regulation 635-102 were not followed regarding Wigginton's case, though this claim was not pursued on appeal. The document notes discrepancies in how the plaintiff refers to the defendants and indicates that Rhode Island did not file a separate motion to dismiss.
The context includes references to Bivens actions, which allow for damage claims against federal officials for unconstitutional conduct, and clarifies that the State of Rhode Island did not contest a motion for summary judgment filed by General Centracchio. The District Court's rejection of Wigginton's claims was based on the determination that they were nonjusticiable, particularly because he failed to seek review through the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records, leading to the conclusion that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies.
Appellant did not pursue the NGR 635-102 issue in this appeal, likely influenced by the ruling in Navas. The District Court's examination of Major Wigginton's due process claim regarding non-retention referenced Rhode Island and U.S. Supreme Court opinions, suggesting that the claim lacked constitutional merit. The Court emphasized the significant deference afforded to military decision-making, indicating that the claims were not justiciable. The referenced cases, including Wright v. Park and Stanley, illustrate the judicial limitations on damage actions related to military service under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the necessity for doctrinal consistency with Feres v. United States.
The Court acknowledged that, assuming appellant's legal theory is valid and he demonstrates the necessary factual basis, he could be entitled to equitable relief. However, it did not evaluate the specific types of relief requested at this stage. The document also discusses the general principles surrounding academic tenure and due process rights for government employees, indicating that any viable due process claim under state law must first establish a federally protected right. The determination of appellant's due process claim hinges on the correct interpretation of R.I. Gen. Laws 30-3-13 and whether this statute provides such a right. The Court noted that the pretermination process for government employees is governed by federal law.
The preliminary determination of whether a government employee has a protectable "property right" or a legitimate expectation of continued employment is governed by the employment contract or state law. This issue is influenced by the definition and scope provided by state law. However, whether this right constitutes a property right of constitutional significance is a federal question. The Rhode Island National Guard (RIANG) is defined by a statutory framework that includes federally recognized officers and enlisted personnel, organized into units authorized by U.S. law and regulations. Officers may be selected from various classes, including current and former military personnel, graduates of military academies, and specially qualified civilians. Additionally, the governor has the authority to reorganize the state militia to enhance efficiency, with stipulations regarding the disbandment of units and adjustments to personnel in compliance with federal laws. It was noted that Major Wigginton, despite previously believing he was part of the staff corps, acknowledged he was never officially an officer of that corps.
Major Wigginton's prior belief that he was a member of the staff corps and his later acknowledgment of not being an officer of the staff corps lack legal significance until the term "staff corps" is clearly defined through judicial interpretation, which has not yet occurred. This situation creates a substantial entitlement that could support an enforceable expectation of continued public employment, as recognized by the Supreme Court. Additionally, Massachusetts law stipulates that an officer of the "state staff" retains their position until age sixty-five unless separated for specific reasons, although the law specifies the officers who constitute the "state staff."
