Casey Martin v. Pga Tour, Inc., a Maryland Corporation

Citations: 204 F.3d 994; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1777; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 2487; 10 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 385; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3376; 2000 WL 245356Docket: 98-35309, 98-35509

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 6, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Casey Martin, a disabled professional golfer with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, successfully challenged the PGA Tour's "walking rule," which required players to walk during competitions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to PGA competitions, determining that allowing Martin to use a golf cart constituted a reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally change the nature of the events. The district court had previously granted Martin a preliminary injunction permitting him to use a golf cart during the qualifying school, where he subsequently qualified for the 1998 Nike Tour. The court also ruled that the PGA is subject to Title III of the ADA, as it operates and leases golf courses classified as public accommodations. Following a bench trial, the district court issued a permanent injunction requiring the PGA to allow Martin to use a cart in eligible PGA and Nike Tour competitions. The PGA's appeal followed.

The district court granted Martin's summary judgment motion, determining that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to PGA and Nike Tour competitions. The court's interpretation of the ADA is subject to de novo review. Title III prohibits discrimination based on disability in the enjoyment of goods and services at public accommodations, which are defined to include entities like golf courses. The court clarified that golf courses qualify as public accommodations under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L), despite the PGA's argument that the competitors' area "behind the ropes" should not be considered a public accommodation since the general public cannot access it. The district court rejected this narrow interpretation, asserting that the public accommodation status cannot be compartmentalized. Even if the area is restricted, it still serves as a place of exercise or recreation or, alternatively, as a place of exhibition or entertainment under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C). The court referenced precedents indicating that Title III applies to all areas relevant to athletic events, including restricted access zones like the playing field, confirming that the definition of public accommodation remains intact regardless of public access limitations.

In Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, the Third Circuit ruled that a physician with a disability could sue a hospital under Title III for denial of staff privileges, classifying it as a denial of "full and equal enjoyment" of public accommodation services. This ruling established that staff privileges involve access to areas not accessible to the general public. PGA's argument about compartmentalizing golf courses during tournaments relies on regulatory examples of mixed-use facilities, such as hotels and factories, which do not apply directly to golf courses. The distinction between public and non-public portions of these facilities is critical; however, in the case of golf courses, they serve as public accommodations during tournaments. PGA's assertion that the exclusivity of its tournaments negates public accommodation status is flawed, as high selectivity does not preclude a facility from being considered a public accommodation. The example of elite private universities, which remain public accommodations despite selective admissions, further supports this point. Moreover, the opportunity for the public to enter qualifying tournaments demonstrates that such golf courses maintain their status as places of public accommodation, regardless of the selection process involved.

A stadium owner inviting the public to compete in long-distance races does not change the nature of the track as a public accommodation, even when only the top ten runners remain for the final race. There is no legal basis to suggest that athletic excellence alters the status of a public accommodation or distinguishes between recreational and professional use. Consequently, golf courses are considered public accommodations during PGA tournaments.

Title III defines discrimination to include failing to make reasonable modifications for individuals with disabilities unless such changes fundamentally alter the nature of the services provided. Allowing Martin to use a golf cart is deemed reasonable as it addresses his access needs and is consistent with practices in similar competitions, such as the Senior Tour. The primary contention is whether allowing Martin to use a golf cart fundamentally alters the PGA and Nike Tour competitions. 

The Rules of Golf do not require players to walk, and the PGA does not mandate walking during certain events, suggesting that walking is not essential to golf. However, the PGA and Nike Tours require players to walk during stipulated rounds unless exceptions are made by the Rules Committee. The district court concluded that the requirement for players to walk serves to introduce a fatigue factor into the game, but found this factor to be insignificant under normal circumstances, indicating that fatigue is largely psychological rather than physical during untimed walking on the course.

The court highlighted that many players preferred walking over using carts in PGA events, and when carts are permitted, no handicap penalty is assigned for using one. Despite using a cart, Martin must still walk approximately 25% of the course, experiencing significant pain and fatigue, which the district court found to be greater than that of able-bodied competitors. The court concluded that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would not fundamentally change the nature of PGA and Nike Tour competitions, as the essential competition in shot-making would remain unaffected. The accommodation would enable Martin to participate despite his disability, aligning with the purposes of the ADA, which aims to prevent discrimination against individuals with disabilities by requiring modifications to existing practices. 

PGA contended that any exceptions to rules affecting competition, such as the walking-only rule, should not be permitted. They argued that the district court's acknowledgment of the fatigue factor as a substantive rule meant Martin's request should be denied. However, the court emphasized that the ADA requires an examination of whether a specific accommodation fundamentally alters the nature of the competition, rather than making broad assumptions based on general rules. The inquiry must focus on Martin’s individual situation to determine if his use of a cart would indeed alter the competition fundamentally. The court asserted that PGA cannot evade ADA requirements simply by defining walking as integral to the competition without allowing for necessary accommodations.

The district court concluded that the fatigue caused by walking did not significantly impact the competition, a finding deemed not clearly erroneous. The court's analysis emphasized that determining whether an accommodation alters competition fundamentally requires a detailed factual examination. Therefore, the PGA's argument that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would set a precedent for other accommodations in sports (such as giving disabled swimmers a head start) is rejected. The court noted that accommodations like allowing a special golf ball or a shorter course would likely alter competition, but using a cart between shots does not fundamentally change the game.

Additionally, the PGA contended it was inappropriate for the district court to assess whether Martin’s condition meant that riding a cart wouldn’t provide him an unfair advantage. PGA argued that evaluating this would impose too great a burden. They referenced case law, including Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, which supported restrictions on older athletes to maintain fair competition, emphasizing the undue burden of determining competitive advantages based on age or experience. However, the district court found that the circumstances of this case were different, with no significant fatigue factor identified. 

The document also critiques the rigid stance against individual assessments found in previous cases and aligns with a more flexible approach proposed by dissenting opinions, suggesting that individual characteristics should allow for tailored accommodations without undermining competitive integrity. This was further supported by the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, which allowed for the individual consideration of a learning-disabled student’s circumstances without detracting from the overall protections of existing rules.

The court determined that Mr. Washington's request for a waiver due to his learning disability would not impose an undue burden on the IHSAA, as he is the only athlete to make such a request in over ten years, and the required case-by-case analysis is not excessive. Similarly, the PGA's refusal to consider the impact of Martin's disability was criticized, as the court found no evidence that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would provide him an unfair competitive advantage. The court concluded that under the ADA, it was appropriate for the district court to make this determination.

The judgment affirmed that a golf course constitutes a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA during PGA tournaments. The district court's ruling that providing Martin a golf cart was a reasonable accommodation for his disability was upheld, and it was determined that this use would not fundamentally alter the nature of the tournaments. The court also noted that PGA is not exempt from the ADA as a private club, as it operates as a commercial entity offering public athletic events. 

The district court awarded Martin attorneys' fees and costs, which were also affirmed due to the court's decision in favor of Martin. The ruling clarifies that Title III protects all individuals from discrimination based on disability in public accommodations, while also specifying that it does not grant access to places where individuals are not entitled to be. The case distinguished itself from Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, where it was found that using a cart could confer a competitive advantage, a conclusion the current court disagreed with. The court's findings regarding Martin's entitlement to relief under § 12182(a) rendered his alternative arguments unnecessary to address.