Barber v. La. Mun. Risk Mgmt. Agency Grp. Self-Insured Fund

Citation: 244 So. 3d 56Docket: 17–1005

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; April 18, 2018; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In this tort case, Appellants, including The Estate of Larry Jeane, Sr., Republic Fire Casualty Insurance Company, and the State of Louisiana, appeal a partial summary judgment favoring Appellees on the issue of liability. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident on July 18, 2014, where Larry Jeane, Sr., driving as Pineville City Marshal, crossed into oncoming traffic, colliding with Appellees' vehicle and causing injuries to its occupants. 

Appellees motioned for partial summary judgment, asserting Mr. Jeane's liability and their lack of fault, supported by affidavits from Sandra Shannon, a witness, and Sarah Barber, an occupant of the impacted vehicle. Shannon's affidavit described seeing Jeane's truck veering into her lane and noted that she observed the subsequent collision. Barber recounted her experience of the incident, indicating a sudden and unavoidable situation leading to her injuries.

Testimony from current Pineville City Marshal Sarah A. Smith revealed that she arrived at the scene after being informed of the accident and found Mr. Jeane unaware of the events. Medical records from Rapides Regional Medical Center indicated that Jeane had health issues, including a history of heart disease and diabetes, and was possibly experiencing low blood sugar at the time of the crash.

In opposition, Appellants presented an affidavit from Dr. Brabson Lutz, an experienced physician who reviewed relevant documents, including accident reports and medical records concerning Mr. Jeane's health prior to the incident. The court ultimately reversed the judgment in part and affirmed it in part, signaling a nuanced decision on the liability issue.

Appellees objected to Dr. Lutz's affidavit under the standards set by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. They also initially objected to the coroner's report but later withdrew this objection during the summary judgment hearing. Dr. Lutz's medical assessment indicated that Mr. Jeane did not have any pre-existing medical conditions that could have caused a loss of consciousness prior to the accident. Testimony from Marshal Smith revealed that Mr. Jeane had received a clean bill of health from his doctor regarding his heart and diabetes, and no driving restrictions were noted. Laboratory results confirmed that Mr. Jeane's blood sugar levels were normal at the time of the incident, ruling out hypoglycemia as a factor. Dr. Lutz concluded that Mr. Jeane suffered a sudden, unforeseeable cardiac arrhythmia leading to loss of consciousness.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment, determining there was no material factual dispute. The court noted that since the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof, the defendants only needed to demonstrate a lack of factual support for the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants claimed Mr. Jeane experienced a sudden, unexpected condition that prevented him from pulling off the roadway, but the court found they did not meet the burden of proving this affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence. Appellants sought supervisory relief, asserting the judgment was final and appealable, which was denied. They then appealed the court's decision.

In their appeal, Appellants argued that the trial court incorrectly applied the evidence standard, overlooked Dr. Lutz's affidavit, and should not have granted summary judgment. The appellate court conducted a de novo review, indicating it would not defer to the trial court's judgment. The court focused solely on whether Appellees were entitled to judgment, emphasizing that the burden of proof rests on the movers in a summary judgment motion to demonstrate no genuine material factual dispute exists. The Louisiana Supreme Court precedent established that a driver claiming sudden unconsciousness must meet a high burden of proof to substantiate their claim.

A motorist claiming unforeseeable circumstances as a defense must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that their actions did not contribute to the accident, as established in Rizley v. Cutrer. While the burden of proof for an affirmative defense lies with its proponent, when the defense aims to defeat summary judgment, the emphasis shifts to producing evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact. A material fact is one that could influence the outcome of a legal dispute, and a genuine issue arises when reasonable minds could disagree about such facts.

The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding victim fault, affirming the trial court's judgment in that respect. However, several facts indicated potential fault on the part of Mr. Jeane, including Dr. Lutz's affidavit, which suggested a sudden cardiac event rendered him unconscious, supported by witness statements. Appellees argued against considering Dr. Lutz's affidavit due to a Daubert challenge, which was not ruled on by the trial court. Consequently, it is presumed that this challenge was implicitly denied. According to Louisiana law, expert opinions must be based on sufficient facts and the record does not suggest that Dr. Lutz is incompetent to testify, thus his affidavit meets evidentiary standards.

Appellees' argument regarding the use of hearsay in expert affidavits is invalid, as experts are permitted to rely on hearsay if it is of a type typically used in their field for forming opinions. Under Louisiana law, experts may express opinions without prior disclosure of the underlying facts unless the court requires it, although they must reveal such facts during cross-examination. Appellees cite two cases, Cash v. McGregor and Lewis v. City of Shreveport, to support their position for summary judgment; however, both cases are not applicable here. Cash involved a jury verdict and does not equate to a summary judgment context. Similarly, Lewis dealt with a trial and involved a higher standard for common carriers, which does not apply to the current case. There is no precedent for finding a driver negligent solely based on medical conditions without evidence of impairment. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Mr. Jeane was unconscious while driving the truck that collided with Appellees' vehicle. The opportunity for Appellants to prove their case at trial cannot be denied based on the current record. The trial court's judgment finding Mr. Jeane at fault is reversed, while the finding that Appellees are free from fault is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are charged to Appellees. The excerpt from Marshal Smith's deposition does not reveal her analysis of the cell phone records, which supports Appellees' motion.