Bharat Bhatt v. Janet Reno

Citation: 204 F.3d 744Docket: 99-1232

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 31, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Bharat Bhatt, a Hindu Indian national residing in Racine, Wisconsin, received a final order of deportation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in August 1998. Following this, he filed for both a writ of habeas corpus and a temporary restraining order to delay his deportation while a motion to reopen his case was pending with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The district court dismissed Bhatt's requests, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which restricts judicial review of certain immigration decisions. On appeal, Bhatt contended that federal courts retained jurisdiction, particularly for habeas corpus claims. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal, referencing its earlier ruling in Yang v. INS, which had established that habeas review does not apply to discretionary actions by the political branches of government. The district court noted its reliance on this precedent and the implications of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, concluding that Bhatt's claims were not subject to judicial review.

On appeal, Bhatt's arguments focus solely on whether federal courts have jurisdiction to consider a deportee's habeas claims after the INS has issued a final removal order. He contests the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which was based on the decision in Yang, asserting that the recently amended section 1252(g) does not strip district courts of jurisdiction over challenges to final removal orders. Bhatt cites LaGuerre v. Reno as precedent that allows judicial review of final removal decisions. He further argues that the historical significance of habeas corpus suggests section 1252(g) should not be interpreted to eliminate federal habeas jurisdiction over non-criminal deportees. 

The court reviews dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. It notes that judicial review of deportation orders was significantly limited by the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), particularly section 1252(g), which states that federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims arising from the Attorney General's decisions related to removal. 

Bhatt argues that section 1252(g) does not repeal habeas jurisdiction, claiming that such jurisdiction has always existed in federal courts and a repeal would grant excessive power to Congress. He contends it is erroneous to assume that section 1252(g) implicitly repealed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 2241, as the language does not explicitly do so. 

While Bhatt acknowledges that section 1252(g) applies to him as an illegal alien seeking district court review regarding his removal, he points out that both LaGuerre and Yang involved deportees convicted of crimes. However, the court has established that section 1252(g) applies to both criminal and non-criminal deportees. The court has consistently ruled that the 1996 INA amendments, particularly section 1252(g), largely eliminate judicial review of deportation, including habeas review, for cases it encompasses.

Exceptions to the strict limitations on judicial review under section 1252(g) are permitted in cases presenting "substantial constitutional issues" or "bizarre miscarriages of justice," where administrative agencies lack jurisdiction. Deportees may seek direct review in the court of appeals for these issues, as illustrated in previous cases like LaGuerre, where the BIA ignored a vacated criminal conviction due to racial bias, and Singh, where a deportee's due process rights were compromised by a lengthy delay. However, Bhatt's case does not qualify for such exceptions, as he fails to specify any substantial constitutional issue or miscarriage of justice. He argues that deportation to India poses a serious threat of persecution pending appeal, but this has not been substantiated with evidence of constitutional violations. Bhatt has already received multiple reviews of his removal challenges, including a denied motion for a stay and a petition for review of the BIA's decision. Furthermore, he contends that Supreme Court precedent directs a reading of section 1252(g) that maintains district court jurisdiction over petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, suggesting that the decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee does not apply to his case, which he believes is limited to specific disputes regarding the Attorney General's immigration actions.

Bhatt misinterprets the Supreme Court's ruling in AADC, which established that section 1252(g) removes federal court jurisdiction to review claims by aliens that the INS selectively initiated deportation based on their First Amendment rights. The Court clarified that such claims stem from the Attorney General's final, discretionary decision to start deportation proceedings, which section 1252(g) expressly prohibits from judicial review. This section strictly limits judicial scrutiny to three specific discretionary actions by the Attorney General: commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, and executing removal orders. The Court noted that Congress aimed to streamline removal processes and that limiting judicial review is justified due to the necessity of enforcing U.S. law through deportation. Consequently, the district court correctly ruled that Bhatt was an alien with a final removal order. The court may examine whether a specific fact or legal conclusion exists for judicial review, but it lacked jurisdiction over Bhatt's further requests since they were linked to the Attorney General's discretionary decision on his removal. Thus, the district court's judgment is affirmed. The case was initially decided through an unpublished order, which was later published following a motion by the defendants-appellees. This section codifies provisions from the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Prior cases, such as Yang and LaGuerre, further reinforced the interpretation that federal courts are divested of jurisdiction in similar deportation contexts, particularly where the deportee does not contest the INS's authority.