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Steven Craig Cooper v. Larry E. Parrish
Citations: 203 F.3d 937; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1718; 2000 WL 140436Docket: 98-6324
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 9, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves an appeal by Steven Craig Cooper and others against Larry E. Parrish and several state officials, stemming from alleged constitutional violations related to attempts to shut down nude dancing nightclubs in Memphis, Tennessee. The plaintiffs argue that their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the chancellor provided ex parte legal advice to prosecutors and when the prosecutors and a private attorney communicated improperly with the chancellor. They claim that these actions, including the filing of public nuisance complaints and restraining orders, constituted an infringement of their constitutional rights. The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the chancellor, prosecutors, and state investigators based on absolute immunity and invoked Younger abstention to dismiss the request for injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the chancellor and the prosecutors but reversed the dismissal of claims against Larry Parrish, determining he was not entitled to immunity, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. Additionally, the court reversed the dismissal of state law claims against all defendants and vacated the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief on the grounds of Younger abstention, remanding for further proceedings on these issues. The plaintiffs had filed their claims in two consolidated complaints, which the court accepted as true for the purposes of this appeal. Plaintiffs assert that in December 1995, Larry Parrish, a private attorney in Tennessee, and John Pierotti, the District Attorney General for the Thirtieth Judicial District, initiated an investigation into specific Memphis nightclubs. Pierotti instructed assistant district attorneys Amy Weirich and Jennifer Nichols to assist in the case. On July 7, 1996, Parrish, Weirich, Nichols, and Pierotti met with Chancellor D.J. Alissandratos, where it is alleged that Alissandratos provided them with "ex parte legal advice" regarding the drafting of pleadings to secure ex parte orders aimed at closing the plaintiffs' nightclubs. On July 11, 1996, Weirich, Nichols, and Parrish filed complaints in Shelby County Chancery Court, claiming that the nightclubs violated Tennessee's public nuisance statute. Although Pierotti was not listed as legal counsel, he endorsed the factual allegations. Following this, they requested temporary restraining orders from Chancellor Alissandratos, which authorized law enforcement to seize eight nightclubs known for nude dancing. On the same day, officers entered the nightclubs, detained patrons and employees for one to five hours, took their identification, and served subpoenas for sworn statements. Additionally, law enforcement seized the business offices of Southern Entertainment Management Company, related to three of the nightclubs. The nightclubs and management offices remained under the district attorney's control for fourteen days, until the restraining orders expired. On December 10, 1996, the district attorney's office secured criminal indictments against Steven Cooper, owner of three nightclubs, on charges including presenting obscene performances and promoting prostitution. The civil nuisance case against Cooper was removed to federal court but later remanded to state court. On March 14, 1997, new District Attorney William Gibbons voluntarily nonsuited the civil action, dismissing it without prejudice, and indicated that the claims would be incorporated into the pending criminal case against Cooper. On July 11, 1997, plaintiffs Steven Cooper and Amanda Holland filed separate complaints in federal district court, which were consolidated on August 27, 1997. Cooper initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants Alissandratos, Parrish, Pierotti, Weirich, Nichols, Glankler, and Simmons, claiming violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, alongside allegations of civil conspiracy and abuse of process under Tennessee law. He sought a permanent injunction against District Attorney William Gibbons to prevent interference with his businesses without prior notice. Holland, an employee at one of Cooper's nightclubs, also filed a § 1983 suit against Parrish, Pierotti, Glankler, Simmons, and unnamed law enforcement officers, alleging the same constitutional violations as Cooper and requesting class action certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). Chancellor Alissandratos moved to dismiss the claims against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting absolute judicial immunity, while the other defendants similarly sought dismissal based on absolute and qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted these motions, dismissing the claims against Alissandratos on May 5, 1998, and the remaining defendants on August 26, 1998. The plaintiffs are now appealing the district court's dismissals. The court's review of the dismissal is de novo, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and dismissal is warranted only if it is clear that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts supporting their claims. The district court ruled that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity based on a "functional approach," focusing on the nature of the functions performed rather than the identities of the actors, placing the burden on officials asserting absolute immunity to demonstrate their entitlement. Chancellor Alissandratos's claim for absolute judicial immunity is challenged by Plaintiffs, who assert he acted unethically and as a de facto counsel by providing prosecutors with "ex parte legal advice" on drafting pleadings to secure ex parte orders against their nightclubs. Generally, judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits for actions taken in their judicial capacity, as established in Mireles v. Waco and Stump v. Sparkman, allowing them to make decisions without fear of personal liability. However, immunity does not apply in two scenarios: nonjudicial actions or actions taken without any jurisdiction. The determination of whether Alissandratos's actions were judicial involves examining their nature and function, considering if they relate to typical judicial responsibilities and whether the parties expected to engage with him in his judicial capacity. Plaintiffs argue that his actions were prosecutorial, not judicial. The case of Barnes v. Winchell illustrates that even if a judicial officer's conduct is improper, they may still be acting within their judicial capacity if the actions are tied to their role in adjudicating cases. The court's analysis will hinge on these factors to evaluate the immunity claim. Chancellor Alissandratos acted within his judicial capacity during ex parte communications with prosecutors, which included providing legal advice to enhance their case. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.03(1), a judicial officer can issue a restraining order without notifying an opposing party prior to legal action. Rule 65.03(2) stipulates that only a judge of the court where the action is pending can grant such orders. Since Alissandratos is a judge of the relevant court, his meetings with the prosecutors were within his judicial authority regarding temporary restraining orders. Although his ex parte discussions may have contravened Tennessee law prohibiting such communications unless no party gains an advantage, these interactions were related to his judicial functions, including issuing ex parte restraining orders. The determination of whether Alissandratos acted completely outside his jurisdiction is critical for assessing judicial immunity. The Supreme Court has ruled that a judge retains immunity unless acting in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Here, Alissandratos possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the public nuisance action against the nightclubs, as described in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-3-101 and 29-3-102, which grant the chancellor the authority to address public nuisances and issue restraining orders. Consequently, despite possible procedural errors in his conduct with the prosecutors, his actions did not occur in clear absence of jurisdiction, thus maintaining his judicial immunity. Chancellor Alissandratos is granted absolute immunity from allegations of constitutional rights violations during meetings with prosecutors, as he acted within his judicial capacity and subject matter jurisdiction. The district court correctly dismissed claims against him due to the plaintiffs' failure to state a viable claim for relief. District Attorney General Pierotti and Assistant District Attorneys Weirich and Nichols also received dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting absolute prosecutorial immunity. This principle, akin to absolute judicial immunity, protects prosecutors from liability under Section 1983 when performing functions intimately linked to the judicial process. The Supreme Court utilizes a "functional" approach to assess entitlement to this immunity, focusing on the nature of the function rather than the individual performing it. Prosecutorial actions related to trial preparation and the initiation of judicial proceedings are shielded by this immunity. However, functions resembling those of law enforcement, such as investigation, warrant only qualified immunity. The plaintiffs contend that the prosecutors do not qualify for absolute immunity since they engaged in civil actions. Nevertheless, several appellate courts have ruled that prosecutors can still be granted absolute immunity when their functions parallel those of prosecutors, irrespective of whether the actions occur in civil or criminal contexts. The court supports the position that prosecutors can be absolutely immune even when involved in civil actions, provided they operate in an enforcement capacity as advocates for the state. The plaintiffs challenge the prosecutors' claim to immunity based on several specific actions: ex parte communications with the Chancellor, the preparation and filing of civil complaints, seeking temporary restraining orders, participating in the forcible occupation of nightclubs, and, for Pierotti, endorsing the truth of the allegations in the complaints. The plaintiffs allege that prosecutors Pierotti, Weirich, and Nichols engaged in unethical ex parte communications with Chancellor Alissandratos regarding anticipated lawsuits related to nightclubs and showbars offering expressive dancing. However, the plaintiffs do not claim that the prosecutors were acting in an investigative capacity during these communications. Instead, they were functioning as advocates discussing public nuisance lawsuits and temporary restraining orders they intended to pursue. This situation parallels the case of Ireland, where state prosecutors were granted absolute immunity for their actions in preparing and filing criminal complaints, as the conduct did not involve investigative activities prior to the decision to file charges. Similarly, the prosecutors in this case are entitled to absolute immunity for their decisions to file public nuisance and civil forfeiture complaints and to seek temporary restraining orders, as they acted within their roles as state advocates without engaging in investigative functions. District Attorney General Pierotti and Assistant District Attorneys Weirich and Nichols are granted absolute immunity regarding the seizure of property and detention of individuals at nightclubs. Plaintiffs claim that Weirich and Nichols participated in unlawful property seizures and supervised law enforcement actions during these incidents. However, absolute quasi-judicial immunity applies when officials act under a valid court order, as enforcing such orders is linked to judicial proceedings. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the prosecutors acted beyond the limits of the temporary restraining orders to sustain their claims. Plaintiffs assert that the prosecutors exceeded these orders by detaining customers and seizing unlisted property. Even assuming the plaintiffs have standing to contest the treatment of customers, the language of the temporary restraining orders is sufficiently broad to encompass both the detention of customers and the seizure of Southern Entertainment Management Company's business offices, which were involved with the nightclubs. The orders permitted the prosecutors to restrain individuals from devaluing or altering the property and to seize any personal property related to the operation of the nightclubs. Consequently, the actions of the prosecutors were within the scope of the orders, affirming their entitlement to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their involvement in the seizures and detentions. District Attorney General Pierotti is not entitled to absolute immunity for swearing to the truth of factual allegations in public nuisance and civil forfeiture complaints, as this action is akin to that in *Kalina v. Fletcher*, where the Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor who certifies the truth of a complaint is only entitled to qualified immunity. Despite Pierotti's argument that Tennessee law permits him to bring such actions, the law does not require him to swear to the truth of the allegations. His act of vouching for the truth is not a prosecutorial function, as it could have been performed by any competent witness, thus disqualifying him from absolute immunity. Additionally, the plaintiffs assert that claims against investigator Mark Glankler and Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent John Simmons were improperly dismissed based on absolute immunity. The law grants absolute immunity to law enforcement officers performing quasi-judicial functions, particularly when acting under valid court orders. Glankler and Simmons demonstrated that they acted within the scope of temporary restraining orders during their enforcement actions, which included detaining individuals and seizing property. Their conduct aligned with the broad language of the restraining orders, thus qualifying them for absolute immunity in executing these actions. Larry Parrish, a private attorney, was dismissed from claims against him due to a lack of absolute immunity, as he was not acting as a public official when the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred. The court referenced previous rulings indicating that private attorneys acting under color of state law do not qualify for immunity unless they can prove they were acting as public officials. In Parrish’s case, he was deemed not to have been properly appointed as an assistant district attorney, as established by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which found that there was no statutory authority for his informal appointment prior to July 1996 and that his compensation from a private organization invalidated any formal appointment. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of claims against him on absolute immunity grounds was found to be in error. Additionally, both defendants, Parrish and District Attorney General Pierotti, asserted claims for qualified immunity. The court outlined a two-part test to evaluate their entitlement to qualified immunity: first, whether the plaintiffs alleged a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, and second, whether that right was "clearly established" such that a reasonable official would recognize the violation. Plaintiffs allege that District Attorney General Pierotti violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by vouching for the truth of allegations in civil forfeiture and public nuisance complaints. To overcome a qualified immunity motion, plaintiffs must establish a clear connection between the defendant's conduct and the claimed constitutional violations. Merely asserting a constitutional breach without specific factual support is insufficient, as established in Garvie v. Jackson and Anderson v. Creighton. Although the district court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaints after the qualified immunity defense was raised, they failed to provide factual allegations demonstrating how Pierotti's actions violated their rights. Consequently, the court should have dismissed the claims against Pierotti based on qualified immunity. Regarding Larry Parrish, the plaintiffs contend he cannot claim qualified immunity because he was not acting as a public official during the alleged unconstitutional conduct. While it was determined that Parrish is not entitled to absolute immunity for assisting prosecutors, the court must still assess his claim for qualified immunity. Generally, private individuals are not eligible for qualified immunity under Section 1983; however, there are limited circumstances under which private attorneys working under government contracts may be granted qualified immunity, as noted in Cullinan v. Abramson. The court affirmed that a law firm hired as outside counsel by the City of Louisville was entitled to qualified immunity against § 1983 claims, referencing a Supreme Court statement suggesting immunity for certain private defendants serving the government. However, it distinguished the present case involving Parrish, who lacked evidence of acting at the state's behest while assisting prosecutors against nightclubs. Unlike the attorneys in Cullinan, Parrish was not compensated by the district attorney's office and did not perform unique governmental functions, thereby not warranting qualified immunity. The court concluded that allowing immunity to a private attorney in this unofficial role would contradict the principles of the qualified immunity doctrine. Additionally, in addressing state claims of civil conspiracy and abuse of process against the defendants, the district court dismissed these claims without specific ruling. The court noted that while Tennessee courts appear to adopt federal immunity doctrines, the precise scope of Tennessee's common law immunity remains unclear and unresolved in state law. The court referenced Buckley v. Fitzsimmons and Burns v. Reed to illustrate that Section 1983 incorporates common-law immunities historically granted to governmental officers, suggesting that the Tennessee Supreme Court would likely apply federal common law immunity principles to the state law claims at hand. However, the court acknowledged potential nuances in Tennessee's common law immunity doctrine that remain unaddressed. It recommended that the district court, upon remand, consider whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). If the district court decides to exercise jurisdiction, it must ascertain the applicable immunities under Tennessee law relevant to those claims. In a separate but related matter, the Cooper plaintiffs sought a prospective injunction against District Attorney General William Gibbons and others to prevent actions that might inhibit their businesses without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The district court abstained from granting this injunction based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which encourages federal courts to refrain from intervening in ongoing state proceedings that involve significant state interests. The elements for Younger abstention are: (1) pending state proceedings, (2) involvement of an important state interest, and (3) provision of an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise constitutional claims in state court. The court found uncertainty regarding whether state criminal proceedings were pending at the time Cooper filed his federal complaint, as District Attorney Gibbons had nonsuited a related nuisance action. The court remanded the case to the district court to clarify if any state criminal proceedings existed when Cooper filed his complaint, acknowledging that if such proceedings were pending, they likely involved significant state interests. The district court recognized the state's significant interest in combating prostitution, illegal obscene performances, and safeguarding minors, as well as regulating obscene materials. Cooper was indicted under statutes aimed at public health and safety, aligning with precedents that support state interests in preventing crime and disease, such as the case of DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga. For Younger abstention to apply, there must be pending state prosecutions and an opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in those proceedings. In this case, the opportunity to raise constitutional claims hinges on whether District Attorney General Gibbons included nuisance charges in the ongoing state criminal proceedings at the time Cooper filed his federal complaint. If these charges were included, Cooper could have raised his constitutional issues during those proceedings. Tennessee case law supports the notion that constitutional questions may be raised at any stage of a criminal trial. The district court is instructed to verify if the nuisance charges were part of the state criminal proceedings. If not included, it should then evaluate the merits of Cooper's request for injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of federal claims against certain defendants, reversed the dismissal of claims against Parrish, and ordered remand for further proceedings. It also reversed the dismissal of state law claims against all defendants and vacated the dismissal of claims for injunctive relief based on Younger abstention, directing remand for further proceedings. Cullbreath is cited as an authority on Tennessee law, and the court does not examine whether Parrish can claim proper appointment as a "Special" Assistant District Attorney post-Cullbreath. A private party collaborating with state officials to infringe upon constitutional rights is classified as a state actor and is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if not eligible for qualified immunity. The rationale for qualified immunity does not apply to non-public officials. The record lacks evidence, apart from indictments returned against Cooper on December 10, 1996, indicating that criminal proceedings were underway when Cooper filed his federal complaint on July 11, 1997. As these indictments might have been dismissed prior to the filing, it remains unclear whether the first Younger requirement has been satisfied.