Jefri Aalmuhammed v. Spike Lee Forty Acres and a Mule Filmworks, Inc. By Any Means Necessary Cinema, Inc. Warner Brothers, a Division of Time-Warner Entertainment Lp Victor Company of Japan Limited Largo International N v. Largo Entertainment, Inc. Jcv Entertainment, Inc.

Citation: 202 F.3d 1227Docket: 99-55224

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 3, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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In the copyright case 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000), Jefri Aalmuhammed appeals against Spike Lee and several film production companies regarding his claim of coauthorship for the movie "Malcolm X." The Ninth Circuit Court rejects Aalmuhammed's claim for "joint work" but allows for further proceedings on a quantum meruit claim. Aalmuhammed, a knowledgeable individual about Malcolm X and Islam, was engaged by Denzel Washington to assist in preparing for his role in the film. His significant contributions included script revisions for accuracy, directing actors, creating new scenes, translating Arabic, and editing during post-production. Despite these efforts, Aalmuhammed had no formal contract with the producers and only received limited compensation. He sought writing credit but was labeled merely as an "Islamic Technical Consultant." After the film's release, Aalmuhammed applied for copyright claiming co-creator status, receiving a registration certificate though it conflicted with prior registrations.

On November 17, 1995, Aalmuhammed initiated a lawsuit against Spike Lee, his production entities, Warner Brothers, Largo International and Entertainment, and Victor Company and JVC Entertainment, seeking declaratory relief and accounting under the Copyright Act. The complaint included allegations of breach of implied contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition claims under both federal and state law. The district court dismissed several claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment on others.

Aalmuhammed asserted that he was a co-author of the film Malcolm X, seeking a declaratory judgment and accounting for profits, claiming authorship of the entire work rather than just his contributions. The district court ruled against his copyright claims, which the defendants argued were barred by the statute of limitations. The court noted that authorship claims must be filed within three years of the claim accruing, which occurs upon creation rather than infringement. The movie credits clearly denied Aalmuhammed's authorship, listing him as an "Islamic technical consultant," but this occurred less than three years before his lawsuit. A genuine issue of fact remained regarding whether authorship had been repudiated prior to that time.

Aalmuhammed contended that he had previously discussed his claim to credit with a Warner Brothers executive, whose response did not constitute an express repudiation of authorship. The discussion left the authorship question open, and thus there was a genuine factual dispute regarding the limitations bar. 

To qualify as a "joint work" under the Copyright Act, there must be a copyrightable work, two or more authors, and an intention for their contributions to be merged into a cohesive whole. The court recognized that Malcolm X is copyrightable and that all parties intended it to be a unified work. Aalmuhammed's substantial contributions included technical help and script modifications, which he argued established his authorship of a joint work.

Speaking Arabic to mosque officials does not constitute a copyrightable contribution to a film. For contributions to be copyrightable, they must be expressed in a form eligible for copyright. Aalmuhammed has presented evidence of rewriting specific dialogue and creating scenes related to Malcolm X's Hajj pilgrimage, which, if accepted, would be independently copyrightable works. This establishes a genuine factual dispute regarding his potential copyrightable contributions. However, while Aalmuhammed demonstrated substantial contributions, he did not conclusively prove he was an "author" of the work under the statutory definition of a "joint work" as outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which requires two or more authors. The concept of authorship traditionally refers to a singular creator, making it challenging to assign authorship in collaborative works, such as films. Various roles, including producers, directors, and screenwriters, can influence the determination of authorship, with different theories suggesting that control over the creative process may define the author. In complex works like movies, the term "author" may encompass multiple contributors, complicating the attribution of authorship without clear contractual agreements.

The Supreme Court's ruling in *Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony* established that the author of a photograph is the photographer, defined as the individual who arranges and captures the image. This definition emphasizes that an "author" is the originator and the one who supervises the creative process, aligning with the Founding Fathers' understanding of the term in the Constitution. In contrast, the determination of what constitutes a copyrightable work was addressed in *Feist Publications*, which requires only "some minimal level of creativity" or "originality." However, this criterion is too broad for establishing authorship in collaborative works like films, where many contributors can claim significant creative input. Instead, *Burrow-Giles* sets a higher standard for authorship, limiting it to those with artistic control, typically found among the top credits—producers, directors, or screenwriters.

The Second and Seventh Circuits support this interpretation, asserting that mere contribution of copyrightable material does not confer authorship in joint works. They require proof of mutual intent to be joint authors, considering factors such as decision-making authority and how the individuals present themselves. The decisions from these circuits align with the principles established in *Burrow-Giles*, reinforcing the need for a clear definition of authorship beyond mere contribution.

In Thomson v. Larson, an off-Broadway playwright, who insisted on sole authorship of a modern version of La Boheme, hired a dramaturg for assistance, agreeing to credit her as "dramaturg," but not as a co-author. Following the playwright's death just before the success of Rent, the dramaturg sued his estate for a declaratory judgment claiming joint authorship. The Second Circuit ruled against her, emphasizing that she had no decision-making authority, was not billed as a co-author, and that the playwright acted as the sole author in all contracts. The court determined there was no intent for joint authorship, citing factors that indicate co-authorship: control over the work, objective manifestations of shared intent, and the inability to appraise individual contributions to the work's success. Control was deemed the most crucial factor. The court compared the case to Aalmuhammed's situation with Spike Lee, noting that Aalmuhammed lacked superintendence over the work, with Lee maintaining control. Additionally, no objective indications of co-authorship were made by any party, including contractual agreements that explicitly defined authorship roles. Ultimately, the absence of control and indications of intent to co-author led to the conclusion that Aalmuhammed had no claim to co-authorship.

Aalmuhammed failed to provide evidence that he was the principal creator of the movie in question. While he had authored a lesser-known documentary about Malcolm X, his contributions to this film, made under Spike Lee's supervision, do not qualify him for co-authorship of a joint work. The legal definition of "authors," as aligned with the Constitution's promotion of knowledge and arts, necessitates that creators can seek and incorporate input from others without losing sole ownership. A broader definition of authorship could lead to numerous individuals claiming rights based on substantial contributions, thereby undermining the original author's copyright status. 

Aalmuhammed contended that a copyright registration certificate implied ownership; however, such a presumption can be challenged by evidence. During litigation, the Copyright Office noted conflicts with prior registration claims, indicating that Warner Brothers did not intend to share ownership with Aalmuhammed. Consequently, the district court found no genuine issue of fact regarding Aalmuhammed's claim to co-authorship and granted summary judgment against him.

Regarding quantum meruit, Aalmuhammed alleged that he provided valuable services, including script material for key Islamic scenes, coordinating with mosque authorities, and teaching actors Islamic practices, without receiving adequate compensation. These contributions were deemed critical to the film’s narrative, transforming it from a tale of hate to one enriched by Islamic themes.

All services related to the claims were performed in New York and Egypt, where specific scenes were filmed. Aalmuhammed's claims of quasi-contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment differ from his authorship claim, although he contributed significantly to the film. There was potential for the producer or director to have a duty to formalize Aalmuhammed's role as either an employee or independent contractor, but this matter is not under review. The focus is on the applicable statute of limitations. Defendants sought to dismiss the claims based on California's two-year statute, while Aalmuhammed argued for New York's six-year statute. The district court agreed with the defendants, applying California law. However, it was determined that New York's interest in applying its statute is stronger than California's, as New York has a more significant connection to Aalmuhammed's claims. Consequently, New York's six-year statute of limitations governs, and since the claims were filed within this period, the dismissal of Aalmuhammed's claims is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, Aalmuhammed alleged unfair competition, claiming his contributions were misattributed in violation of the Lanham Act and California law, which will also be reviewed de novo based on the complaint's allegations.

Failure to provide appropriate credit for a film can constitute "reverse palming off" under the Lanham Act in certain circumstances. Claims under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are generally aligned with those under the Lanham Act. The defendants contended that Aalmuhammed's script was not used sufficiently verbatim to support a violation; however, this argument pertains to evidence rather than the sufficiency of the complaint itself, which alleges substantial rewriting and extensive use of Aalmuhammed's work. The court did not need to resolve whether Aalmuhammed had a genuine issue of unfair competition, as the case had not proceeded to summary judgment. 

The district court's dismissal of claims against the Largo defendants, based on extraterritoriality and the precedent set in Subafilms, was also reversed. The complaint did not clarify if the defendants' actions occurred outside the U.S., although they were referred to as "the film's foreign distributors." Their principal place of business being in California raises the possibility of activities conducted within the U.S. The ruling affirms part of the lower court's decision while reversing and remanding part of it, with each party responsible for their own costs. The case was deemed suitable for decision without oral argument.

The referenced legal opinions include key cases that shape copyright law and restitution principles. The U.S. Supreme Court case Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), emphasizes that mere facts cannot be copyrighted, underscoring the necessity of originality in copyright claims. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), reiterates the importance of originality and the protection of artistic works. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 1998), further develops these concepts by addressing how an idea, when voluntarily submitted to a defendant who benefits from it without an express agreement, may allow the plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of that idea under contract law.

Additional references discuss potential remedies available to plaintiffs under various statutes, including the U.S. Code and California Business and Professions Code, regarding unfair competition and restitution. Notable cases like Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris, Krauss, and others illustrate the application of these principles in different contexts, particularly when there are claims of unjust enrichment or the use of ideas without compensation. The legal landscape encapsulated by these cases reveals a nuanced understanding of intellectual property rights, restitution claims, and the implications of voluntary idea submission in economic transactions.