Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 28, 2017; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Donna "Renee" Watts appeals a trial court's judgment that denied her request to revoke an inter vivos donation of immovable property to her ex-husband, Sonny. After their divorce, Renee was awarded the house on Marilyn Lane, which later became their matrimonial domicile upon their remarriage on December 6, 2006. Renee donated the house to Sonny on September 4, 2009. Following the filing of divorce proceedings by Sonny in 2015, Renee sought to revoke the donation, citing ingratitude, even as both continued to reside in the home.
In the course of the divorce proceedings, Sonny asserted the residence as his separate property due to the donation and sought to evict Renee. The trial court ruled in favor of Sonny, prompting Renee to file for a new trial and amend her revocation petition to include the court's judgment as an act of ingratitude.
During a hearing on her revocation claim, Renee alleged the donation was invalid due to non-compliance with Louisiana Civil Code Article 1747, which mandates that interspousal donations be executed in an authentic form, signed simultaneously at the same location by both parties. The trial court, however, concluded that despite the lack of evidence showing the signing occurred simultaneously and in the same place, the donation was not rendered null and void. Consequently, the court denied her request to revoke the donation, and Renee subsequently appealed the decision.
Article 1747 must be interpreted alongside related provisions in the Civil Code regarding inter vivos interspousal donations, particularly La. C.C. art. 1744, which states that donations made in contemplation of marriage must comply with specific regulations. Renee's donation of the Marilyn Lane residence to Sonny, made in consideration of their marriage but not following Article 1747, falls under general donation rules. Per La. C.C. art. 1541, such donations require an authentic act; despite Renee's earlier challenges to the act's legitimacy, she did not contest its validity on appeal, affirming the trial court's decision that the donation was properly executed.
Regarding property classification, Renee argues that the donation, executed during their marriage, presumes the Marilyn Lane residence as community property. She claims the donation does not explicitly designate the property as Sonny's separate property, thus contesting the trial court's classification. Under La. C.C. art. 2343.1, a transfer to a spouse can convert separate property to community property if stated as such, but the September 4, 2009 donation was made through an authentic act. The donation's language indicates Renee irrevocably gifted the property to Sonny with legal warranties, and both spouses' testimonies supported that the donation aimed to secure a home for Sonny after her death, although their interpretations of Renee's intent regarding property ownership differed. The presumption of community property can be rebutted, with the burden of proof on the spouse claiming separate property, and the trial court's determination on property classification is reviewed under a standard that respects factual findings.
Sonny stated that from 2009, when the donation of the Marilyn Lane residence was executed, until 2015, when he filed for divorce, Renee never expressed a desire to alter the donation terms. He filed for divorce due to Renee's threats to evict him from the house, which was in his name. The trial court classified the Marilyn Lane residence as Sonny's separate property, finding no error in this classification based on Sonny's assertion that the property was "in his name" and the donation's clear language stating that Renee irrevocably donated the residence to Sonny and his heirs.
Renee argued for the revocation of the donation due to Sonny's alleged ingratitude, citing his divorce filing, eviction judgment, refusal of voluntary revocation, threats of violence, and disparaging remarks about her family. Generally, donations are irrevocable unless the donee commits grievous injuries toward the donor. The trial court's assessment of whether Sonny's actions constituted grievous injury was factual and not found to be manifestly erroneous. The court concluded that Sonny's actions, including seeking a divorce, did not amount to grievous injury warranting revocation of the donation, and there were no precedents supporting revocation based solely on a divorce pursuit. Thus, the trial court's ruling that Sonny's actions did not demonstrate sufficient injury to justify revocation of the donation was reasonable.
Refusal to consent to the revocation of a donation can be considered a grievous injury, but only in specific cases as established in Perry v. Perry. However, no Louisiana court has applied this principle subsequently, leading to the trial court's conclusion that Sonny's decision not to revoke Renee's donation did not constitute a grievous injury. In addressing Renee's claims about Sonny's remarks, Sonny denied making threats and clarified that his statement about no longer loving Renee was related to his intention to divorce. Though he acknowledged being upset with Renee’s daughter and suggested he might reveal information about her, he claimed this was merely venting and he would not act on it. Therefore, the trial court reasonably determined that Sonny's comments did not amount to grievous injury warranting donation revocation.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed, with appeal costs assigned to appellant Donna Renee Watts. Although Renee's separate property was used to build the Marilyn Lane residence, Sonny also contributed. The trial court's judgment contained both its reasoning and the decision, which is technically improper but does not invalidate the judgment. The court found the donation valid but did not explicitly classify the Marilyn Lane residence as community property. Instead, it implied that the property belonged to Sonny. Renee's earlier motions concerning the classification of the property were considered in this appeal, and the rejection of her motion for a new trial indicates the trial court's denial of her claim regarding community property status. As such, the classification issue is part of the current appeal process.
The court in Hill v. TMR Exploration, Inc. ruled that the denial of a motion for new trial is an interlocutory and non-appealable judgment; however, if an appellant's brief indicates an intention to appeal the merits, the appeal may be treated accordingly. The donation in question involved a specific tract of land in Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana, described in detail. Renee argued that the use of "donees" created ambiguity, suggesting the donation was intended for both her and Sonny. However, the donation later explicitly identified Sonny and his heirs as the sole donee. The court determined that the plural term was likely a typographical error and concluded, after considering parol evidence, that the donation was irrevocably intended for Sonny as his separate property. The trial court's findings were deemed not manifestly erroneous, thus affirming its decision.
