Samuel Appiah v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Docket: 97-1705
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; January 20, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
Samuel Appiah, a Ghanaian citizen residing illegally in the U.S., petitioned for suspension of deportation, which necessitates showing continuous physical presence in the U.S. for seven years. His deportation proceedings coincided with the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which introduced a "stop-time" rule affecting how continuous presence is calculated. Appiah argued that retroactive application of this rule would violate his due process and equal protection rights. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his claims, noting that he did not meet the seven-year requirement under the new rule. Appiah's unauthorized stay in the U.S. began after he overstayed his student visa, and although he married an American citizen in 1993, the marriage petition was later withdrawn. The immigration judge denied his request for suspension, citing insufficient evidence of extreme hardship and questioning the legitimacy of his marriage. The BIA upheld the immigration judge's decision, leading Appiah to seek judicial review. The court ultimately affirmed the BIA's ruling, confirming that Appiah had not accrued the necessary continuous presence to qualify for relief.
Prior to 1996, the Attorney General had the authority to grant suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the INA, requiring aliens to be physically present in the U.S. for at least seven continuous years before applying. Time spent in deportation proceedings counted towards this presence, but meeting the requirements did not guarantee suspension, as it was subject to the Attorney General's discretion. The 1996 IIRIRA significantly changed this landscape by repealing the suspension provision and introducing "cancellation of removal" under INA section 240A. It altered the initiation of deportation proceedings from "orders to show cause" to "notices to appear" and implemented a "stop-time" rule, ending the period of continuous residence or physical presence once an alien received a notice to appear.
IIRIRA's amendments generally did not apply to those in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997, but the transitional rule established that the stop-time rule applied to all notices to appear issued regardless of the enactment date. The BIA interpreted the new rule to include prior "orders to show cause," disqualifying aliens from suspension if they did not meet the continuous physical presence requirement before their proceedings began. Although the Attorney General vacated this BIA decision for review, it was never conducted, as Congress enacted NACARA in 1997, which amended the stop-time rule to replace "notices to appear" with "orders to show cause" and exempted certain nationalities from the new rules. The BIA later confirmed that the stop-time rule applied to all pending deportation cases, except for those exempted by NACARA. This legal framework sets the stage for evaluating Appiah's claims.
Appiah argues that the new stop-time rule should not impact his eligibility for suspension of deportation, claiming it would apply the law retroactively in an impermissible manner, violating his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The analysis begins with the statutory challenge, referencing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, which instructs that if Congress has clearly defined a statute's reach, further analysis is unnecessary. In this instance, Congress explicitly stated that the stop-time rule applies to pending deportation proceedings, as indicated by IIRIRA and NACARA. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this in Tefel v. Reno, clarifying that the rule applies to aliens facing deportation before and after IIRIRA's enactment, countering any notion that it applies solely to post-IIRIRA cases.
Other courts have similarly interpreted analogous immigration statutes as clear in their language, establishing that Congress intended retroactive application. Even if the statute's language were ambiguous, the stop-time rule does not retroactively affect rights because it only modifies Appiah's eligibility for discretionary relief, an inherently non-rightful matter. The Court in Landgraf noted that disappointment in expectations does not equate to retroactive application. Appiah's anticipation of suspension does not constitute a legal right to relief, reinforcing that hope for reprieve is not a basis for entitlement under the law.
Appiah's due process and equal protection claims are dismissed on the grounds that illegal aliens lack a vested right against deportation, and the statutory provisions in question meet the rational basis standard. The Fifth Amendment prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process, and the Supreme Court has affirmed equal protection under this amendment. However, Appiah has not provided sufficient justification for a more rigorous review of his claims. As an illegal alien, he does not possess the right to remain in the U.S., nor is eligibility for suspension of deportation a constitutional right; it is considered an "act of grace" at the Attorney General's discretion, which does not establish a protected interest.
Judicial review in immigration matters is limited, with the Supreme Court recognizing the government's authority to expel or exclude aliens as largely immune from judicial oversight. The constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection do not constrain the federal government's immigration regulation powers. The stop-time rule, which aims to prevent aliens from delaying deportation proceedings to gain eligibility for suspension, is deemed rationally based on Congress's intent to eliminate such incentives for delay.
Appiah's argument that NACARA improperly established special classes of suspension applicants is also rejected. Under IIRIRA section 309(c)(5)(C), certain aliens can still accrue time towards continuous residence after being served an order to show cause, which differentiates based on national origin. However, strict scrutiny is not applicable, as Congress retains the authority to favor certain nationalities in immigration law, allowing for discriminatory practices in this context.
NACARA is constitutionally sound, as it was established in response to the U.S. government's encouragement for Nicaraguans and Cubans to stay in the country and to provide special protections for certain Central American and Eastern European groups. This legislation aims to remedy the IIRIRA's alterations that could adversely affect many Central Americans who sought refuge due to war and oppression, preserving prior commitments to these groups. Congress specifically targeted certain nationalities, and the court refuses to alter this legislative compromise.
The new stop-time rule is applicable to Appiah's deportation proceedings, as he received an order to show cause before completing seven years of continuous physical presence, rendering him ineligible for suspension of deportation. Consequently, the petition for review is denied, and the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision is affirmed. The case does not contest other statutory requirements, which include demonstrating good moral character and proving that deportation would cause extreme hardship to the alien or to a qualifying family member.
