United States v. Daniel J. Balint and James A. Ketchum

Citations: 201 F.3d 928; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 241; 2000 WL 15013Docket: 98-3130, 98-3143

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 11, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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At 5:30 a.m. on September 29, 1994, a brown Plymouth blocked the entrance to the Wisconsin Women's Health Care Center in Milwaukee, containing defendants James Ketchum and Michael Skott in a welded steel cage, while defendant Daniel Balint was secured in a steel box with his body extending outside the vehicle. A blue Chevrolet at the rear held Robert Stambaugh, whose neck was locked in a steel collar attached to a welded pipe on a clothes dryer, and George Wilson, who was similarly restrained. Robert Braun was also in the back seat, with his arm fixed to a welded pipe. Due to the restraints, police could not move the vehicles, necessitating the intervention of 27 firefighters with power tools to extricate the individuals, which took four hours and resulted in the cancellation of twelve patients' appointments for reproductive health services.

The six men were charged under 18 U.S.C. sec. 248(a)(1), the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (Access Act), which carries penalties of up to six months in prison or a $10,000 fine. Defendants Balint and Skott opted for a bench trial before a magistrate, while Wilson, Ketchum, Stambaugh, and Braun sought a jury trial before a district judge. District Judge Rudolph T. Randa later ordered all defendants to be tried together in the district court and denied the jury trial request initially granted by Magistrate Judge Aaron Goodstein. 

Several motions to dismiss were filed, with Balint and Ketchum arguing that the Access Act was unconstitutionally vague and beyond Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Judge Randa initially granted the motion to dismiss, citing a lack of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but this decision was reversed in United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), leading to the setting of a trial date. Subsequently, Judge Randa also overturned the prior jury trial ruling, prompting Ketchum to appeal the denial of a jury trial.

At the bench trial, defendants, including Balint, admitted to constructing a blockade in opposition to abortion, citing a commitment to saving 'pre-born babies.' Balint contended that the government did not adequately demonstrate the necessary motive for a violation of the Access Act and claimed the Act was unconstitutionally vague, failing to provide sufficient notice of potential prosecution. The court found all six defendants guilty on April 30, 1997. In August 1998, Balint and Ketchum were sentenced to time served and a $10 assessment, and all six defendants were ordered to pay $1,759.04 in restitution to Milwaukee for the firefighters’ rescue operation, made jointly and severally liable. Skott paid the restitution in full on April 3, 1999, leading to the release of liens against Balint and Ketchum. Both defendants are appealing the restitution order. 

Ketchum challenges the denial of a jury trial, while Balint argues his conviction is unsupported by sufficient evidence regarding illegal motive and that the Access Act is unconstitutionally vague. Ketchum aligns with Balint's arguments in his appeal. 

The Access Act prohibits using force or obstruction to interfere with individuals seeking reproductive health services, requiring proof of three elements: the use of force, intentional interference, and a motive linked to the provision or receipt of such services. The court confirmed the defendants' obstruction of the clinic and their intent to prevent access. Balint concedes the first two elements but argues that the government failed to prove the necessary motive linking his actions to the obstruction of individuals seeking reproductive health services. The judge interpreted the defendants' stated motive of protecting pre-born babies as an admission of a motive that the statute prohibits, implying that Balint was motivated by the anticipated occurrence of abortions on the blockade day.

Balint contends that the statute's wording links criminal liability solely to interference related to current or past abortion services, asserting that attempts to hinder future services are not prohibited. He argues that Congress intended to criminalize interference only when abortions were occurring at the time of protest, as indicated by the phrase "is obtaining or providing" in 18 U.S.C. sec. 248(a)(1). Balint claims that without an abortion in progress when protests occur, his actions lack the necessary intent. 

Statutory interpretation begins with the text, which must be enforced as written if its meaning is clear. The plain meaning prevails unless its literal application contradicts the drafters' intentions. Interpretation considers the entire statute's language, purpose, and policy, allowing for a restricted meaning to avoid absurd outcomes. Balint's argument hinges on the present tense usage, suggesting it confines criminalization to simultaneous actions. However, the government critiques this as overly technical, and the Supreme Court emphasizes the significance of verb tense in statutory construction. The present tense can denote both immediate and ongoing actions. Thus, the statute's language likely prohibits interference related not just to abortions in progress but also to those occurring on a recurring basis.

Section 248(a)(1) prohibits interference with the provision of reproductive health services, encompassing actions motivated by past, present, or future service provision. The law explicitly protects individuals seeking or providing these services, indicating Congress's intent to prevent obstruction regardless of the timing. The act of intimidation is inherently future-focused, contrasting with the broader scope of interference, which includes current activities. The statute's language, particularly "is obtaining or providing," signals ongoing service provision, and a narrow interpretation would yield absurd outcomes, such as allowing interference simply due to timing. 

In reviewing the application of the statute to Balint, the court assesses evidence favorably towards the prosecution, determining whether a rational fact-finder could establish the crime's essential elements. The trial court found sufficient evidence that Balint interfered with the Wisconsin Women's Health Care Center driven by motives related to the clinic's ongoing provision of abortion services. Balint's defense argues that the Access Act's vagueness violates due process by failing to provide fair warning of prohibited conduct; however, the magistrate judge previously dismissed this motion, and the trial court did not address it at trial. The legal standard for this vagueness claim is reviewed de novo.

Balint's due process 'fair warning' challenge is based on the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Lanier, which establishes that a criminal defendant has a right to clear notice that their behavior is illegal. The 'fair warning' requirement applies in three scenarios: (1) if a statute is vague, making it difficult for individuals to understand its meaning; (2) if a criminal statute is ambiguous, necessitating strict interpretation in favor of the defendant; and (3) when a court uses a new interpretation of a statute that was not previously clear. Balint argues that the Access Act is problematic under all three contexts, particularly claiming vagueness regarding its motive element.

However, vagueness must first be established to support a 'fair warning' challenge. A statute is deemed unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable indication of what is prohibited. The Access Act has survived various vagueness challenges, and Balint does not clarify how his argument differs from those previously dismissed. The court finds the statute clear in its present progressive language, which prohibits interference with abortion services regardless of when such services occur. 

In Lanier, the Supreme Court concluded that constitutional issues do not arise when an accused is charged under clearly defined laws. The Access Act explicitly protects abortion providers and their clients, making its language unambiguous. Balint's actions, initiating illegal conduct before the clinic opened, do not render the statute vague, as it clearly prohibits interference with ongoing and future abortion-related activities.

Balint argues that the statute in question, while not unconstitutional, is vague enough to invoke the rule of lenity, necessitating a narrower interpretation of the law against him. However, the rule applies only when there are competing interpretations of what constitutes a crime. Normal statutory construction methods can resolve any ambiguities, and the statute clearly criminalizes interference with abortion services, making the rule of lenity inapplicable. 

Balint also claims that a ruling against him would be "novel," infringing upon his due process rights, as it would be the first court interpretation of the motive element of the Access Act. The court counters that due process does not protect defendants from clarifications of statutory meaning that are not unpredictable shifts in the law. The statute was clear enough to inform Balint of the criminality of his actions in 1994.

Ketchum contests his conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds, asserting that he was denied a jury trial. His offense, classified as a first-time, nonviolent violation of the Access Act, was deemed "petty," for which the right to a jury trial does not apply, as established in past Supreme Court rulings. The court cites its previous decision in United States v. Soderna, confirming that such an offense is not serious enough to warrant a jury trial.

Lastly, both Ketchum and Balint challenge a district judge's restitution order requiring all defendants to jointly pay the City of Milwaukee for expenses incurred from dismantling auto blockades. However, this issue is rendered moot since codefendant Michael Skott has already paid the restitution in full.

A case is deemed moot when the court can provide no relief that would benefit the party seeking it, as established in legal precedent. A live controversy may become moot on appeal due to an intervening event, such as Skott's full payment of restitution. Even if the trial court made an error in ordering the original defendants to repay the city, acknowledging such an error would not benefit Balint and Ketchum since their obligation has been removed by Skott's payment. The court cannot require the City to issue a refund to Balint and Ketchum for money already paid by Skott. While payment of litigation sanctions can allow for refunds, this case is governed by the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), which treats restitution orders similarly to civil judgments. Under the VWPA, if a codefendant fulfills a judgment, any appeals regarding that judgment become moot between the plaintiff and remaining defendants. Consequently, since Skott satisfied the restitution order, the appeal by the other codefendants is rendered moot.

Balint's interpretation of the Access Act's motive requirement is rejected, with the court finding sufficient evidence for the requisite motive. His claims that the Access Act is vague and did not provide adequate notice of the likelihood of arrest are also dismissed. The court reaffirms its previous decision in Soderna, thereby upholding the trial court's denial of a jury trial for Ketchum. Additionally, the challenge to the restitution order is not reviewed, as the full payment made to the City of Milwaukee eliminates any ongoing controversy regarding that issue. Consequently, the district court's convictions of Balint and Ketchum, along with the denial of Ketchum's jury trial, are affirmed, while the appeal concerning the restitution order is dismissed. The document notes that the mootness doctrine applies, as a case or controversy must exist throughout litigation, thus rendering any potential future civil suits by third parties irrelevant to this appeal.